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ABSTRACT 




Chair: Ronald F. Inglehart 
 
 
The dissertation is based on the premise that culture affects individuals’ political 
attitude and behavior via internalized cultural values and as “human-made” environments 
under which they think and act. It specifies culture as individualism and collectivism, 
which have been widely studied as the central organizing dimensions of culture. The 
constructs have also been advanced as crucial to the scientific study of culture.  
The analysis draws on the limits and achievements of two theoretical frameworks: 
political culture and culture-oriented psychology. The political culture approach has been 
proposed to provide a unifying theoretical framework that bridges the gap between 
micro- and macro- level analysis. Existing empirical political culture literature, however, 
shows that the aggregate level analysis has been the dominant approach to the study of 
political culture. The alternative, culture oriented psychology has provided the ways to 
analyze how culture affects an individual’s psychology but the effort to identify the 
cultural effects on political attitude and behavior has been largely absent. 
 ix 
Thus, the empirical analysis of this dissertation attempts to identify the cultural 
effects of individualism and collectivism on the individual’s political attitude and 
behavior while disentangling the individual and national level effects based on multilevel 
modeling. It uses the five waves (1981-2007) of the World Values Survey for thirty 
OECD member countries and attempts to establish a stronger case for the external 
validity of the findings. 
The analysis finds that in general individualism and collectivism matter both for 
the elements of civic culture/social capital and for political responsibility attribution. The 
significant cultural effects show up either at one level or at both: Individualism affects 
trust, tolerance, membership, and political participation positively while collectivism 
affects these civic culture/social capital variables negatively. In contrast, individualism 
affects national pride and political interest negatively while collectivism affects them 
positively. Individualistic cultures as well as collectivism at both levels affect subjective 
well-being positively. Furthermore, it finds that individualism enhances consideration of 
personal responsibility while collectivism facilitates consideration of government 
responsibility for maintaining basic personal welfare.  
The dissertation concludes with discussion of the substantive implications of the 





In comparative politics, we need a theoretical framework that facilitates 
meaningful comparisons of politics across countries. Students of political science have 
advanced attitudinal or behavioral, institutional, and cultural frameworks to this end. 
Except for the cultural approach, however, there is a significant theoretical disjuncture 
that might hinder identifying the implications of individual, micro-level findings for 
aggregate, macro-level analysis or vice versa. In other words, we have done the division 
of labor under both macro-level analyses and micro-level ones for a long time. This has 
led to successes in developing sophisticated theories based on empirical findings at each 
level of analysis. However, the gap between these two levels needs to be bridged to reap 
the fruits of such specialization. The dissertation proposes that the cultural approach 
answer the call. 
Indeed, the study of political culture has aspired to bridge the gap between these 
two major approaches in comparative politics since Almond and Verba’s pioneering 
work: 
 
[this] relationship between attitudes and motivations of the discrete 
individuals who make up political systems and the character and 
performance of political systems may be discovered systematically 
through the concepts of political culture.. the connecting link between 
micropolitics and macropolitics is political culture” (1963, 32). 
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Lipset also emphasized the role of the political culture approach in bridging “a 
growing gap in the behavioral approach in political science between the level of 
microanalysis based on psychological interpretations of the individual’s political 
behavior and the level of macroanalysis based on the variables common to political 
sociology” (1965, 8).  
Culture-oriented psychologists have also recognized the need and attempted to 
develop integrative frameworks that should help the similar efforts in comparative 
politics. For example, they have examined cultural implications for individual’s 
psychology and proposed unifying theoretical frameworks (e.g., Nisbett’ sociocognitive 
system, Georgas’ ecocultural framework, and Oyserman’s socially contextualized model 
of cultural influences).1
The integrative efforts of the cultural approach do not claim cultural determinism 
as alternative to both the micro- and macro-level approaches. In fact, the cultural 
approach denies any determinism that might be built into those alternative frameworks 
while establishing culture as interdependent system of cause. Culture or belief systems 
are not viewed as mere consequences of economic, social changes and political processes 
as suggested by Barry (1978) and Pateman (1980) but shown to shape socioeconomic 
conditions and are shaped by them, in reciprocal fashion (Almond and Verba 1963; 
Almond 1980; Inglehart 1990 and 1997; Harrison and Huntington 2001). 
 
However, the cultural approach has its own drawbacks: First, culture, the key 
concept of cultural analysis, is the point of contention. It has been used as a conceptual 
umbrella covering collective or shared attitudes, mass beliefs, emotions, meanings, values, 
                                                 
1 For a review of each framework, see Nisbett (2001), Georgas (2004), and Oyserman et al. (2002b). 
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ideology, and so on. Besides this conceptual ambiguity is the question of what constitutes 
“political” in political culture, the key concept of cultural framework in comparative 
politics.2
My dissertation begins with the recognition of these limits as well as the 
advantages of the integrative cultural approach, which is much need in the field of 
comparative politics. It will first review the previous works of political culture and 
political psychology in order to establish why students of political culture need to 
introduce such cultural frames as individualism and collectivism and how we can take 
advantage of achievements of cross-cultural psychology, in the study of the cultural 
 Thus, cultural analysis has been vulnerable to criticism of either tautology, i.e., 
culture explains culture (Jackman 1987) or “deus ex machina,” i.e., cultural factors are 
often introduced as a post hoc explanation (Hall 1986; Eckstein 1988; Street 1993). 
Second, as related to the conceptual ambiguity, cultural analysis has yet to settle on an 
operational definition of constituent variables of political culture (Lane 1992; Reisinger 
1995). In other words, we have yet to answer the question of “how do I know one when I 
see one?” about the variables we use in cultural studies (Ross 1997, 61). Third, a causal 
linkage has yet to be established between culture and individuals. Culture has been 
typically defined as an attribute of collective entities such as groups, countries, or 
civilizations. Hence, the descriptions and explanations of cultural framework have often 
been made at aggregate or macro-level – for example, classificatory studies about cultural 
differences across countries and “clash of civilization” (Huntington 1996) – and have yet 
to specify the implications of culture for psychology and behavior of individuals, who 
make up, share, and are constrained by, culture. 
                                                 
2 For extensive review of conceptual problems of political culture, see Patrick (1984) and Reisinger (1995). 
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influence on citizen’s political preference and behavior. Second, the dissertation will 
examine how individualism and collectivism affect the individual’s political attitude and 
behavior while disentangling the effects of the micro-level cultural values from those of 
the macro-level cultural frames and political institution. It draws on the premise that 
culture affects individuals’ political attitude and behavior via internalized cultural values 
and as “human-made” environments under which they think and act. Thus, it aims to 
establish a unified explanatory framework that consists of culture, attitude, behavior, and 
institution, all of which have been key constructs in comparative politics.  
To investigate the implications of individualism and collectivism for individual’s 
political attitude, policy preference, and behavior, I’ll organize the dissertation in the 
following way: 
Chapter II will present a critical review of literature and theory on political culture 
and individualism and collectivism in particular. Chapter III and IV will present 
empirical findings based on a series of multilevel statistical analyses. Specifically, 
Chapter III will present the findings of the implications of individualism and collectivism 
for political interest and behavior as well as for the theory of civic culture and social 
capital in order to contribute to the discussion of the conditions for successful democracy, 
the subject of which has been the main theme in the study of political culture since 
Almond and Verba. Chapter IV will present the implications of individualism and 
collectivism in the domain of political responsibility attribution. In Chapter V, I will 
summarize the findings, discuss the limit of the study, and consider the implications of 




Political Culture and Individualism and Collectivism  
A Theoretical Review 
 
“(P)sychologists have sought basic organizing principles of cultures that could 
move the field beyond both broad generalizations and particularized description and set 
the stage for predictive model building…To date the two constructs that most captured 
popular appeal are individualism and collectivism” (Oyserman and Uskul 2008, 146). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the previous works of political culture 
and political psychology in order to establish why we need to introduce such cultural 
constructs as individualism and collectivism in the scientific study of cultural influences 
on citizens’ political preference and behavior. First, I will critically review select political 
culture literature and propose that the empirical investigation into the implications of 
political culture for the individual level has been largely missing, which needs to be 
addressed. Second, I will examine previous works about individualism and collectivism, 
primarily in cultural and cross-cultural psychology, in order to make a case for how we 
can enrich the study of political culture by taking advantage of interdisciplinary efforts.1
  
 
                                                 
1 The distinction between cross-cultural psychology and cultural psychology is conceptual, reflecting 
contrasting perspectives concerning the role of culture in psychological theory and the goals of culturally 
based research. The former aims to validate the claims to universality of existing psychological theories 
and assess a wider range of environmental effects by using the naturally occurring variation in social 
environments while the latter aims to identify new psychological constructs and theories based on 
interdisciplinary work (Miller 2002). For a further distinction, see Greenfield (2000), and Smith et al. (2006 
Chapter 3). 
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Brief History of the Political Culture Studies 
 
The intellectual interest in political culture is not a modern phenomenon. Since 
Plato and Aristotle, political philosophers have suggested that collective, bonding human 
psyches – e.g., ethos or mores – important for sustaining a political community of any 
form. In a similar vein, the cycle of political change explained in social psychological 
terms appears recurrently well into the nineteenth century. Thus, the general agreement 
that Almond and Verba’s work (1963) is seminal in the study of political culture may be 
attributable to the fact that they made a case for the crucial role of political culture or 
“civic culture” to be exact, for a successful government drawing on the empirical analysis 
of one of the first large scale comparative surveys (for an overview on the intellectual 
history of political culture theory, see Almond 1980 and 1990).  
The empirical inquiry into political culture has its share of ups and downs since its 
introduction to political science in the 1950s (for a brief overview on the development of 
the empirical political culture studies, see Pye 1972 and 1991; Almond 1990 and 1993, 
Dalton 2000). The initial popularity was largely due to its more scientific, rigorous 
methodological posture, utilizing statistical analysis of survey data gleaned from random 
samples across multiple countries and cultural groups accompanied by sophisticatedly 
constructed interview schedules, among others. This systematic, quantitative approach to 
the study of political culture was a clear breakaway from a psycho-analytical and 
anthropological “reductionism,” which had dominated the field since the turn of the 
century. Thus, political culture studies in the 1960s and the 1970s contributed to 
pioneering modern comparative politics. They aimed to construct generalizable 
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knowledge about an individual’s political attitude and behavior in different political 
regimes based on modern scientific methods and systematic comparisons. 
The initial success of empirical political culture studies was eclipsed by academic 
challenges from the neo-Marxist on the left and rational choice advocates on the right. 
The former disputed the objectivity in general, and criticized Western ethnocentric 
tendencies in particular, of political culture studies. The latter discredited them for their 
atheoretical and frequent post-hoc approach that did not acknowledge its fundamental 
assumption of universal rationality. Rational choice or positive political theory began 
dominating in the discipline of political science in the late 1970s and 1980s while the 
influence of the neo-Marxist criticisms waned to a point of insignificance at least in the 
academic community, which was most likely facilitated by the crisis and eventual demise 
of the communist regime.  
It is no coincidence that the popularity of modern political culture research 
declined in the same decades. However, the original rationale for the study was still valid 
as Reisinger (1995, 331) forcefully summarized by the question: “how can scholars 
satisfactorily explain cross-national differences in politics without attending to the 
subjective orientations of the societies’ members?” By the late 1980s, such prominent 
scholars of political culture as Wildavsky (1987), Eckstein (1988), Inglehart (1988), and 
Almond (1990) had led a reaction to the criticisms and attempted to redress the balance in 
the field that had been dominated by rational choice models and to revive it.  
The signs of the times were also favorable to the movement of “the renaissance of 
culture.” There were a series of historical developments that were not accounted for 
effectively by economic factors alone. The influence of religion and tradition was felt all 
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over the world. Changes in the Catholic Church played a major role in the “third wave” 
of democratization in such traditionally Catholic countries as ones in the Mediterranean 
and Latin America as well as the Philippines, Poland, and Hungary. Muslim 
fundamentalism had become the most important political factor in the Islamic world. One 
cannot explain unprecedented, rapid economic development in East Asia without 
resorting to Confucianism. Moreover, in advanced industrial societies, religion and “post-
materialist” values had been exerting not only a durable but increasing influence on 
electoral behavior while social class voting had declined markedly (Inglehart 1988; 
Huntington 1991; Pye 1997). All these social phenomena cried for a cultural explanation 
and students of political culture responded both with diverse perspectives and with the 
help of new technical and empirical capabilities. 
Inglehart (1990 and 1997) and Inglehart and Baker (2000), for example, first 
empirically reconfirmed the validity of the basic thesis of The Civic Culture and refuted 
economic determinism and “linear” modernization theory. He made a cogent argument 
that political culture is a crucial intervening variable in the long-term relationship 
between economic development and the emergence of mass democracy and that it is a 
central factor in the survival of democracy. Inglehart also observed that advanced 
industrial societies had moved from the “Modernization phase” where traditional and 
survival cultural values are dominant, into a “Postmodernization phase,” where secular-
rational and subjective well-being cultural values are prevalent.2
What makes Inglehart’s works distinguished among modern empirical political 
culture study is the fact that he convincingly established his case based on a body of 
 
                                                 
2 Inglehart (2005) later relabeled subjective well-being with self-expression values. 
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evidence that was much larger than that available to Almond and Verba in terms of the 
number of countries and years covered. His Culture Shift (1990), which focused on 
advanced industrialized democracies, utilized not only the World Values Survey (WVS) 
of twenty five countries, 1981-1982 but also Euro-Barometers of twelve countries, 1970-
1986, and a three nation panel study of the United States, West Germany, and the 
Netherland, 1974-1981. Inglehart verified his findings and extended them to forty three 
societies representing 70 percent of the world’s population over the three decades 1970-
1990, in his Modernizations and Post-Modernization (1997), where he used the two 
waves, 1981 and 1990-1991, of the WVS and the Euro-Barometer surveys from 1970 to 
the 1990s. Inglehart and Baker (2000) reconfirmed the primary author’s previous findings 
based on the three waves of the WVS, which added the 1995-1998 survey and extended 
further to include sixty five societies and 75 percent of the world’s population. 
Putnam (1993 and 2000) is another successor to the tradition of The Civic Culture 
and responsible for the renaissance of the study of political culture in the recent decades. 
His quest for an answer for what it would take to make a good democracy led him to 
examine cultural variations within two countries, Italy (1993) and the United States 
(2000). His answer lied in the theory of social capital or “social networks and the 
associated norms of reciprocity,” which has produced numerous policy as well as 
academic debates since. I will revisit his works in Chapter III. 
Huntington also made a significant contribution to the revival of political culture 
research, especially after the fall of communism. He summarily hypothesized, “In the 
post-Cold war world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, 
political, or economic. They are cultural… the most important groupings of states are no 
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longer the three blocks of the Cold War but rather the world’s seven or eight major 
civilizations” (1996, 21, italics is added).3
Recent political culture research has geared toward more global issues and 
perspectives, armed with even more data sources accumulated over a longer period of 
time across countries (for increased data resources in comparative political behavior, see 
Geer 2004; Kittilson 2007). Harrison and Huntington (2000), for example, gathered for 
the “Cultural Values and Human Progress” symposium prominent experts on such 
diverse topics as the link between values and progress, the universality of values and 
Western “cultural imperialism,” geography and culture, the relationship between culture 
and institutions, and cultural change and asked them to shed light on the question of how 
culture “affects the extent to which and the ways in which societies achieve or fail to 
achieve progress in economic development and political democratization” (Huntington 
2000, xv). According to Harrison (2000), despite the lack of consensus on the topics,
 Although his broad-brush treatment of cultural 
zones and adversarial view based on anecdotal evidence invited much criticism from 
diverse disciplines, it surely enriched the field of political culture by escalating again the 
role of culture in world conflicts as well as in modernization or civilization to a point of 
scholarly contention. 
4
                                                 
3 Huntington (1996, 20) defined civilization identities as culture and cultural identities “at the broadest 
level.” 
 the 
participants agreed that cultural values and attitudes are an important and neglected factor 
in “human progress” and hence called for “a comprehensive theoretical and applied 
research program with the goal of integrating value and attitude change into development 
4 For example, Sachs (2000) argued that culture is an insignificant factor for economic development by 
comparison with geography and climate. 
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policies, planning, and programming in Third World countries and in anti-poverty 
programs in the United States” (xxxii). 
Inglehart has also expanded his lifetime perspective on political culture to “the 
theory of human development”5
In sum, the history of political culture research is as old as the history of 
comparative politics. Since the turn of the century when modern political science began 
to establish itself as an independent academic field, the popularity of political culture 
research as one of the major approaches to understand political behavior across nations 
and cultural zones has waxed and waned. In the recent decades, the political culture 
approach has invited renewed interests with global policy concerns as well as favorable 
research environments. The political culture approach has now been considered one of 
 with the colleagues in psychology as well as in political 
science. He first formulated the theory with Welzel and Klingeman (2003) and elaborated 
on it with “the human development syndrome” with Oyserman (2004) and “the human 
development sequence” with Welzel (2005). His latest co-authored work addressed the 
relationship among development, freedom, and happiness (Inglehart et al. 2008). Based 
on the World Values Surveys among others, which now spans almost three decades and 
covers the majority part of the world, these authors attempt to demonstrate that 
socioeconomic development, emancipative cultural change and democratization 
constitute a coherent syndrome of social progress. This cultural pattern or “human 
development syndrome” as they put it, has been universal in its presence across nations 
and cultural zones and as a whole contributed to broadening human choice and freedom. 
                                                 
5 The authors owed the idea to Amartya Sen. 
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the two viable scientific paradigms along with rational choice theory in political science 
(Wildavsky 1987; Eckstein 1988; Inglehart 1990; Ross 1997; Fuchs 2007). 
 
Bring the Individual Back in Political Culture 
 
There have probably been as many critics as defenders of political culture studies. 
In this dissertation, I will focus only on the aspect of political culture research that has 
motivated my inquiry into psychological implications of political culture. That is, 
existing political culture research, especially in the recent decades, has not paid due 
attention to the implications of political culture for the psychology of the individual 
whose political attitude and belief system constitutes, shapes, and is affected by, political 
culture. I observe that the neglect of the political psychology approach in the study of 
political culture is reflected in the definitions and the subsequent empirical approach 
dominant in the empirical study of political culture. 
 
Psychological Definitions of Political Culture without Psychology 
Culture and its particular type, political culture, have been typically defined and 
studied as a macro-phenomenon.6
                                                 
6 In this dissertation, I do not intend to conceptually distinguish political culture from culture except that 
the former involves political objects and processes while the latter human affairs in general, subsuming the 
former as a field of study. Almond and Verba (1963, 12) made a similar distinction: “We speak of a 
political culture just as we can speak of an economic culture or a religious culture. It is a set of orientations 
toward a special set of social objects and processes.” Therefore, statements about political culture in this 
dissertation also apply to culture in general and vice versa, otherwise noted. For a comprehensive 
conceptual distinction between political culture and culture, see Pye (1965, 8-9) and Verba (1965, 521-525). 
 For example, Elkins and Simeon (1979) advanced that 
political culture is “the property of a collectivity” such as nation, region, class, ethnic 
community, formal organization, and so on. According to the authors, individuals do not 
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have cultures but attitudes, beliefs, and values. They argued that we must develop precise 
means of identifying the culture-bearing unit in different situations in order to refine its 
utility as an explanatory concept beyond a descriptive category. Hofstede concurred by 
claiming that “culture presupposes a collectivity” (2001, 5) and defined it as “the 
collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of 
people from another” (2001, 9) and used similar definitions in his other works including 
the first edition of Culture’s Consequences (1980). He reserved the term “value” and 
“personality” to refer to the comparable concept of culture at the individual level. 
Triandis cited in several works (1995, 1996, and 2001; Triandis and Suh 2002) a 
renowned anthropologist Kluckhohn’s definition that “culture is to society what memory 
is to individuals” and elaborated that “it includes what has worked in the experience of a 
society, so that it was worth transmitting to future generations” (Triandis and Suh 2002, 
135). 
In fact, there have existed “psychological or subjective definitions” of political 
culture that draw on such psychological terms as orientation, attitude, affect, cognition, 
feeling, evaluation, and so forth. Almond and Verba, for example, presented that political 
culture “refers to the specifically political orientations – attitudes toward the political 
system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (1963, 
12, italics added). We can find another typical example of psychological definitions in 
Verba’s work. He defined culture as “the system of beliefs about patterns of political 
interaction and political institutions” (1965, 516, italics added) and those beliefs are 
fundamental, usually unstated, and unchallengeable, assumptions or postulates about 
politics. He also established a denotative criterion of political culture for subsequent 
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political culture studies by distinguishing it from other specific political psychological 
constructs such as partisan affiliations and attitudes or beliefs about domestic and 
international policy issues. 
Even these psychological definitions, however, have not been intended to refer to 
psychology at the individual level but psychology of a collectivity. Almond and Verba, 
pioneer of the “individual-oriented” political culture approach was not an exception. 
Immediately after they offered a psychological definition, they elaborated on the political 
culture of a society as “the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and 
evaluations of its population” (1963, 13) and this is the working definition for the five 
nation comparative survey study. Their contemporary students of political culture made 
parallel definitions, which have been used without a fundamental modification since (Pye 
(1965), Verba (1965), and Almond and Powell (1966 and 1978)). Moreover, Inglehart 
who initiated the renaissance of political culture studies in the 1980s defined political 
culture in a similar fashion: “the subjective aspect of a society’s institutions, the beliefs, 
values, knowledge, and skills that have been internalized by the people of a given society, 
complementing their external systems of coercion and exchange” (1997, 15). Harrison 
and Huntington and the Cultural Values and Human Progress project also defined culture 
“in purely subjective terms as the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying 
assumptions prevalent among people in a society” (2000, xv, italics added). Thus, a 
definition of political culture has been considered psychological to the extent that it 
involves psychological constructs regardless of the reference levels, that is, the individual 
or the aggregate.  
 15 
The notion of political culture as a psychological attribute of collectivities, 
however, seems to have precluded or dismissed its core constituent element, the 
individual, in subsequent research.7
First, the relationship between political culture of a collectivity and other 
psychological constructs at the individual level, which is a crucial part of psychological 
definitions of political culture, has not been well specified.
 The implications of this dismissal can be identified at 
least in two aspects: (1) the lack of elaboration on psychological implications (2) the 
preference for a macroexplanation.  
8
Since Almond and Verba, students of political culture studies have rather casually 
used and expanded such psychological terms as attitude, orientation, belief, affect, feeling, 
cognition, value, and so on, often as components of political culture.
 The effects of political 
culture on the individual are frequently posited in a definition but without much 
elaboration. Moreover, they are rarely subject to operationalization or to rigorous 
empirical testing.  
9
                                                 
7 Reisinger (1995) suggested that defining culture as a societal-level attribute is a way to overcome the 
level of analysis problem.  
 But at the same 
time, they have often conceptualized these psychological constructs as consequences of 
culture, explicitly or otherwise, even in the same work. Almond and Powell (1978, 25), 
for instance, defined political culture “as the set of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings about 
politics current in a nation at a given time” and suggested that “the attitude patterns that 
have been shaped in past experience have important constraining effects on future 
8 Notable exceptions include Wildavsky (1987) who attempted to specify the relation between political 
culture and preference and Eckstein (1988) who made a careful distinction among the components of a 
political culture at the different levels of analysis. Both of their works, however, are theoretical. 
9 Some of the examples are shown above. 
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political behavior.” Although they acknowledged Barry’s criticism (1978) on the lack of 
specification of causal mechanism in political cultural analysis and introduced such 
psychological terms as “attitude consistency” or “issue constraint,” the authors did not 
expound nor present any evidence for, the causal mechanism between attitude and 
behavior, which has been one of the central problems in Western psychology (Markus 
and Kitayama 1991). Elkins and Simeon, who explicitly dismissed the idea of culture as a 
property of individual, also put forward “constraining effects” of political culture on the 
individual’s cognition. They presented political culture as “a short-hand expression for a 
“mind-set” which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of 
alternative behaviors, problems, and solutions which are logically possible” (1979, 128) 
yet did not elaborate on how political culture affects our attention. Almond (1980, 26) 
once advanced “the explanatory power of political culture variables is an empirical 
question, open to hypothesis and testing.” However, students of political culture have not 
followed up this dictum at the individual level psychology.10
Second, the primacy of collectivity in political culture research has facilitated 
macroexplanation that “one social pattern, structure, or entity is explained by reference to 
other social phenomena” (Little 1991, 183). Fuchs (2007, 163), for example, advanced as 
one of the paradigmatic cores of the political culture research program that political 
culture must be considered as a macro-phenomenon so that it can feasibly influence 
another macro-phenomenon of regime persistence. 
 
                                                 
10 By contrast, the cultural effects on individual psychology have been extensively studied empirically as 
well as theoretically in cultural and cross-cultural psychology. For example, culture is conceptualized as 
meta-schema or foundational schema (Oyserman et al. 2002b). It is also shown that culture often 
determines self-construal and subsequent psychological functioning (Markus and Kitayama 1991), emotion 
(Kitayama and Markus 1994), value (Triandis 1995), personality (Triandis and Suh 2002), and cognition 
(Nisbett 2003). However, existing literature in these fields have not addressed the cultural effects on 
political psychology of the individual. 
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The preference for macroexplanation, as with other tendencies in the empirical 
study of political culture, began with The Civic Culture, where Almond and Verba 
attempted to identify political culture congruent with democratic political system. Many 
students of political culture, especially in the field of political development and 
modernization, have followed their lead as they tried to identify the cultural requisites for 
democracy. In other words, they sought to determine cultural patterns of a nation that “fit” 
or “are linked with,” a democracy.11
However, we can rarely find the empirical studies of political culture that examine 
the cultural implications for an individual’s political attitude and preference despite 
increasing accumulation of survey data across nations.
 We can also find, with relative ease, other types of 
macroexplanation in political culture research in the works of Inglehart (1990 and 1997) 
and Inglehart and Baker (2000) that have traced cultural value changes among the people 
of the world from traditional, survival culture to secular-rational, self-expression culture 
following the system level socio-economic changes; Huntington (1996) who predicted 
the post-Cold War conflicts based on major civilizations; Putnam (2000) who explained 
the performance of the state governments of the United Stated based on the stock of 
social capital of each state; Welzel and his colleagues (2003) and Inglehart and Welzel 
(2005) that have attempted to identify human development syndrome, among others.  
12
                                                 
11 For the review of congruence theory, see Dalton and Shin (2006, 5-13). Chapter II of the dissertation will 
revisit the congruence theory. 
 Indeed, the political culture 
approach so far has focused on the cultural linkage with various macro-socioeconomic 
and political phenomena such as democratization, stability and survival of democracy, 
12 There is a notable exception: Inglehart et al. (2008) examined cultural impact on subjective well-being at 
the individual level using multilevel modeling. 
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economic development, conflicts among nations, human development, and so forth, but 
largely neglected the cultural implications for political psychology of the individual. 
Hence, we do not have enough information how the individuals in different cultures think 
and respond to the issues relevant to politics. In other words, we have not explicitly tested 
the idea that political culture affects political attitude and behavior or more broadly 
political psychology of the individual. Students of political culture seem to have taken the 
individual for granted so far. 
 
Issues in the Individualistic Approach to Political Culture 
Granted, there is a strand of empirical work in political culture research classified 
as the individual-oriented, psychological approach to political culture. Reisinger (1995, 
330) observed that most of recent defenders of political culture study fall within the 
individualistic, survey-based approach and it grew largely from the Almond’s work. One 
should, however, note that the dominant approach in political culture, as he 
conceptualized, has not been individualistic if cross-national and has been liable to make 
a flawed inference about the aggregate cultural groups if in fact individual-oriented as 
true to its name.  
First, drawing on the individual level survey responses does not make the political 
culture approach individual-oriented or psychological as Reisinger and others suggested 
(Lane 1992; Peters 1998; Wilson 2000). As discussed above, the preference for 
macroexplanation in political culture research has led to using survey data aggregated to 
various cultural groups or frequently to a country, which is the major unit of analysis in 
the field. Thus, survey-based cross-culture studies that these authors referred to as 
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examples of the individualistic approach would be, in fact, better understood as aggregate 
or country-oriented, especially if these studies made cross-national comparison.13 Second, 
the individualistic approach that aims to make a “cross-level” inference without utilizing 
information at the aggregate level is vulnerable to “individualistic” fallacy, as Inglehart 
and others have pointed out. Individualistic fallacy – or “reverse ecological fallacy” 
according to Hofstede (2001) – refers to the incorrect assumption that one can draw 
aggregate-level conclusion from individual-level findings because an individual level 
relationship represents similar strength and direction at the aggregate level. Welzel and 
Inglehart (2007) advanced that the danger of making the fallacy pervades the entire 
political culture literature as most political culture studies examine the individual level 
determinants of attitudes that are assumed to have an impact at the societal level. In other 
words, aggregating individual level responses for cross-cultural comparison does not 
constitute individualistic fallacy but making a fallacious inference about properties or 
relationships at the aggregate level solely based on the individual level data does.14 This 
has often been the case in political culture research (Peters 1998; Inglehart and Welzel 
2003; Welzel and Inglehart 2007).15
To avoid this methodological pitfall and take advantage of the vastly expanded 
individual level data, the empirical analysis of the dissertation draws on multilevel 
 
                                                 
13 Their examples include The Civic Culture and a series of work by Inglehart. It should be noted that for a 
considerable period between The Civic Culture and Inglehart’s works, such cross-national studies remained 
quire rare (Dalton 2000). 
14 Seligson (2002) mistakenly argued to this effect. 
15 In fact, the issue of cross-level inference is not limited to political culture research but relevant to cross-
national research in general where one of the central methodological problems is the linkage between 
individual and aggregate relationship (Eulau 1986; Peters 1998; Hofstede 2001; Welzel and Inglehart 2003 
and 2007). I will discuss ecological fallacy, the other type of error of cross-level inference, when reviewing 
Hofstede below. 
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modeling mainly with the five waves of the World Values Survey data. In other words, 
the empirical approach of the dissertation is both individual-oriented and cross-cultural. I 
will elaborate on this analytic method in the last section of this chapter substantively and 
empirically in Chapter III. 
In sum, this dissertation is motivated by the neglect of the individual by existing 
political culture literature, especially in the recent decades: the political cultural effects 
on the individual are frequently posited in a theory of political culture without proper 
elaboration or being subject to empirical testing. The relationship between political 
culture and other macro socio-economic phenomena has been the dominant subject of the 
field. Furthermore, the individual-oriented approach to political culture has been 
incomplete in the sense that it has been either in fact a society-centered study if 
comparative or a series of within-country studies if individualistic. 
In this dissertation, I do not advance that we should redefine or approach culture 
as the psychological attribute of the individual nor the psychological definition and the 
comparative individualistic approach is superior to other society-oriented definitions and 
approaches. In addition, I do not intend to develop the microexplanation that culture must 
be explained by the individual, as advocates of methodological individualism would 
advance (Lukes 1973, Chapter 17). I maintain, however, that a study of political cultural 
implications at the individual level is long overdue, despite increasing accumulation of 
survey data across nations. So far we have gained rich understanding of how culture as a 
macro-phenomenon is located in the causal mechanism of system level variables, owing 
largely to Inglehart’s work, but we have yet to learn how political culture affects political 
attitude and behavior of the individual. 
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Fortunately, we have a body of research in cultural and cross-cultural psychology 
we can draw on for this purpose. 
 
Why Individualism and Collectivism? 
 
Culture is usually reserved for societies – e.g., nations, ethnic or regional groups 
within or across nations, and various social organizations, as discussed above. In contrast, 
political attitude, preference, beliefs, and behavior are often reserved for the individual. 
Thus, in order to understand the way culture relates to the individual, we first need to 
specify dimensions of cultural variation (Triandis et al. 1988, 323 italics added).16
Psychologists who are interested in the cultural implications for the individual’s 
psychological functioning seem to have agreed upon the most important dimensions of 
cultural difference, that is, individualism and collectivism. Triandis, one of the pioneers 
who introduced, popularized, and refined the dimensions in psychology, observed that 
there are “the striking similarities in behavioral patterns found in very different locations 
around the world” and they “apparently have in common only that the cultures are 
 In fact, 
the identification of dimensions of culture has been suggested as a major goal in cross-
cultural psychology. According to Leung and Bond (1989), one must first be able to link 
observed cultural differences to specific dimensions of culture that are hypothesized to 
have produced the differences in order to build a truly universal theory in psychology that 
takes into account the influence of culture. 
                                                 
16 Dimensions can be identified empirically as in Hofstede’s work or theoretically as in Schwartz’s. 
Hofstede and Schwartz agree that dimensions represent fundamental problems of society (Hofstede 2001 
and Schwartz 2004). For a further theoretical discussion of dimensions of culture, see Leung and Bond 
(1989), Hofstede (2001), Vinken et al. (2004), and Triandis (2004). 
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characterized by more collectivist or more individualist behaviors” (1994, 50). Greenfield 
(2000) theoretically justified the selection of these dimensions. She advanced that the 
deep structure of culture that generated behaviors and interpretations of human behavior 
in an infinite array of domains and situations consisted of the framework of individualism 
and collectivism. Oyserman and her colleagues confirmed the popularity of the cultural 
dimensions in the field. According to these authors, a major thrust of cultural psychology 
in the past two decades has been based on modeling culture in terms of differences across 
groups in levels of individualism and collectivism (Oyserman et al. 2002b, 111). Indeed, 
Triandis and his associates’ work (1988) “Individualism and Collectivism: Cross-cultural 
Perspectives on Self-Ingroup Relationships” has been chosen as one of the studies that 
changed the discipline of psychology (Hock 2001).17
Then, how could students of political culture who attempt to analyze the cultural 
effects on the individual benefit from the academic achievements by the neighboring 
discipline? To answer this question, I will critically review select psychology literature, 




Utilities of Individualism and Collectivism as Cultural Dimensions 
Among several potential cultural dimensions18
                                                 
17 This single article was cited in over 200 studies from a wide variety of scientific fields between 1995 and 
2000 (Hock 2002, 219). 
 that help us organize such diverse 
psychological constructs as attitude, behavior, affect, cognition, values, and so forth, of 
18 For example, Triandis (1989 and 1995) tight vs. loose cultures or cultural complexity; Inglehart (1997) 
traditional vs. secular-rational and survival vs. self-expression; Schwartz (2004) autonomy vs. 
embeddedness, egalitarian vs. hierarchy, and harmony vs. mastery. It is also worthy of note that Pye (1965, 
22-23) used a similar dimensional term as a “theme” to organize fundamental cultural values discussed 
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the individuals, what is so special about individualism and collectivism? We can answer 
this question based on theoretical as well as practical grounds. 
For practical reasons, one should begin with Huntington’s observation. 
Huntington (1996) predicted, as discussed above, that the major world conflicts after the 
Cold War would occur along the “cultural fault lines separating civilizations” and 
suggested that the difference between individualist Western cultures and collectivist non-
Western cultures would constitute major cleavages. Triandis (1995, 13-15) concurred and 
elaborated. He claimed that about 70 percent of the world population is collectivist and 
many in these groups disagree with individualism of Western civilizations. With the end 
of the Cold War, the contact between these two adversarial cultural groups has been 
increasing as the former Communist countries began to open their borders and changed 
from totalitarian, command economies, supposedly favorable to collectivism, to market 
economies, supposedly favorable to individualism.19
                                                                                                                                                 
among political scientists in the 1960s. The themes include trust-distrust, hierarchy-equality, liberty-
coercion, and parochial-national identifications. 
 In addition, ongoing rapid 
globalization that has been making the world smaller and smaller with unprecedented 
technological development in mass communication and transportation has facilitated the 
interaction, virtual as well as actual, between individualists and collectivists. Thus, the 
potential for different kinds of world conflicts has risen, too. Based on these down-to-
earth observations of the socio-economic, political transformation in the world, 
culturalists has demanded a better understanding of those opposing cultural frames. 
19 Triandis also presented the weakening of trade unions and the ascendancy of entrepreneurs as another 
evidence of “cultural shift” from collectivism to individualism. 
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Theoretically, as illustrated from the opening excerpt in this chapter, culture-
oriented psychologists has advocated individualism and collectivism as essential for 
scientific development of the field of cross-cultural and cultural psychology. For example, 
cultural psychologists have maintained that individualism and collectivism clarify fuzzy 
constructs of culture and facilitate a direct linkage of psychological mechanism at the 
individual level to a cultural dimension at the aggregate level by conceptualizing and 
operationalizing parallel constructs at both levels of analysis. In addition, they have 
argued that individualism and collectivism offer more parsimonious, coherent, and 
empirically testable dimensions of cultural variation by providing the field with an 
organizing theme and focus for prediction and investigation. These cultural constructs 
also allow productive integration of knowledge accumulated in diverse fields of studies 
including anthropology, psychology, and political science, among others. Furthermore, 
individualism and collectivism suggest convergence across different methodologies 
(Triandis et al. 1988; Kim 1994; Hofstede 2002; Oyserman et al. 2002b; Oyserman and 
Uskul 2008). 
In sum, the world after the Cold War has called for the renewed interests in 
individual and collectivism, two opposing cultural frames deemed as a major source of 
the world conflict in the future. With rapid globalization and the regime change of the 
Soviet system, the interaction between two cultural views is ever increasing – hence, the 
possibility of the world conflict – and a proper understanding of individualism and 
collectivism is needed. Theoretically, these dimensions have been advanced as the basic 
organizing principles of cultures that should be utilized in scientific model building in 
psychology. 
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Intellectual History on Individualism and Collectivism 
As the scholarly interest in political culture is not a modern phenomenon, neither 
is the intellectual interest in individualism and collectivism. We can trace the origin of 
philosophical interest in these constructs to the Greek Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle in the 
West and the Confucian tradition in the East (Triandis 1995, 19-25; Nisbett et al. 2001; 
Nisbett 2003). 20
Aristotle, Plato’s student, however, laid the philosophical foundation for 
individualism in the Western thinking along with the Sophists. His discourse on “the 
central, basic, sine qua non properties” or “essence” of an object represents the 
individualist epistemology in the Western tradition. According to Nisbett and his 
 We can find the first intellectual exchange on these views in the 
normative debate between the Sophists and Plato in the fifth century BC. Individualism 
and collectivism were deemed as antagonistic and have largely been since. For example, 
the Sophists promoted personal agency, that is, the individuals are in charge of their own 
life and free to act as they choose without following the group norms while Plato 
criticized them for not having moral standards of what is good and proper and advocated 
a civic life. Plato’s Republic that expounded an ideal state governed by philosopher kings 
has been considered a paternalistic, collectivist text. Collectivism was also advanced by 
Confucius, their contemporaneous philosopher in the East, who emphasized virtuous, 
ethical conduct and obligations among various relationships in the society. Indeed, the 
view that emphasizes virtue or proper behavior is implicit in most of the Eastern religions 
such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Shintoism (Triandis 1995). 
                                                 
20 The West primarily refers to Western Europe and the United States and the East refers to East Asian 
countries that include China, Japan, and South Korea. Culture-oriented psychologists have been using these 
regional references for quite some time. 
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colleagues, the individualist epistemology that primarily focuses on an individual object 
and its attribute vis-à-vis its surrounding field is markedly in contrast with the collectivist 
epistemology in the Eastern tradition that focuses on the relationships between the object 
and the field (Nisbett et al. 2001; Nisbett 2003).21
Individualism and collectivism have been at the center of much thought and 
debate in the West (Lukes 1973; Triandis 1995; Oyserman et al. 2002a; Allik and Realo 
2004) as opposed to in the East, where collectivist Confucianism has been dominant. In 
fact, there is a long Western tradition of contrasting individualistic and collectivistic ideas 
by contemporary thinkers. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century,
 
22
                                                 
21 I will revisit their theory in the context of personal versus collective agency in Chapter IV. 
 for example, one 
can contrast Locke’s advocacy of inalienable individual rights to life, liberty, and 
property with Rousseau’s ardent support for the general will of the people as a whole and 
Smith’s laissez-fare capitalism with Marx’s communism, in the context of the opposing 
views of individualism and collectivism. Individualistic ideas such as liberty and equality 
promoted by the French Revolution and the American Revolution provoked collectivistic 
reactions idealizing the old regime of collective social structure – e.g., Burke. One can 
also contrast John Stuart Mill’s psychologistic reductionism that “human beings in 
society have no properties but those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, 
the laws of the nature of individual man” (1843/1963 Vol. 8, 879) with Durkheim’s social 
facts “external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of 
which they exercise control over him” (1895/1982, 52) in explaining social phenomena.  
22 The terms individualism and collectivism were used for the first time by English political philosophers in 
these centuries (Lukes 1973, 1; Triandis 1995, 19). 
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It is worthy of note that not all the philosophical debates about individualism and 
collectivism in those periods were adversarial. The French intellectual de Tocqueville, for 
example, attempted to redefine individualism in a positive light, as more than just egoism 
that would jeopardize community as reactionaries to the French Revolution portrayed. In 
other words, he presented individualism as necessary to as well as the natural product of, 
democracy by linking the word with individual rights and freedom, equal opportunity, 
and limited government (1835 and 1840/2003).23
Furthermore, there have been intellectuals who acknowledged the similar cultural 
frameworks as individualism and collectivism and contrasted different cultures based on 
these organizing religious and philosophical themes. For example, Weber (1904/2002) 
contrasted individualistic Protestant societies with collectivistic Catholic societies. In a 
similar fashion, Tönnies (1887/1955) distinguished self-interest, association based 
relationships of urban societies (Gesellschaft) and community-focused relationships of 
small villages (Geminschaft). 
 
Against the backdrop of these philosophical debates and beginning with the late 
nineteenth century, empirical investigation of various cultural groups increased. 
Anthropologists led the study of culture and suggested the cultural dimensions similar to 
individualism and collectivism (Triandis et al. 1988; Triandis 1995, 26-28; Hofstede 
2001). Kluckhohn, for example, contrasted individual oriented with group-oriented 
relationship values (e.g., autonomous and active versus dependent and accepting) and 
with Strodtbeck distinguished linear (e.g., submission to elders), collateral (e.g., 
                                                 
23 Tocqueville was also aware of possibility that individualism should degenerate into selfishness: 
“individualism, at first, only saps the virtues of public life; but in the long run it attacks and destroys all 
others and is at length absorbed in downright selfishness” (1835/2003, 98). 
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agreement with group norms), and individualistic orientations (e.g., doing what self-
conceptions dictate). In addition, Mead presented cultural dimensions such as cooperation, 
competition, and individualism based on the ethnographic study of primitive peoples. 
 Serious empirical work that draws on individualism and collectivism was, 
however, not launched in psychology until Geert Hofstede’s comparative, multinational 
survey work Cultural Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values 
(1980).  
 
The Empirical Approach to Individualism and Collectivism:  
Hofstede, Triandis, Schwartz, and Inglehart & Oyserman 
 
Since first published in 1980, Hofstede’s work has inspired numerous empirical, 
cross-cultural studies. It is considered the most influential of cultural classifications and 
one of the most cited sources in the entire Social Science Citation Index – cited 1,800 
times through 1999 (Hofstede 2001; Kirkman et al. 2006). In a marked contrast with 
previous cultural research that is characterized by the relativistic, ethnographic approach 
among others, Hofstede’s work aimed to build a scientific model of culture drawing on 
the empirical analysis of the extensive survey of the individuals from a large number of 
countries. It greatly facilitated empirical, cultural and cross-cultural research in 
subsequent decades by providing four overarching cultural patterns (e.g., dimensions) 
identified from the cross-national survey data.24
                                                 
24 The original four dimensions were extracted from paper-and-pencil survey results collected from over 
88,000 employees of the IBM, one of the largest multinational corporations, in seventy two countries 
(reduced to forty countries that had more than fifty responses). The survey, which consisted of many work-




Hofstede’s empirical model of culture consists of the five dimensions identified 
from the factor analysis of the national average scores of employees’ ratings of 
workplace relevant values.25
 
 Individualism and collectivism (IDV), a central focus in his 
first edition, is one of these organizing cultural dimensions and defined as follows: 
Individualism stands for a society in which ties between 
individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and 
her/his immediate family only. Collectivism stands for a society in which 
people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, 
which throughout people’s life time continue to protect them in exchange 
for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede 2001, 225). 
 
As illustrated from the definition and methodology to identify the cultural 
dimensions, Hofstede’s analysis of culture is ecological or aggregate-level based. In other 
words, he defined those cultural frames with reference to an aggregate not individuals as 
he did for culture and explicitly studied the origins and consequences of these cultural 
dimensions at the same aggregate level (e.g., national wealth, educational and political 
systems). In addition, one should note that he did not view individualism and collectivism 
as separate dimensions. That is, low IDV means high collectivism and high IDV means 
low collectivism, according to Hofstede’s analysis.26
This path-breaking analysis has its own drawbacks relevant for the dissertation: 
First, the definition of individualism and collectivism is simplistic, centering on the 
relationship between the individual and in-group, i.e., whether individual is independent 
 
                                                 
25 The other dimensions include power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. In the second 
edition (2001), Hofstede added the fifth dimension, long-term vs. short-term orientation based on the 
expanded dataset. 
26 He did not provide an abbreviation for collectivism. 
 30 
of or dependent on his or her in-groups. It appears that it has to do with the fact that the 
dimension was derived empirically not theoretically. Moreover, conceptualizing IDV as 
an attribute of a collectivity should keep one from analyzing diverse aspects of the 
construct. Second, as a macroexplanation, it could not explain the attitude and behavior 
of the individuals.27 Indeed, Hofstede acknowledged that his work in fact did not intend 
to do so, arguing that a different unit of analysis, that is, individual or aggregate, requires 
a theoretically distinct approach to avoid “ecological fallacy” in his case. He advanced 
that in general we should not confuse the within-system relationship with the ecological, 
between-system relationship. This amounts to the fallacy the possibility of which 
increases when one infers properties or relationships at the individual level solely based 
on the aggregate level data.28
Hofstede’s macro-analysis of individualism and collectivism has been followed 
by a host of the individual level analysis of the cultural frames, initiated by Triandis and 
his associates. The changes in academic focus on the level of analysis may have to do 
with the fact that the implementation of Hofstede’s method is extremely time and 
resource intensive and that attention has shifted to the ways cultural frames affect 
individuals (Oyserman et al. 2002a). 
  
Among the numerous contributions Triandis and his associates made to cross-
cultural psychology, there are three important issues that are especially relevant to this 
dissertation. First, Triandis refined Hofstede’s aggregate-centered definition of 
                                                 
27 The second edition (2001) added a review of psychological literature on the implications of 
individualism and collectivism for personality and behavior (231-233). 
28 This is the reverse type of individualistic fallacy, the other type of mistaken cross-level inference 
discussed above. In the second edition, he mentioned, without much elaboration, multilevel analysis as an 
alternative to either level of analysis. 
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individualism (IND) and collectivism (COL) both conceptually and empirically. He, with 
the help of the associates, reported that the different methods of measuring these cultural 
syndromes29 converge (Triandis et al. 1990; Triandis and Gelfand 1998) and provide four 
defining attributes that distinguish them: (1) The definition of self is interdependent in 
COL and independent in IND (2) Personal and communal goals are closely aligned in 
COL and not at all aligned in IND (3) Cognition focus that guides much of social 
behavior includes norms, obligations, and duties in COL and attitudes, personal needs, 
rights, and contracts in IND (4) An emphasis on relationships, even when 
disadvantageous, is common in COL while the emphasis is on rational analyses of the 
advantages and disadvantages of maintaining a relationship in IND (Triandis 1995 and 
1996).30
Second, Triandis explicitly distinguished the two different levels of analysis, 
individual and aggregate, and tried to link them by formulating personality attributes 
 Triandis also conceptualized and measured collectivism independently as 
opposed to Hofstede and emphasized the “target-specific” nature of collectivism. He 
observed that collectivism is better construed as concern for a certain subset of people 
and interpersonal relationships – e.g., excluding strangers and foreigners – rather than as 
concern for the entire universe of human being (Hui and Triandis1986; Hui 1988; 
Triandis et al. 1988; Triandis et al. 1990). By this narrow specification, Triandis might 
have removed the normative aspect of collectivism but reminded the need for a clear 
operationalization of the construct. 
                                                 
29 Triandis (1995, 43) defined a cultural syndrome as “a pattern characterized by shared beliefs, attitudes, 
norms, roles, and values that are organized around a theme and that can be found in certain geographic 
regions during a particular historic period.” 
30 He further classified individualism and collectivism, based on the type of relationships, into horizontal 
and vertical ones, making four types of IND and COL. 
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variables corresponding to the cultural syndromes, that is, idiocentric for individualism 
and allocentric for collectivism, and utilizing the dimensional approach (Triandis et al. 
1985; Triandis et al. 1988; Triandis 1994 and 1995). This methodological ingenuity is 
significant because it suggested the way we incorporate these cultural constructs of both 
levels of analysis in the same model and has facilitated the investigation of the 
implications of the variations in a dimension at one level of analysis for the other level, 
which the empirical analysis of the dissertation aspires to follow. 
Third, as related to the second point and suggested by the transition from 
Hofstede’s aggregate analysis, Triandis and his fellow scholars made a significant 
contribution to the way empirical analysis of culture chooses and frames the subjects of 
investigation. In a sense, he pioneered and established the psychological study of 
individualism and collectivism, that is, the study of how these cultural syndromes affect 
the psychology of the individual (Hock 2001). Examples of the subjects include the 
influences of individualism and collectivism on self-concept (Triandis 1989), social 
behavior (Triandis et al. 1990), well-being (Suh et al. 1998), and personality (Triandis 
and Suh 2002). It is worthy of note, however, that Triandis largely speculated the 
implications of these cultural syndromes for politics in Individualism and Collectivism 
(1995). Furthermore, the focus was on the political system, not on the individual 
psychology.  
Schwartz expanded the horizon of the field by putting individualism and 
collectivism in the context of the basic human values. His original intention to study 
individualism and collection was to refine the then-dominant definitions of these cultural 
constructs by Triandis, which are characterized by the defining attributes discussed above. 
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In doing so, Schwartz drew on his universal values framework he had developed and has 
continued to do until now (Schwartz 1990, 2004, and 2006; Schwartz and Bilsky 1987; 
Schwartz and Bardi 2001; Schwartz and Boehnke 2004). 
Defining values as “desirable, transsituational goals, varying in importance, that 
serve as guiding principles in people’s lives” (Schwartz and Bardi 2001, 269), Schwartz 
advanced that there exist ten universal value types31 on the individual level he confirmed 
empirically based on a series of large-scale cross-national surveys.32
Despite this largely dichotomous classification of universal value types, Schwartz 
made a strong case against it. The dichotomy of individualism and collectivism, argued 
Schwartz (1990), leads one to overlook values that inherently serve both IND and COL 
(e.g., wisdom), ignores values that foster the universal goals of collectivities other than 
 Based on the 
criterion of “whose interests it serves,” he classified these motivational goals into 
individual type values, which “serve the self-interests of the individual, not necessarily at 
the expense of any collectivity” and collective type ones, which “focus on promoting the 
interests of others” but again does not necessarily ask for individual’s sacrifice. For 
example, values such as hedonism, achievement, self-direction, social power, and 
stimulation are classified into individual type values while values such as prosocial, 
restrictive conformity, security, and tradition, are classified into collective types. He 
determined that maturity values belong to both types because they “serve both individual 
and collective interests” (Schwartz 1990). 
                                                 
31 Drawing largely on Rokeach’s work, Schwartz theoretically derived the ten basic values that exist in all 
cultures, hence universal human values. The label of each value type is self-explanatory so no further 
elaboration is offered here. 
32 Since 1992, he has developed the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) that involved more than 60,000 
individuals in sixty four nations on all continents and measured fifty seven values. 
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in-group (e.g., universal values such as equality and social justice), and promote the 
mistaken assumption that IND and COL values each form coherent syndromes in polar 
opposition. Moreover, he did not assume that individual and collective interests 
necessarily conflict, as illustrated from the value type classification. 
Granted, the first two rationales call for more rigorous definitions of the 
constructs, which Triandis appears to have agreed. As discussed above, Triandis 
attempted to rid normative aspects of IND and COL and emphasized the target-specific 
nature of the latter. In addition, Triandis (1995) recognized the third rationale, namely, 
the possibility of orthogonality of these cultural syndromes, which I will address in the 
final section of this chapter in detail.  
 There are two other points that Schwartz made needs to be addressed here 
because they also inspired the dissertation. First, he warns against post-hoc interpretation 
of empirical analyses (e.g., exploratory factor analysis prevalent since Hofstede) of IND 
and COL at both levels of analysis and puts an emphasis on the theory-based, a priori 
specification of the cultural dimensions. Schwartz claimed that he derived those 
individual level universal values and cultural value orientations – e.g., autonomy vs. 
embeddedness, egalitarianism vs. hierarchy, and harmony vs. mastery – a priori instead 
of relying on ecological factor analysis as Hofstede did (1990, 1994, 2004 and 2006). 
One can easily agree that a barefoot, post hoc empirical analysis would lead us nowhere 
because any outcome of the analysis should be wide open to interpretation.  
Second, he maintained that the individual and cultural levels must be 
distinguished for both conceptual and empirical purposes. He emphasized that whether or 
not different values at the individual level or other cultural level values go together at 
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each level would depend upon the factors operative at each level.33
Both Hofstede and Triandis have also acknowledged the need of separate analyses 
in terms of level but it is Schwartz who carried them out based on a large-scale cross-
cultural surveys. Indeed, he extended his individual level value framework to the cultural 
level analysis of “prevailing value emphases” and presented a separate, quasi-circumplex 
value structure for each level of analysis.
 For example, it would 
not be easy to find an individual who endorses the value of being humble and of authority 
at the same time. Yet a nation in which there is strong average endorsement for authority 
tends to be the one in which there is strong average endorsement of being humble. In a 
nation characterized by a hierarchical culture, there should be a large number of people 
who value authority and a large number of other people who value being humble. 
34
In sum, Schwartz’s work has allowed us to acknowledge the need to approach 
culture from both levels of analysis, based on a priori theory, in order to gain a fuller 
understanding of the subject. We now appreciate the fact that cultural logic is different 
from individual logic. The question is how we should incorporate separate analyses into a 
meaningful whole, utilizing the results from both levels. 
 He also distinguished and confirmed 
empirically different factors operating at each level that affect values at the corresponding 
level (for individual level see Schwartz and Bilsky 1987; Schwartz and Boehnke 2004 
and for cultural level see Schwartz 2004 and 2006).  
                                                 
33 According to Smith and Bond (2006), Schwartz here addressed one of the most central and vexing 
questions in contemporary cross-cultural psychology: “How can it be that when the same data are analyzed 
at two-different levels, the results are not the same?” (41) 
34 Each value type at the individual level and each cultural value orientation at the national level is placed 
in a quasi-circumplex structure, depending on the theoretical and empirical compatibility among the types 
and among the orientations, respectively (Schwartz 2004; Schwartz and Boehnke 2004). In a sense, he 
extended his disapproval of the simple dichotomy and orthogonality of IND and COL to the overall value 
structures. 
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Finally, I will conclude this section with Inglehart and Oyserman’s work (2004) 
that suggested possibly one of the most important research agendas for cross-cultural 
psychology in the future as well as offered an integrative analysis of the works of 
Hofstede, Triandis, and Schwartz.  
Indeed, Inglehart and Oyserman were not the first authors who identified the 
commonality among these authors and attempted to compare and contrast them. For 
example, Hofstede (2001) validated his individualism and collectivism (IDV) with 
Inglehart’s cultural dimensions and postmaterialist values found that his dichotomy was 
strongly correlated with Inglehart’s “well-being versus survival” dimensions.35
Schwartz (2004 and 2006) contrasted his cultural value orientations with the 
works of Hofstede (1980 and 2001) and Inglehart (Inglehart and Baker 2000) 
conceptually as well as empirically. He first verified the problem of the “catchall” nature 
of Hofstede IDV by showing that IDV correlates with all three of his cultural dimensions. 
Schwartz then observed that Inglehart’s conceptualizations of the two cultural dimensions 
– i.e., traditional versus secular-rational and survival versus self-expression – shared the 
elements relevant to his embeddedness and autonomy dimension. That is, Inglehart’s 
survival and tradition pole of the cultural dimensions both stress conformity to the in-
group, submission to authority, limits on individual expression, intolerance toward out-
groups, and rejection of change, which characterize embeddedness while secular-rational 
 He also 
validated IDV with Schwartz’s cultural value categories and found that it was positively 
correlated with Schwartz’s autonomy and egalitarian commitment and negatively 
correlated with conservatism and hierarchy. 
                                                 
35 In this second edition, Hofstede validated all his five cultural dimensions with other cultural works that 
involved similar cultural constructs published since the first edition. 
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and self-expression pole both stress the opposite, hence share the elements of autonomy. 
Schwartz, however, disputed the orthogonality of Inglehart’s empirical dimensions 
because “the prevailing value emphases” facing societies should not be independent.36
Inglehart and Oyserman also demonstrated that Hofstede’s IDV, Triandis’ 
individualism-collectivism, Schwartz’s autonomy-embeddedness, and the first author’s 
self-expression-survival value dimension significantly overlap both conceptually and 
empirically. In contrast with Schwartz, these authors focused on survival/self-expression 
values, the one dimension that not only has been measured over a longer periods of time 
but also can help integrate all these disparate dimensions into a meaningful theoretical 
framework. In fact, Inglehart and Oyserman confirmed that only one dimension emerged 
from Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and it accounted for fully 78% of the cross-
national variance of those cultural dimensions. This dimension is remarkably robust 
emerging with the different measurement approaches, different types of samples, and 
different time periods. Thus, Inglehart and Oyserman made a cogent case that these 
cultural dimensions, independently identified by Hofstede, Triandis and Inglehart, tap 
similar underlying construct that reflects the extent to which people give top priority to 
autonomous, individual choice over survival needs.
 
37
Armed with time-series data of the World Values Survey, spanning from 1980 to 
2000, the extrapolative use of which is justified based on the robust identification of the 
common dimension, Inglehart and Oyserman also attributed to economic development a 
 
                                                 
36 As noted above, Schwartz offered a quasi-circumplex structure of basic value dimensions at both levels 
of analysis, i.e., individual and cultural. The issue of the orthogonality of Inglehart’s cultural dimension is a 
methodological one and needs a further study, which is beyond the scope of the dissertation. 
37 Inglehart and Welzel (2005, chapter 6) confirmed the result. 
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shift toward the free choice aspects of individualism and away from the traditional 
survival aspects of collectivism. In addition, they argued that this cultural shift was 
conducive to the emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions. 
Inglehart and Oyserman’s work made a significant contribution in the 
psychological study of culture in that it illustrated the way how students of culture 
integrate disparate works into a meaningful theoretical whole both theoretically and 
empirically and how we can take advantage of data resources collected over a long period 
of time to investigate the antecedents and consequences of cultural shift, which should 
constitute one of the most important research agendas in cross-cultural psychology in the 
future. 
  
Oyserman et al.’s (2002a) Meta-Analysis of Individualism and Collectivism  
Oyserman and her associates has done so far the most comprehensive review of 
the empirical studies of individualism and collectivism in their “Rethinking Individualism 
and Collectivism: Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions and Meta-Analysis” (2002a), 
which covers more than 250 different studies from 1980, the year that Hofstede published 
the first edition, to 1999. 
This broad, meta-analysis attempted to answer two crucial questions tackled by a 
wide variety of approaches and methods from existing literature in the field: Are 
European Americans higher in individualism and lower in collectivism than people from 
other societies? 38
                                                 
38 Oyserman and her associates acknowledged that no systematic test of the underlying assumption that 
European Americans value or behave more individualistically than others despite of the seeming consensus 
that European Americans are the prototype defining individualism. This illustrates the problem that within-
culture variations of individualism and collectivism have not been tested in general. For a notable exception, 
see Vandello and Cohen (1999). 
 Are theoretically derived implications of individualism (IND) and 
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collectivism (COL) for psychological functioning in the domains of self-concept, well-
being, attribution style, and relationality, borne out in the empirical literature?  
The authors began the analysis by providing an overview of IND and COL as 
cultural orientations. Instead of offering alternative definitions of IND and COL, they 
present theoretical core elements of each construct and elaborate on the constructs based 
on existing operational definitions. That is, the core element of IND is the assumption 
individuals are independent of one another while that of COL is the assumption that 
groups bind and mutually obligate individuals. Based on the content analysis of the items 
that make up twenty seven available IND-COL scales, they identify seven components of 
IND such as independent, striving for one’s own goals, personal competition and wining, 
focus on one’s uniqueness, thought and actions private from others, knowing oneself and 
having a strong identity, and clearly articulating one’s needs and eight COL components 
such as considering close others an integral part of the self, wanting to belong to groups, 
duties and scarifies, concern for group harmony, seeking advice for decision, self changes 
according to context, focus on hierarchy and state issues, and a preference for group work. 
According to the authors, these components or domains account for 88% of items across 
each of the scales included in the analysis, which illustrates that they are core elements of 
the existing empirical definitions of IND and COL. 
As for the first question, the answer is complicated than expected. On the one 
hand, Americans are individualists as defined by their response to IND scales and the 
way they define themselves, and what evidence they find convincing and motivating. On 
the other hand, it is equally clear that they are relational and feel close to group members, 
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seeking their advice, all of which represent collectivistic aspects.39 The answer for the 
second question is not so definite that there is not enough evidence for the need for 
multiple psychologies rather than a single, general psychology. In other words, observed 
psychological effects40
In answering these questions, this comprehensive study highlights two problems 
of previous studies of individualism and collectivism that inspired my dissertation. First, 
one cannot help notice that there has been a notable absence of the studies that examine 
psychological implications of these cultural constructs in the domain of political 
psychology. Among the large number of studies included in the meta-analysis, one can 
hardly find a study that either analyzes cultural influence on the individual attitude or 
behavior directly relevant to political issues or explores political psychological 
implications of the findings. As discussed in the section above, there have been the 
renewed interests in political culture for theoretical and practical reasons. Yet 
macroexplanation – that is, culture affects macro socio-economic phenomena – has been 
dominant at least in political science. This may have to do with the tendency of the 
discipline, especially in comparative politics, that focuses on macro political, socio-
 of IND and COL tend not to be large and not to be replicated. In 
addition, focus on either a particular country comparison or a particular aspect of 
psychological functioning in a broader domain jeopardizes the generalizability of the 
findings of the studies. 
                                                 
39 This is consistent with Markus’s observation (2001) that the portrait of America a nation of rugged 
individualists is incompatible with the empirical evidence as unalloyed endorsement or rejection of 
individualist value statements was quite rare among the survey participants. He also cautioned that it would 
be equally erroneous to conclude that Americans today are predominantly communitarian in their impulses. 
40 The effects in the meta-analysis refer to main effect, i.e., size and direction of differences in IND-COL 
and moderator effects, i.e., to what extent, scale reliability, scale content, and sample composition influence 
size and direction of main effect differences. 
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economic outcomes and choose a country as the unit of analysis.41
Second, there is an issue of external validity in the current culture oriented 
psychological studies of individualism and collectivism, as Oyserman and her associates 
acknowledged. One would be hard pressed to justify that the findings could be 
generalizable to the real world when most dataset were collected from undergraduates 
and worse from 2-3 countries. According to Oyserman et al. (2002a, 6), over 80% of 
studies in the meta-analyses used undergraduates and the bulk of cross-national research 
comes from comparisons of American undergraduates that supposedly represent the West 
with undergraduates from Japan, Hong Kong, China, or Korea that supposedly represent 
the East. This may be attributable to the fact that they selected the studies based on such 
explicit keywords as individualism, collectivism, independence, interdependence, 
allocentrism, and idiocentrism, which should have narrowed the scope of the analysis. 
We can address this issue of generalizability by utilizing a large scale cross-national 
survey that is far more representative, in terms of the number of countries and 
respondents and the way samples are selected, than the studies included in the meta-
analysis. For example, we have Hofstede’s IBM data expanded by Bond and his 
 Thus, it is remarkable 
that a study that examines political psychological implications of individualism and 
collectivism is yet to be done even in the field of cross-cultural psychology, where 
academic focus has been on the way cultural frames influence individuals (Oyserman et 
al. 2002a). Therefore, the dissertation aims to examine political psychological 
implications of individualism and collectivism for the individual’s attitude and behavior, 
largely absent from the previous studies of culture at the individual level. 
                                                 
41 Hofstede (2001) made a similar observation that political science focuses on the aggregate level of 
analysis under “the division of labor among the social sciences.” 
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colleagues, the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS), Global Leadership and Organizational 
Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) research program, and the World Values Survey (WVS) 
available for this purpose. To increase external validity, this dissertation utilizes the WVS 
that has measured attitudes, policy preference, and political behavior as well as values, of 
random samples of the individuals from almost all over the world, at multiple time points 
across more than a quarter century from 1980 to 2007.  
 
Other Issues in the Study of Individualism and Collectivism 
 
I conclude the theoretical review chapter with revisiting some of the issues raised 
here and organizing them into three research agendas. In addition, I will discuss how I 
will address them in the empirical analysis of the dissertation. 
 
Level of Analysis and Multilevel Analysis 
Many cross-cultural psychologists since Hofstede have argued that different 
levels of analysis, that is, individual or cultural, need to be distinguished for theoretical as 
well as for empirical purposes. Hofstede who carried out the county level analysis of 
individualism and collectivism emphasized that his “ecological” or aggregate analysis 
should not be used to explain individual psychology. Theoretically, argued he, “cultures 
are not king-size individuals: They are wholes, and their internal logic cannot be 
understood in terms used for personality dynamics of individuals” (2001, 17).42
                                                 
42 This reminds us of Durkheim’s social facts discussed above. 
 
Empirically, he made an arguable claim to the effect that cross-level inferences would 
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lead to a fallacy of one kind or another, that is, ecological fallacy or reverse ecological 
(individualistic) fallacy.43
Triandis agreed with Hofstede in the sense that he advanced different terminology 
– i.e., allocentric and idiocentric as personality attributes of collectivism and 
individualism, respectively – distinguish the individual level analysis from the cultural 
level one. Triandis, however, has focused on the individual level analysis without 
systematically incorporating the information at the cultural level except for review works 
(1989 and 1995).
 In a sense, Hofstede justified the reason why he focused on the 
country-level cultural analysis. 
44
Schwartz also acknowledged the importance of distinguishing levels of analysis in 
gaining a complete perspective on culture. He conceptualized and tested empirically 
separate value structures at each level of analysis and then related relevant individual 
level universal values and cultural value orientations to corresponding aspects of 
individualism and collectivism. By doing separate analyses and hence focusing on the 
differences between two levels of analysis, however, Schwartz appears to fail to 
incorporate the results from different levels of analysis more systematically despite the 
fact that he has used his own large scale cross-cultural survey data (SVS). 
 In addition, he approached the issue of level of analysis as a 
“measurement” issue rather than the one of incorporating the information gained at either 
level of analysis (Triandis et al. 1990; Triandis 1995, Appendix). 
                                                 
43 He even maintained that the ecological fallacy is a special temptation for political scientist while the 
reverse ecological fallacy for social psychologist (2001, 16). 
44 This may have to do with the fact that his work has largely drawn on the studies that compared samples 
from two to three countries. 
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Inglehart has clarified what involves the aggregate level analysis of culture and 
when we need it. In doing so, he corrected the widespread misconception about 
ecological fallacy. According to Inglehart, the fact that culture consists of individuals 
does not invalidate any findings about political, socio-economic implications of culture 
without supporting evidence at the individual level. In other words, he made a convincing 
case that some relations are entirely ecological and only exist at the aggregate level as 
ecological reality and thus does not need empirical support from the individual level data. 
For example, democracy exists only at the aggregate level so the assumption that the 
beliefs of individuals affect democracy only mean that aggregations of these beliefs – i.e., 
cultural level mass beliefs – affect democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2003; Welzel and 
Inglehart 2007).45
In sum, many students of culture agree that we need separate constructs and 
approaches, both theoretically and empirically, depending on the level of analysis in the 
study of culture. Considering the implications of the dominance of collective oriented 
definitions of culture for the psychological approaches, the effort of distinct, conceptual 
and operational definitions of culture has been in the right direction. Moreover, students 
of culture in diverse fields of study seem to have worked in the spirit of the division of 
labor. Yet they rarely seem to have attempted to incorporate the information gained at 
different levels so far. In other words, it appears that the choice of analysis for the 
 One can understand why he has defended and made a significant 
contribution himself to, the macro-level analysis of civic culture and cultural shift. In 
addition, Inglehart has called for a proper specification of the level of analysis based on 
what one attempts explain. 
                                                 
45 Hofstede also noted that some ecological correlations reflect properties of larger social structure and 
therefore are meaningful (1980, 29). In the second edition (2001), he removed this acknowledgement. 
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empirical study of culture has been limited to either the individual or the aggregate level, 
avoiding fallacies of cross-level inference, that is, ecological or individual fallacy. 
That being said, in this dissertation, I will draw on the multilevel modeling (MLM) 
in which the cultural as well as the individual level information is incorporated in the 
same model to explain individual level attitude and behavior. This is a new generation 
analytic technique in cross-cultural psychology that takes account of the fact that 
individuals within the same context – in this case, the same nation – tend to be more 
homogeneous or clustered to use the terminology of MLM than others within different 
contexts.46
I advance that the multilevel approach is most appropriate for the empirical 
analysis of the dissertation since it is reasonable to assume that political values, attitudes, 
and behavior of the individuals in the same country are more homogenous than others in 
different countries considering that they are raised under the same educational system and 
share the same historical experiences. Furthermore, my dissertation aims to utilize the 
information at both the individual and the country level to account for political 
psychology of the individuals in the integrative analysis. I will elaborate on MLM in the 
 In addition, it accounts for the fact that in this type of nested data structure, 
the variations at the individual level should be explained by the information at the 
contextual level as well as at the same individual level (Oyserman and Uskul 2008). 
Hofstede in fact suggested that MLM could be used to avoid both types of cross-level 
fallacies and could “provide crucial insights into the working of social systems” (2001, 
17).  
                                                 
46 Multilevel modeling is often referred to as Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM), the statistical analysis 
that deals with this type of the nested hierarchical data structure. The World Values Survey, the main 
dataset the dissertation draws on is also organized in a hierarchical structure, the individuals nested within a 
country. 
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empirical analysis of the dissertation focusing on the methodological justification of 
multilevel modeling. 
   
Contrasting Constructs of Individualism and Collectivism 
In the study of individualism and collectivism, one of the most important 
theoretical questions that has profound methodological implications is whether the 
concepts of individualism and collectivism is bipolar and opposite or domain specific and 
orthogonal (Oyserman et al. 2002a).47
In the dissertation, I conceptualize and operationalize individualism and 
collectivism as multidimensional constructs at the individual level and as unidimensional 
and bipolar ones at the cultural level. A the individual level, the multidimensionality of 
the constructs have been supported theoretically by Triandis’ arguments on multiple key 
attributes and the orthogonal classification – i.e., vertical and horizontal – of the 
constructs, Schwartz’s circumplex structure of values subsuming individualism and 
collectivism, and Oyserman et al.’s content analysis of the existing scales. The target-
 In other words, students of culture have debated 
whether values, attitudes, behaviors of individualists are directly opposite to those of 
collectivist. Thus, bipolar opposition granted, if you know someone is individualistic then 
you can safely assume that he or she is not collectivistic. At the cultural level, they have 
debated whether knowing how collectivistic a country is allows one to predict how 
individualistic it is. 
                                                 
47 In statistical analysis, independent variables are said to be orthogonal if they are uncorrelated or 
independent of each other. Social scientists have borrowed this term to describe the similar case where 
knowing the effect of one variable does not give any information about that of another variable, on the 
outcome of interest. Thus, two variables are not orthogonal if two variables are somehow related – 
positively or negatively – or simply opposites in an extreme case. 
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specific nature of collectivism also supports the domain specific conceptualization of the 
construct. Thus, Oyserman and her associate observed that “it is probably more accurate 
to conceptualize IND and COL as worldviews that differ in the issues they make salient” 
(2002a, 5). In other words, individuals can hold two seemingly contrasting cultural values 
at the same time and the activation of either value depends on the situation and the issue 
content they deal with.48
At the cultural level, it would be more reasonable to conceptualize individualism 
and collectivism as unidimensional since such collective attributes would be robust to 
short-term, situational cues unlike individual cultural values as the multidimensionality at 
the individual level suggests. In addition, the bipolar unidimensional approach at the 
cultural level has to do with the way students of culture have identified the dimensions of 
cultural syndromes (e.g., ecological factor analysis based on the aggregate survey data). 
According to Oyserman and her associates (2002a, 8-9), the bipolar single dimension 
approach seems to have been more popular even among researchers studying 
psychological implications of these cultural syndromes. The majority of the 170 studies 
included in their meta-analysis measured only one of the constructs. 
 Hofstede, who initiated the bipolar approach at the cultural level, 
also supported a multidimensional model at the individual level (2001, 215-216).  
The decision for distinct conceptualization and measurement is consistent with the 
results of existing studies (Triandis et al. 1988; Rhee et al. 1996; Triandis and Suh 2002). 
In practice, I will construct a separate index for individualism and collectivism at the 
individual level based on the World Values Survey and utilize the country level measures 
                                                 
48 According to Oyserman et al. (2002b), we need social psychological research and the social cognition 
approach to examine situation specific and cognitive, cultural effects, respectively, as suggested by the 
domain specific multidimensionality of individualism and collectivism at the individual level. 
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by Hofstede and Triandis. The empirical analysis, however, will not incorporate the idea 
of orthogonality at either level as some existing literature suggested because it is an 
observational study and draws on a large scale survey dataset, which is vulnerable to 
spurious correlations. 
 
External Validity and the World Values Survey 
As suggested by Oyserman et al. (2002a), the study of cross-cultural psychology 
has been vulnerable to the issue of external validity, that is, whether we can generalize 
the findings from the research to the real world.  
The criticism has been valid to some extent. The vast majority of empirical 
studies of culture have compared samples from only two or three cultures, usually 
operationalized as different nations (Schwartz 1994; Oyserman et al. 2002a). The study 
of comparative political behavior, where cross-cultural research of individualism and 
collectivism such as this dissertation belongs, has also had the similar issue. According to 
Jennings (2007), cross-national studies for investigating contextual effects have been 
confined to a small number of countries since the pioneering five-nation study of The 
Civic Culture. In addition, cross-national comparisons that examine individual-level 
effects typically involve convenience samples of college students, many of them 
participate in the study while attending a psychology course (Oyserman et al. 2002a). 
Moreover, experiment, preferred research method in psychology especially for 
establishing causality at the individual level, has often been subject to the similar 
criticism of generalizability because of its highly contrived lab settings.  
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The problems of the small-n countries/cultures, unrepresentative samples are 
inevitable due to the limited research resources. Furthermore, since obviously cultural or 
national level variables cannot be manipulated, experimental methods can only be applied 
to the individual level analysis.49
To address the issue of the generalizability of the research findings in the spirit of 
methodological triangulation, the dissertation draws on the five waves (1981-2007) of the 
World Values Survey, one of the largest cross-national surveys of representative samples. 
Out of the whole dataset that covers almost 80 percent of the world’s population, the 
dissertation uses the data from thirty OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development) member countries that largely consist of the wealthiest nations in the 
world
 One should also acknowledge the fact that these 
problems themselves will not make any findings of cross-cultural studies that utilize at 
least one of these methods not generalizable or invalid. As suggested by Oyserman and 
her associates’ extensive meta-analysis (2002a), there is not the only one way but exist 
multiple ways, to learn the scientific truth. Any findings from one research method can be 
and must be verified by others from different methods. It is worthy of note that Hofstede 
also advocated such a pluralistic method tradition, that is, “methodological triangulation” 
(2001, 5). 
50
                                                 
49 The discussion about intricacies involving experimental methods and the necessity of comparison 
methods in comparative politics, see Peters (1998, 1-5). 
 and many of which have the history of administering standardized, scientific 
opinion surveys. I will describe technical details of the dataset in the next empirical 
chapter.
50 According to World Bank, twenty one member countries belong to high-income economies while the 




Political Psychology of Individualism and Collectivism 
 
“Political psychology is, at heart, concerned with the characteristics of individuals 
and of situations that are most conducive to a successful political system” (Mutz, 2007, 
80). 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore political psychological implications of two 
major cultural frames and values, individualism and collectivism. As discussed in 
previous chapter, scholarly efforts to examine the cultural effects on individual’s political 
attitudes, policy preferences, and behavior, have been largely absent not only in political 
culture research but also in cross-cultural study of psychology. 
First, following the tradition of the civic culture study, this chapter will assess the 
effects of individualism and collectivism on a series of variables that are conducive to 
stable, successful democracy: trust, tolerance, subjective well-being, membership, and 
national pride. Second, it will analyze the cultural effects on political interest and 
participation, subjects of which have been of inherent interest to students of political 
culture as well as of comparative political behavior. These two variables can also be 
deemed as components of social capital as they measure “civic engagement.” In both 
analyses, I attempt to disentangle the effects of cultural factors at the individual level 




Civic Culture and Democracy 
 
Since Almond and Verba’s (1963) pathbreaking study, students of political 
culture who attempt to go beyond the descriptive, typological approach have focused on 
identifying the model of political culture congruent with the structure of the political 
system, which leads to the stability of political regimes and to stable democracy in 
particular. The authors, based on the one of the first large-scale comparative surveys of 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico, argued that the civic 
culture, a mixture of more traditional cultures such as subject and parochial ones with 
more modern, rational, participatory culture,1 is “particularly appropriate for” and “most 
congruent with” democratic political system.2
Eckstein concurred and elaborated on this “congruence theory.” He expected 
governments to perform well to the extent that their authority patterns are congruent with 
the authority patterns of society. Moreover, he advocated “balanced disparities” or 
combinations of democratic and non-democratic traits as a condition for effective 
democracy (Eckstein 1969 and 1997). In fact, Almond and Verba attribute civic culture 
as the prescription to democracy to this blending of apparent contradictions by Eckstein 
(Almond and Verba 1963; Almond 2002, 198). 
  
Inglehart, who initiated the renaissance of the study of political culture in the 
1980’s, reinterpreted civic culture as “a coherent syndrome of personal life satisfaction, 
                                                 
1 Almond (1980) traced the origin of the idea of civic culture to Aristotle’s conception of mixed 
government that is organized on both oligarchic and democratic principles with a predominant middle class. 
2 According to Lijphart (1980), the wordings such as “fit,” “most appropriate,” and “congruent” suggest 
that Almond and Verba were aware of the causality issue in political culture. 
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political satisfaction, interpersonal trust and support for the existing social order” (1988, 
1203) and found that high level of civic culture was strongly correlated with economic 
development as well as with stable democratic institutions (1988 and 1990). Inglehart 
could make a stronger case for confirming congruence theory because he used a body of 
evidence that not only was much larger than that available to Almond and Verba but also 
covered a number of years.3
Putnam has distinguished himself in the study of political culture by seeking more 
explicitly conditions not only for stable democracy but also for good or successful one, 
that is, “strong, responsive, effective representative institutions” (1993, 6). Putnam’s 
approach was also ingenious in that he focused on cultural variations within a single 
country – in one study, Italy (1993) and in the other, the United States (2000). His 
answers, however, are not something completely new: culture, civic culture in particular, 
matters. Based on a multi-method, comparative study of Italy’s regional governments, 
Putnam demonstrated that the stock of social capital, defined as “features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated actions,” (1993, 67) 
 In addition, he reaffirmed the finding of interdependent 
relationship between culture, economy, and democracy with the expanded World Values 
Survey data in later work (1997, Chapter 6). 
4 was positively correlated with 
the performance of regional and local governments.5
                                                 
3 For these works (1988 and 1990), Inglehart used Euro-Barometers (twelve countries 1970-1986), the 
World Values Survey (twenty five countries 1981-1982), and three nation panel study (the United States, 
West Germany, and the Netherlands, 1974-81). 
 He basically replicated this finding 
4 In this sense, his conceptualization of social capital is very close to Inglehart’s civic culture as discussed 
above. 
5 Putnam (1993) proposed twelve indications of institutional performance or effectiveness such as cabinet 
stability, budget promptness, statistical and information services, reform legislation, legislative innovation, 
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utilizing the extensive data about the performance of state governments of the United 
States (2001). For example, the states with high stock of social capital tend to perform 
better in such areas as education, child welfare, economy, health, crime rate, and so on. 
Drawing on these works of political culture and civic culture study in particular, 
this chapter will explore the effects of individualism and collectivism at the individual 
level as well as at the country level on a series of individual level variables that have been 
shown to enhance the performance of democratic political system: interpersonal trust, 
tolerance, membership, subjective well-being, and national pride. In other words, it will 
examine the effects of the major cultural frames and values on the components of civic 
culture and social capital at the individual level. 
In addition, this chapter will evaluate the effects of individualism and collectivism 
on political interest and participation, both of which have been suggested to measure 
civic engagement as social capital. Combined with the analysis of the cultural effects on 
the components of civic culture and social capital, this will help us understand how at the 
individual level cultural factors contribute to sustaining stable or successful democracy. 
Moreover, this analysis is relevant to one of the central problems in Western psychology, 
the inconsistency between attitudes and behavior (Markus and Kitayama 1991, 24). By 
exploring differential implications of individualism and collectivism for political attitude 
and behavior, this analysis attempts to contribute to the discussion of one of the enduring 
dilemmas in psychology. 
The empirical analysis of the dissertation, which makes up Chapter III and 
Chapter IV, utilizes the information from both the individual and cultural level data in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
day care centers, family clinics, industrial policy instruments, agricultural spending capacity, local health 
unit expenditures, housing and urban development, and bureaucratic responsiveness. 
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same model, the approach of which breaks from previous political culture research that 
have drawn largely on the aggregate level analysis. Therefore, I will explain first the 
rationale behind the statistical analysis used in the dissertation: multilevel analysis.  
 
Why Multilevel Analysis? 
 
There are two methodological reasons6
The fact that the observations are not independent entails serious statistical 
consequences. It violates the assumption that the errors are independent, which underlies 
the standard linear models such as analysis of variance (ANOVA) and ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression models. Thus, if we pooled all the observations ignoring the 
dependence among them and apply the linear models, it will deflate the estimated 
standard errors and hence produce spuriously significant results, i.e., commit Type I 
 why multilevel analysis is most 
appropriate for the empirical analysis of the dissertation: First, the problem of dependent 
observations within the same cultural context necessitates multilevel modeling (MLM). 
We can reasonably expect people who live under the same culture to think and behave 
similarly to a certain degree that they are different from people who live under different 
cultures. In other words, individuals within the same culture are not truly independent. 
Although they do not directly address questions from cross-cultural studies, MLM 
experts Kreft and Leeuw concur with this assumption: “The more individuals share 
common experiences due to closeness in space and/or time, the more they are similar, or 
to a certain extent, duplications of each other” (1998, 9). 
                                                 
6 For substantive justification, see Chapter II. 
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errors.7 In fact, it has been shown that a slight ICC (Intraclass Correlation Coefficient), a 
measure of the degree of dependence of individuals can dramatically increase the Type I 
error, especially when the number of observations per contextual unit is large (Kreft and 
Leeuw 1998; Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Bickel 2007).8 Considering the fact that the 
minimum number of the observations per country in this analysis is greater than 1,000 
(Greece, N=1,142), the concern about Type I error is particularly valid.9
Thus, MLM is appropriate because it attempts to explain individual level variation 
with the higher level factors as well as the same level factors, taking into account the fact 
that individual level observations are dependent or share variation (Steenbergen and 
Jones 2002).  
 
Second, the empirical analysis of the dissertation is a response to increasing call 
for utilizing contextual information in comparative political behavior as well as in the 
psychological study of culture (Hofstede 2001; Seligson 2002; Jennings 2007; Curtice 
2007; Oyserman and Uskul 2008). The typical dataset in comparative political behavior 
is structured hierarchically. That is, the individual level data (Level 1) are collected and 
organized according to a country (Level 2) as in the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES) or as in the World Values Survey (WVS), which is the primary data 
source of the dissertation. However, cross-cultural studies as well as the empirical study 
                                                 
7 Steenbergen and Jones (2002), for example, showed that most predictors of EU support became 
significant once they ran OLS regression ignoring the multilevel structure of the Eurobarometer survey that 
consisted of 15 EU member states. 
8 It can also be called a measure of group homogeneity. Formally, it is defined as the proportion of variance 
in the outcome variable that is between the second-level units with data having a two-level hierarchical 
structure (Kreft and Leeuw 1998, 9). 
9 According to Kreft and Leeuw (1998, 10), a small ICC (say p=0.01) inflates the Type I error rate from the 
assumed 0.05 to an observed 0.17 for groups of mere 100 observations. 
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of comparative political behavior have under-utilized the information from this unique 
data structure. As discussed in Chapter 2, most comparative political behavior studies as 
well as cross-cultural psychological studies have done either a separate analysis per each 
country or compared samples from only two to three countries. In other words, neither of 
them has fully taken advantage of the contextual information, the incorporation of which 
into a multilevel model is likely to reduce model misspecification compared with a single 
level model (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 219). In addition, MLM takes into account not 
only the uniqueness of each context but also what they have in common by incorporating 
contextual information, what Kreft and Leeuw (1998) would call “borrowing strength.” 
In sum, multilevel analysis is superior to traditional alternative methods that 
address the issue of dependent observations within contexts. For example, either we 
could run a single analysis based on pooled observations without correcting for 
dependent observations at the lower level or do a separate analysis per each country and 
compare the results. However, the former will be likely to entail spuriously significant 
results while the latter will discard the information at the contextual level, i.e., the 
country level in this case, as discussed. Moreover, the need for separate analyses for 
separate contexts contradicts the premise that countries are related to each other (Kreft 
and Leeuw 1998). For example, one can arrange all the countries along the cultural 
dimensions of individualism and collectivism.10
                                                 
10 Steenbergen and Jones (2002) found that the conventional approaches – e.g., dummy variable model and 
two-step analysis, both of which are implemented in an OLS regression analysis – in political science for 
multilevel data are not satisfactory: Dummy variables are only indicators of contextual differences and do 
not explain why the regression regimes for the subgroups are different. The two-step or “slopes as 
outcomes” analysis implicitly assumes that the macro-level predictors fully account for contextual 






The World Values Survey 
The empirical analysis of the dissertation primarily relies on the five waves of the 
survey data of thirty OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
member countries from the World Values Survey (WVS).11
www.worldvaluessurvey.org)
 The WVS has been most 
extensive of the academic survey program. The first wave of the project was conducted 
from 1981 to 1984 for twenty countries by the European Values Survey (EVS) group and 
each wave has since been administered in approximately every five years, with an 
average sample size of 1,400 respondents per each country per wave. The second wave 
was conducted in 1990–1993 for forty two countries, the third wave in 1995–1997 for 
fifty four countries, the fourth wave in 1999–2001 for sixty two countries, and the fifth 
wave in 2005–2007 for fifty seven countries. Surveys have now taken place in almost 
eighty societies that represent all major regions of the world and plan to carry out the 
sixth wave of surveys in 2010 – 2011. All WVS surveys are conducted t in face-to-face 
interviews, using a standardized sampling population of adult citizens aged eighteen and 
over (Heath et al. 2005; the World Values Survey website ( ). 
The empirical analysis of the dissertation draws on the data from thirty OECD 
countries in order to increase the number of observations included in the analysis. They 
largely consist of the high-income economies that have a history of administering quality 
opinion surveys. In addition, other macro-level measures such as government size and 
individualism and collectivism at the country are available mostly for these countries. 
                                                 
11 East Germany is included as a separate country even after the reunification, making the maximum level 2 
number of observations thirty one. 
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Table 3.1 shows the number of respondents per country and wave that are included in the 
analysis (N=151,734). 
 
Constructing Individualism and Collectivism Index  
at the Individual Level 
 
At the individual level, individualism and collectivism represent cultural values. 
They are cultural because they are shared among members in a specific group and 
transmitted from one generation to another within the same group. Triandis supported 
this idea citing Kluckhohn’s definition of culture: “Culture is to society what memory is 
to individuals. It includes what has worked in the experience of a society, so that it was 
worth transmitting to future generations” (2002, 135). North (1990, 37) also concurred by 
citing Boyd and Richerson (1985, 2) on the definition of culture: “the transmission from 
one generation to the next, via teaching and imitation, of knowledge, values, and other 
factors that influence behavior.”  
In addition, individualism and collectivism are values because they are deemed 
desirable and reflect something durable and trans-situations by the members of a specific 
group. In this sense, these cultural values are distinguished from attitudes, opinion, and 
preference, all of which tend to be specific and short-lived. By using the term “values” to 
refer to enduring cultural orientations of an individual, the analysis follows the distinction 
made by Hofstede who reserved the term to refer to the comparable notion of culture at 
the individual level: “In studying “values” we compare individuals; in studying “culture” 
we compare societies” (2001, 15). 
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The World Values Survey has an item that satisfies these properties and has been 
measured across all the five waves: “Here is a list of qualities that children can be 
encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? 
Please choose up to five!”12
Based on the discussion in Chapter II about critical components of individualism 
and collectivism at the individual level, each cultural value index is constructed using the 
following additive formulas: 
 This question specifically invokes the transmissional nature 
of culture by referring to “children” and “encouraged to learn at home” and implicates 
desirable value by asking respondents to choose qualities that they consider “especially 
important.” Moreover, it invokes family, which has been repeatedly demonstrated as “a 
prime agent of socialization” in political socialization literature (Jennings 2007).  
 
Individualism = independence + feeling of responsibility + imagination 
 + determination and perseverance 
 
Collectivism   = tolerance and respect for other people + religious faith  
 + unselfishness + obedience 
 
Specifically, I draw on the definitions and core attributes of each construct 
suggested by Hofstede (1980 and 2001), Triandis (1995), Schwartz (1990), and 
Oyserman et al. (2002a) in particular. Oyserman and her colleagues suggested seven 
individualistic value components and eight collectivistic ones based on the 
comprehensive content analysis of existing scales. The former includes independent, 
                                                 
12 There are other value choices that are not included in the analysis because they were measured only one 
of the waves or determined as not relevant to the cultural values of interest. They include good manners, 
politeness and neatness, honesty, patience, leadership, self-control, loyalty, thrift saving money and things, 
and hard work. 
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compete, goal, unique, private, self-know, and direct communicate. The latter includes 
related, advice, belong, context, duty, group, harmony, and hierarchy.13 The analysis 
determines that independence and responsibility belong to “independent” domain, 
imagination to “private,” and determination and perseverance to “compete.” It also 
decides that tolerance and respect for other people belong to “harmony” domain and 
unselfishness to “related” or “duty” or “harmony,” and obedience to “hierarchy.” The 
analysis determines that religious faith be included in the collectivism index at the 
individual level although the item does not fit well in any of Oyserman et al.’s eight 
collectivistic content categories.14 The rationale behind the decision is Schwartz’s 
universal value types, among others. I maintain that religious faith, without invoking any 
specific denominations, belong to tradition, one of his collective value types.15
The analysis constructs each cultural value separately because their component 
qualities are conceptually distinct. As discussed in Chapter II, it approaches 
individualism and collectivism at the individual level not as bipolar unidimensional 
 Schwartz 
explained that tradition represented “respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs 
and ideas that traditional culture or religion impose” and listed “respect for tradition, 
accepting my portion in life, and devout” as examples (1990, 144 italics added).  
                                                 
13 Refer to Chapter II for description of each domain. 
14 Note that not all cultural value items fit perfectly in Oyserman et al. (20002a)’s fifteen (seven 
individualism and eight collectivism) components, which account for 88% of items across each of the 
scales included in their meta-analysis. 
15 The items of the individualism index also fit in Schwartz’s individual value types, derived a priori. For 
example, independence and imagination with self-direction that represents “independent thought and 
actions” and includes “creativity, independent, imaginative, intellectual” values, determination and 
perseverance with achievement that represents “personal success through demonstrated competence 




values but as multidimensional ones. Some previous research has even shown that they 
are empirically orthogonal, especially when they are measured separately at the 
individual level (Oyserman et al. 2000a). Considering the fact this analysis draws on a 
large number of cases (N=151,734), which is likely to increase the possibility of spurious 
correlation, I decide not to include both of them in the same model. The analysis also 
confirms a relatively high correlation between two indices (r = -.24). Table 3.2 shows 
mean and standard deviation of each index across countries along with the country level 
ratings of individualism and collectivism, which is the average of the measures by 
Hofstede (1980) and Triandis (1990). 
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate that individualism and collectivism as cultural values 
show relatively little change across the waves per country, which suggest the static nature 





The first dependent variable “Trust” is measured dichotomously “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very 
careful in dealing with people?” Paxton (2007) proposed this as a measure of 
“generalized trust,” which is a critical component of social capital. Although it has been 
measured in all the five waves of the survey, it does not specify a group of people trusted. 
The wording “most people” may be problematic because collectivism as individual value 
has been shown to be target-specific (Hui and Triandis1986; Hui 1988; Triandis et al. 
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1990).16 Therefore, the second dependent variable for trust, “Trust Index,” is constructed 
using a series of questions in the fifth wave. It is an additive index that is composed of 
five items, each asking whether respondents trust their neighborhood, people they know 
personally, people they meet for the first time, people of another religion, and people of 
another nationality. The answer choices include “not trust at all,” “not trust very much,” 
“trust a little,” and “trust completely.” Thus, the higher the score, the more a respondent 
trusts others in general. Note that this variable excludes “your family” in order to 
distinguish the family members from the others when it comes to the target of trust or 
trustee.17
Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of trust in general and Figure 3.5 the distribution 
of trust index across countries. 
 In addition, trust beyond the family members or “generalized others” to use 
Paxton’s term, is what matters to civic culture and social capital. 
Intolerance 
The five waves of the World Values Survey have a list of ten outgroups or 
stigmatized groups18
                                                 
16 This is discussed in Chapter II. 
 that respondents might not want to live nearby. In this analysis, 
“Intolerance Index” is constructed by counting the number of outgroups or stigmatized 
groups respondents would not like to have as neighbors among eight out of those 
minority groups that have most observations throughout the waves: people of a different 
race and immigrants/foreign workers as outgroups and heavy drinkers, people with a 
17 I constructed another trust measure based only on strangers, that is, people they meet for the first time, 
people of another religion, and people of another nationality. The results were essentially the same so I 
decide to use “Trust Index,” a more inclusive measure but without the family component. 
18 Each country can add specific minority groups to the list of eight groups, common to most countries 
across the waves. There are a total of 41 minority groups that the WVS has asked or been given by 
respondents over the five waves. 
63 
 
criminal record, emotionally unstable people, people who have aids, drug addicts, and 
homosexuals as stigmatized groups. Thus, the higher the number is, the more intolerant a 
respondent is. Figure 3.6 represents the distribution of intolerance index across countries. 
Membership 
“Membership Index” is constructed using the items of the first four waves of the 
World Values Survey to maximize the number of observations included in the analysis. 
The survey asks whether a respondent belong to a series of social groups out of which (1) 
social welfare service for elderly, (2) religious organization, (3) education, arts, music or 
cultural activities, (4) labor unions, (5) political parties, (6) human rights, (7) professional 
associations, and (8) youth work groups are included. This is one of the two behavior 
measures in the analysis, the other being “Political Action Index” below. Figure 3.7 
illustrates the distribution of membership index across countries. 
Subjective Well-being 
Since the first wave, the World Values Survey has measured “feeling of happiness” 
by asking “Taking all things together, would say you are: very happy, rather happy, not 
very happy, or not at all very happy?” and “life satisfaction” by asking “All things 
considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” on a 10-point 
scale. Following Inglehart and his colleagues (2008, 267), subjective well-being (SWB) 
index is constructed using two measures of satisfaction with life (10 point scale) and 
feeling of happiness (4 point scale) as follows:  
 
SWB = life satisfaction – 2.5* happiness.  
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Thus, the happiest and the most satisfied respondent would have a SWB score of 
7.5 while the unhappiest and the most unsatisfied one would have a SWB score of -9. 
Figure 3.8 shows the distribution of SWB across countries. 
National Pride 
Each wave of the World Values Survey has asked how proud a respondent is to be 
his or her countryman on a scale from 1 to 4, 4 being very proud and 1 being not at all 
proud. The analysis includes this variable as a proxy measure for the degree that a 
respondent is satisfied with his or her political system, one of the key measures of 
Inglehart’s civic culture. Figure 3.9 illustrates the distribution of national pride across 
countries. 
Political Interest 
All the five waves have the same question asking “How interested would you say 
you are in politics?” on a scale 1 to 4 and this item is used as “Political Interest” variable. 
Figure 3.10 represents its distribution across countries. 
Political Action Scale 
The World Values Survey has asked a question throughout all the five waves 
whether a respondent “has done” or “might do” or “would never under any circumstances 
do” a certain, non-electoral forms of political participation: signing a petition, joining in 
boycotts, and attending peaceful demonstration.19
                                                 
19 Each wave of the World Value Survey have a series of voting intention/preference questions framed as 
“which party would you vote for” and “you would never vote for.” Only the newest fifth wave has a 
question of whether a respondent voted in the recent elections to the national parliament. Initially, I chose 
the latter question as a measure of political behavior but decided to exclude it in the current analysis 
because factors crucial to the individual’s voting decision such as institutional contexts (Jackman 1987) – 
e.g., compulsory voting and parliamentary or presidential system – and country and time specific stakes 
could not be controlled appropriately at the time of the analysis. The preliminary analysis without those 
factors found that cultural effects did not seem to matter in one’s voting decision. 
 Political action scale is constructed by 
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adding these 3 scale items, making the score of 6 mean that a respondent has done all 
these difficult forms of political participation, 0 mean that he or she would never 
participate in any of them under any circumstances. This is one of the two behavior 
measures in the analysis, the other being “Membership” above. Figure 3.11 depicts the 




Other than Individualism and Collectivism cultural value indices discussed above, 
the following independent variables are included in the models. 
 
Level 1: Individual Level 
Left-Right 
This is a 10 category measure for ideological self-identification, 1 being left and 
10 being right. Survey research has shown that left-right scale is a powerful summary or 
“rule-of-thumb” measure of political discourse at least in Western democracies. That is, it 
has repeatedly suggested that the majority of voters in most Western democracies 
conceive of politics in terms of a left-right ideological dimension and can readily place 
themselves on left-right dimension, more than a sense of party affiliation (Inglehart and 
Klingemann 1976; Inglehart 1997). This ideological self-placement variable is included 






This is a dichotomous variable that collapses full time (thirty hours a week or 
more), part time (less than thirty hours a week), and self-employed into “employed” 
category while retired/pensioned, housewife not otherwise employed, student, and 
unemployed into “unemployed.” 
Income 
Income is measured on a 10-point scale, where 1 indicates the lowest income 
decile and 10 the highest income decile. It measures household income that includes all 
wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. 
Education 
Education is a 10 category variable that classifies the groups a respondent belongs 
to based on the age when he or she completed education.20
Gender 
 There is another variable that 
measures a respondent’s education level by asking “the highest educational level that you 
have attained.” However, the analysis selected the age based education variable framed as 
“At what age did you (or will you) complete your full time education, either at school or 
at an institution of higher education? Please exclude apprenticeships” considering the fact 
that each country has different education system and more importantly it has more 
observations (n= 127,657) than the former (n=88,086).  
This is a dichotomous variable that classifies the gender of a respondent. 
 
                                                 
20 The variable is missing for New Zealand, making the maximum number of level 2 observations thirty in 
the multilevel models. When the analysis draws on only the fifth wave data as in “Trust Index,” I use an 8 
category education variable instead to maximize the number of observations included in the model. 
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Level 2: Country Level 
Individualism-Collectivism Ratings at the Country Level (IND-COL) 
This analysis utilizes an independent measure of individualism and collectivism at 
the country level in addition to the corresponding measures at the individual level. That is, 
it relies primarily on the measure by Suh and his colleagues (1998). The authors averaged 
the country level measures by the two leading experts on the cultural frames, Hofstede 
(1980) and Triandis (1990). The analysis complemented their measure by filling in 
missing values with available ones by either author. Table 3.2 shows the ratings of 
Individualism-Collectivism (IND-COL) ratings at the country level.  
In contrast with the corresponding individual level values, this country level 
variable is considered bipolar, unidimensional, as discussed on Chapter II. In other words, 
the higher the rating of IND-COL, the higher individualistic but the lower collectivistic 
culture a country has. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of IND-COL across the 
countries (M=6.49, SD=1.83, Max=9.55, Min=2.4). It shows that the countries in the 
West (the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom) have the most 
individualistic cultures while the countries in the East (South Korea and Japan), the 
former Soviet countries (Poland and Slovakia), religious or still developing countries 
(Turkey, Portugal, and Mexico) have more collectivistic cultures.  
There are three reasons why the analysis uses the existing measure of cultural 
level individualism and collectivism instead of the country means of those cultural values 
of the individual level as some multilevel modeling literature might suggest. First, I 
theorize the bipolar unidimensionality of cultural level measures in Chapter II as the 
aggregate measure based on Hofstede and Triandis reflects. The individual level cultural 
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value indices used in the analysis are constructed in a way that they can represent the 
multidimensionality of individualism and collectivism at the individual level. Thus, it is 
difficult to interpret substantively or claim the unidimensionality of, the cultural level 
aggregate means of these indices. Second, I attempt to test the internal validity of one of 
the most studied measure (Oyserman et al. 2002a). One can cast doubt on the validity of 
IND-COL – i.e., whether this popular cultural level variable measures what it is supposed 
to measure – if it fails to show expected effects on the individual’s political attitude and 
behavior. Third, more methodologically, it has to do to with the fact that the analysis uses 
grand-mean centering in every model and hypothesizes not only the intercepts but also 
the slopes at the first level (i.e., the individual level) are random across countries. If we 
reintroduce the group means of cultural values as second-level (i.e., the country level) 
variables into a group-centered model, it will become equivalent to a uncentered, “raw 
score model” with a random intercept but with a fixed slope (Kreft and Leeuw 1998, 109). 
This means that each country has different intercept but the same cultural value effect 
across countries. This is not what the analysis intends. Grand-mean centering can get 
around this problem. I will revisit the centering issue in multilevel models section. 
Government Size 
Government size is measured by government share of real gross domestic product 
per capita in % in 2000 Laspeyres constant prices (Penn World Table 6.2).21
                                                 
21 East Germany is the only country that does not have the measure and is excluded in Model 2 and Model 
4 in the multilevel analysis. 
 This is an 
institutional proxy variable that is assumed to represent the degree of collectivism at the 
macro-level. Note that Markus (2001) proposed “limited government” as one of three 
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individualistic values in American politics. Thus, I theorize that the size of the 
government will reflect the aggregate demand or tolerance of such individualistic values. 
 
Cross-level Interaction 
There is one cross-level interaction variable in the analysis: individualism or 
collectivism at the individual level (level 1) multiplied by individualism-collectivism at 
the country level (level 2). The cross-level interaction variable is included in the models 
to determine whether cultural level effects interact to amplify or dampen corresponding 
cultural values at the individual level beyond the sum of the effects from both levels. 
 
Multilevel Model Analysis 
 
Multilevel Models 
For each dependent variable that measures political attitude and behavior, I run 
four multilevel models in order to estimate the effects of individualism and collectivism, 
disentangling their individual level effect as cultural values from their cultural level effect 
as cultural frames. The analysis specifies that the intercept and the slope of the cultural 
value indices of the individual level (i.e., level 1 or micro-level) are random, that is, vary 
over countries in all the multilevel models. Two country level (i.e., level 2 or macro-level) 
variables, “Individualism Culture” and “Government Size” are introduced to explain the 
variations of the intercept and the slope of the cultural value indices of the micro-level. 
“Individualism Culture” is included in all the multilevel models and “Government Size” 
is included in Model 2 and Model 4. “Individualism Culture” is also used to estimate the 
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cross-level interaction effect with its micro-level counterpart, cultural value index of 
individualism and collectivism in Model 3 and Model 4. Thus, Model 1 is the simplest 
one as it does not have government size nor the cross-level interaction term. Model 4, as 
a full model, has two level-2 variables and the interaction term of the cultural effect. 
The other parameter estimates of interest are variance components, the statistical 
significance of which is used to test the assumption that there exist differential contextual 
effects and that each context is a legitimate macro-unit of analysis in multilevel modeling. 
The estimation of the multilevel models is based on the independently pooled cross-
sectional data of thirty OECD member countries over the five waves of the World Values 
Survey. 
Grand-Mean Centering 
All the independent variables including the dichotomous ones are grand-mean 
centered. There are three reasons why the analysis decides to use grand-mean centering. 
First, grand-mean centered model is a better choice because the primary goal of this 
analysis is to measure the individual as well as the cultural level effects of individualism 
and collectivism on the individual’s political attitude and behavior. An alternative, group-
mean centered model is considered a better choice when a researcher’s primary interest is 
in measuring relationships between group-level independent variables and group-level 
outcomes (Bickel 2007). Second, the raw score model and the grand-mean centered 
model are “equivalent linear models,” giving the same fit, the same predicted values, and 
the same residuals, while the parameter estimates can easily be translated into each other. 
Thus, it will facilitate substantively meaningful interpretations of the estimates. In 
contrast, a group-mean centered model is a completely different model from a raw score 
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one in the sense that they are not equivalent linear models as between grand-mean 
centering and raw sore model and thus need a different theoretical justification (Kreft and 
Leeuw 1998). Third, centering helps avoid multicollinearity in multilevel models with 
cross-level interactions. Indeed, students of multilevel modeling recommend that grand-
mean centering is the best choice in most applications (for centering issues, see Kreft and 
Leeuw 1998, 106-114; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, 30-35; Bickel 2007, 137-144). 
Multilevel models in the analysis for this chapter summarized as follows: 
Model 1: Macro-level Individualism without Cross-level Interaction 
Level 1: Individual 
Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation 
= B0 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
(+ B5 L-R Ideology) + B6 Individualism or Collectivism + rij 
 
Level 2: Country 
B0 = G00 + G01 Individualism Culture + u0j 
B6 = G10 + u1j 
 
Mixed Model 
Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation 
= G00 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
(+ B5 L-R Ideology) + G10 Individualism or Collectivism  
+ G01 Individualism Culture + u1j Individualism or Collectivism + rij + u0j 
 
Model 2: Macro-level Individualism and Government Size without Cross-level 
Interaction 
Level 1: Individual 
Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation 
= B0 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
(+ B5 L-R Ideology) + B6 Individualism or Collectivism + rij 
 
Level 2: Country 
B0 = G00 + G01 Individualism Culture + G02 Government Size + u0j 
B6 = G10 + u1j 
 
Mixed Model 
Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation 
= G00 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
(+ B5 L-R Ideology) + G10 Individualism or Collectivism + G02 Government Size 
+ G01 Individualism Culture + u1j Individualism or Collectivism + rij + u0j 
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Model 3: Macro-level Individualism with Cross-level Interaction 
Level 1: Individual 
Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation 
= B0 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
(+ B5 L-R Ideology) + B6 Individualism or Collectivism + rij 
 
Level 2: Country 
B0 = G00 + G01 Individualism Culture + u0j 
B6 = G10 + G11 Individualism Culture + u1j 
 
Mixed Model 
Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation 
= G00 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
(+ B5 L-R Ideology) + G10 Individualism or Collectivism  
+ G01 Individualism Culture  
+ G12 Individualism or Collectivism*Individualism Culture  
+ u1j Individualism or Collectivism + rij + u0j 
 
Model 4: Macro-level Individualism and Government Size with Cross-level 
Interaction 
Level 1: Individual 
Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation 
= B0 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
(+ B5 L-R Ideology) + B6 Individualism or Collectivism + rij 
 
Level 2: Country 
B0 = G00 + G01 Individualism Culture + G02 Government Size + u0j 
B6 = G10 + G11 Individualism Culture + u1j 
 
Mixed Model 
Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation 
= G00 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
(+ B5 L-R Ideology) + G10 Individualism or Collectivism  
+ G01 Individualism Culture + G02 Government Size 
+ G12 Individualism or Collectivism*Individualism Culture  
+ u1j Individualism or Collectivism + rij + u0j 
 
A mixed model is a collapsed form of level 1 and level 2 models. B represents the 
fixed effect at the individual level except for the intercept (B0) and the slope of cultural 
values (B6), both of which are random, that is, vary over countries. Gst is the effect of the 
macro variable t (i.e., macro-level intercept, Individualism Culture, and Government Size) 
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on the regression coefficient of micro variable s (i.e., micro-level intercept and 
Individualism or Culturalism index). It represents the fixed effect at the country level. r 
refers to level 1 error and u level 2 error. The subscript i indexes respondent and j country. 
Left-Right self-placement is parenthesized because it is included only in the models for 
national pride and political action scale. 
The analysis used STATA software and the restricted maximum likelihood 
(REML) method to estimate parameters. “Trust” is the only binary variable and the 
estimation is based on multilevel logistic regression model. Table 3.3 and 3.4 show the 




The analysis focuses on (1) the statistical significance of slope and intercept 
variance estimates and (2) the effects of individualism and collectivism on the component 
variables of civic culture and social capital while disentangling their individual level 
effects as cultural values from the cultural level effects as cultural frames. 
First, I hypothesize that the variance estimates of intercept and slopes of 
individualism and collectivism as cultural values are statistically significant across all the 
models. In other words, I expect that there exit differential effects of individualism and 
collectivism as cultural values at the individual level across countries. In addition, I 
expect the mean of each dependent variable when all the independent variables are set to 
their means – 0 in this analysis because of grand-mean centering – to be different across 
countries. Substantively, this hypothesis implies that each country is unique in that it has 
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the different effects of cultural values and a different baseline value for each dependent 
variable. In other words, this hypothesis is intended to confirm empirically that each 
context, a country in this analysis, is a valid second-level unit in the multilevel modeling 
analysis. 
Second, the effects of collectivism on trust and tolerance are hypothesized to be 
negative while the effects of individualism on these civic culture/social capital variables 
are hypothesized to be positive. 
Trust presupposes positive consideration of or sometimes even emotional 
investment in others. According to Paxton (2007, 48), trust implicates “a conscious or 
unconscious decision to place trust, arrived at through an assessment of trustworthiness 
of a potential trustee.” Tolerance also involves consideration of others although it does 
not have to positive. Thus, trust and tolerance presuppose enhanced consideration of 
other regarding, collectivistic values such as relationship and interdependence. 
A considerable cross-cultural psychological literature has shown that especially in 
collectivistic cultures, these values function only when one considers others in question 
as members of groups one identifies with, that is, members of one’s own in-group. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that the distinction of in-group versus out-group is 
amplified and vital to collectivists (Hui and Triandis1986; Hui 1988; Triandis et al. 1988; 
Triandis 1989; Schwartz 1990; Triandis et al. 1990; Kitayama and Markus1991; Triandis 
1995). Hofstede’s definition (2001) of collectivism even specifies “strong, cohesive in-
group” and “unquestioning loyalty” as its key components, as introduced in Chapter II. 
In-groups are characterized by similarities among the members who share a sense 
of “common fate” with other members. In contrast, out-groups are characterized as 
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“groups with which one has something to divide, perhaps unequally, or are harmful in 
some way, groups that disagree on valued attributes, or groups with which one is in 
conflict” (Triandis 1995, 9). Defined broadly, the specific scopes of in-group and out-
group depend on culture. That is, in individualistic cultures the in-group includes “people 
who are like me in social class, race, beliefs, attitudes, and values” while in collectivistic 
cultures it typically includes family and friends. Moreover, collectivists are inclined to 
view ambiguous groups as out-groups while individualists tend to view such groups as 
quasi-in-groups. Thus, most interpersonal behavior occurs within that huge in-group in 
individualistic cultures (Triandis et al. 1988; Triandis 1995). 
That being the case, I expect the negative effects of collectivism on trust and 
tolerance especially when the target is deemed as not “one of us” and thus in an 
adversarial relationship with “us” by default. In contrast, I expect the positive effects of 
individualism on trust and tolerance for such huge, quasi-in-group members. In fact, 
Hofstede’s validation analysis with the World Values Survey shows that individualism is 
positively linked with trust and trust at least at the aggregate level (2001, 191). At the 
individual level, it has been shown that Americans, typical individualists, were more at 
ease with strangers than others and more willing to trust others (Oyserman et al. 2002a). 
Third, individualism is hypothesized to have a positive effect on membership 
while collectivism is hypothesized to have a negative effect on this behavioral component 
of civic culture/social capital.  
According to Triandis (1995), as discussed in Chapter II, the constructs of 
individualism and collectivism can be distinguished along the dimension of personal-
communal goal alignment. For example, one can identify collectivism when group goals 
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have priority and individualism when personal goals have priority. Thus, individualists 
are theorized to maintain multiple memberships to the extent that it helps attain self-
relevant goals and that the benefits of participation exceed the costs. They are also 
hypothesized to leave and join groups as personal goals change. In other words, group 
memberships for individualists are impermanent and nonintensive.22 Indeed, empirical 
literature found that Americans interacted with more groups and felt they could choose 
their groups more freely (Triandis et al. 1988; Kim 1994; Oyserman 2000a). In contrast, 
collectivists tend to stick with narrowly defined in-groups and family and close friends in 
particular, even when personal goals should be adjusted to be aligned with the goals of 
the group where they belong.23
Based on this observation, I expect that individualism is positively linked while 
in-group oriented collectivism is negatively associated, with the number of groups 
individuals join. In other words, individualism is hypothesized to encourage individuals 
to be joiners while collectivism is hypothesized to constrain individuals to stick to a 
relatively small number of narrowly defined in-groups. 
  
Fourth, the effects of culture on subjective well-being (SWB) are hypothesized to 
be opposite and depend on the level of cultural factors. That is, at the individual level the 
effect of individualism (IND) is hypothesized to be negative while the effect of 
collectivism (COL) on this measure of subjective global evaluation of happiness is 
                                                 
22 The multiple memberships in individualistic cultures may also explain the hypothesized positive effects 
of individualism on trust and tolerance. To maintain multiple memberships in diverse groups based on their 
needs, individualists might learn and internalize “equity” norm that discourages bias and favoritism and 
facilitates trust and tolerance. 
23 Triandis and his colleagues (1998, 325) observed that individualists make friends easily but by “friends” 
they mean nonintimate acquaintances (325). 
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hypothesized to be positive. In other words, I expect that collectivists are more likely to 
feel satisfied and happy while individualists are less likely to feel the same. At the 
cultural level, however, the effects are hypothesized to be reversed. Individualistic 
cultures (IC) are hypothesized to affect one’s SWB positively while collectivistic cultures 
(CI) are hypothesized to affect one’s SWB negatively. 
Empirical evidence has shown that collectivistic people perceive that they receive 
a more and better quality of social support than individualists do. It has also suggested 
that people who have emotional support from others, more specifically from in-group 
members, are less likely to feel lonely but are more likely to feel happy, to be healthy, 
and live longer, which implies higher level of SWB. In contrast, individualism has been 
linked to high levels of alienation and perceived loneliness, which should be the 
symptoms of lower level of SWB (Triandis 1985 et al. 1985; Triandis et al. 1988; 
Triandis 1995; Oyserman et al. 2000a). Thus, I expect the opposite influence of 
individualism and collectivism at the individual level on personal life satisfaction, which 
is also one of the civic culture components. 
At the aggregate level analysis, a body of empirical work has shown that 
individualistic culture is positively linked with SWB. For example, Diener et al. (1995), 
based on surveys from fifty five nations, found that the correlation between individualism 
and SWB was strongly and persistently positive even when other predictors such as 
income, equality, and human rights, all of which were positively correlated with SWB, 
were controlled.24
                                                 
24 The authors’ data consist of Veenhoven’s probability surveys and a large scale college student samples 
from 40 nations. 
 Their individualism measure primarily drew on Hofstede and Triandis 
as the empirical analysis of the dissertation did. Veenhoven (1999) also found, based on 
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probability surveys of forty three nations from his “World Database of Happiness,” that 
“individualization,” a similar measure of individualism showed a clear positive 
relationship with quality-of-life measured by citizen’s subjective appreciation of life. In 
addition, Hofstede (2001, 191) reported that his IDV measure positively correlated with 
happiness (r=.66) and life satisfaction (r=.58), based on the data of nineteen wealthy 
countries from the second wave of the World Values Survey (1990-1993).  
Furthermore, Inglehart et al. (2008) showed, based on multilevel analysis, that 
“sense of free choice” at the country level as well as at the individual level positively 
affected one’s subjective well-being. Although these authors’ measure of cultural value 
and frame are mere one aspect of individualism of this analysis, their finding, along with 
the other works discussed here, provide a key rationale for why I expect reversed cultural 
effects at the national level. That is, I theorize that individualistic cultures would enhance 
individuals’ SWB by providing favorable cultural environments where they feel more 
freedom of choice and control over their lives. Indeed, Inglehart et al. (2008)’s “sense of 
free choice” is one of dependent variable in Chapter IV and I will be able to provide the 
supporting evidence for this reasoning. 
Fifth, I expect that the effect on national pride is negative while the effect of 
collectivism on this civic culture component is positive. That is, individualism is 
hypothesized to lead individuals to feel less pride while collectivism is hypothesized to 
lead individuals to feel more pride, in their country.  
A growing body of cross-cultural psychology literature suggests that people in 
different culture tend to have different construals of the self or self-concept. In other 
words, individualism has been shown to facilitate the independent while collectivism the 
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interdependent, construal of the self.25
Thus, I theorize that collectivistic construal of the self encourages the individual 
to link pride, which is an attribute of the self, with the nation, which is a collective he or 
she belongs to while individualistic, egocentric self-concept discourages the conceptual 
connection.  
 Specifically, the former conception of 
individuality encourages “egocentric, separate, autonomous, idiocentric, and self-
constrained” notion of the self while the latter “sociocentric, holistic, collective, 
allocentric, ensembled, constitutive, contextualist, connected, and relational” self-concept 
(Markus and Kitayama 1991; Kim 1994; Triandis 1995; Oyserman et al. 2002a). Markus 
and Kitayama also argued that independent construal of the self did not need others even 
including in-group members such as family and friends while interdependent self 
included them in the construal.  
Sixth, I expect that individualism and collectivism have opposite effects on 
political interest and participation, the variables in which students of comparative 
political behavior have had inherent interest. That is, individualists are less likely to be 
interested in politics and hence less likely to participate in non-electoral, difficult forms 
of political activity such as signing a petition, joining in boycotts, and attending peaceful 
demonstration. In contrast, collectivists are more likely to be interested in politics and 
hence more likely to participate in those difficult forms of political activities. 
 It has been suggested, as discussed in Chapter II, that the core attributes of 
individualism include independence, autonomy, and self-reliance. These individualistic 
                                                 
25 Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed that this differential construal of the self has significant 
psychological consequences in the domain of cognition, emotion, and motivation, all of which had been 
approached as the universal psychological functioning. 
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values help individuals interact positively in most interpersonal relations with “quasi-in-
group” members because “truly reciprocal” interdependence presupposes actor’s 
independence and awareness of shared interests with others. Thus, Waterman (1984, 65-
69) hypothesized that individualism would be positively linked with such social attitudes 
as tolerance, trust, and cooperation, which is consistent with the one suggested above.  
However, these individualistic cultural values have also been advanced to have 
negative effects on individual’s social attitude and behavior when the issue and situation 
facing the individual involve a group as a whole including a broad collectivity such as 
society or government. In other words, individualistic cultural values function positively 
only when the situations involve interpersonal relationships. Collectivism should replace 
individualism when the situations involve intergroup relationships (Triandis 1995). Thus, 
individualism has been suggested to affect civic engagement in matters of public interest 
negatively (e.g. Sampson 1977; Merelman 1991). The decreasing stock of American 
social capital, extensively shown by Putnam (2000), has been suggested to support the 
reasoning (McBride 1998).  
Specifically relevant to politics, individualistic cultural values that emphasize 
independence, autonomy, and self-reliance have been theorized to be central to “classical 
liberalism” and individualists’ preference for laissez-faire when it comes to politics and 
the form of government in particular. According to Lukes’ “political individualism,” 
independent individuals are “the sole generators of their own wants and preferences and 
the best judges of their own interests” and therefore the purpose of governments should 
be “confined to enabling individuals’ wants to be satisfied.” The government should not 
“influence or alter their wants, interpret their interests for them or invade or abrogate 
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their rights” (1973, 79-80).26
In a sense, those individualistic values function as ego-centric or self-interested 
orientations when individuals deal with a collective and the government in particular. 
Thus, I expect the negative effects of individualism on political interest and participation. 
 Markus (2001) concurred with this idea in the context of 
American politics and proposed “limited government” as one of the distinct aspect of 
individualism along with autonomy and self-reliance. 
In contrast, collectivism is hypothesized to have a positive effect on these political 
attitude and behavior variables considering that in collectivist cultures the country as a 
whole could be relevant in-group.27
Finally, I expect that the direction and statistical significance of the effects of 
cultural values at the individual level and cultural frames at the country level are aligned 
except for subjective well-being. For example, significant positive effect of individualism 
at the individual level on tolerance would be accompanied with significant positive effect 
of individualism at the country level. Thus, individualists who live in individualistic 
culture are expected to be most tolerant. Substantively, this means that in general 
individual’s cultural values are expected to be aligned with the dominant cultural frame. 
 In addition, collectivistic, group-oriented cultural 
values encourage individuals to align their goals to communal ones and thus they should 
have inherent interest in those goals (Triandis et al. 1988; Triandis 1995). In a sense, the 
expectation is consistent with the hypothesis for national pride. 
                                                 
26 According to Lukes (1973 Chapter 12), the other two component ideas of political individualism are a 
view of government as based on the individually given consent of its citizens and a view of political 
representation as representation not of orders or estates or social functions or social classes, but of 
individual interests. 
27 In collectivistic cultures, family and friends are typical examples of in-groups but neighbors, work 
groups, or even the country as a whole could become the relevant in-groups (Triandis et al. 1988). 
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In addition, I expect significant cross-level effects of the aligned cultural values and 
frames. That is, there would be synergistic, mutually reinforcing cultural effects from the 
individual and cultural level. For example, I hypothesize that a collectivist in collectivist 
culture feels far more national pride – more than sum of the net effects from both levels 




All the variance components are statistically significant, which suggests that there 
exit contextual effects. As shown from the bottom parts of Table 3.3 – Table 3.18, all the 
variance estimates for intercept and slope are at least two times larger than their standard 
error (SE). In other words, it is highly likely that each country has different intercept and 
slope estimates of the cultural values of individualism and collectivism. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that each country is a legitimate unit of analysis in multilevel 
modeling analysis as well as in the study of culture. This finding is consistent with 
Inglehart and Baker’s observation (2000) that the differences between the cultural values 
such as survival/self-expression and traditional/secular-rational values held by members 
of different religions such as Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims within given societies 
are much smaller than are cross-national differences. It is also consistent with Schwartz’s 
observation (2004) that the cultural distance between samples from the same country was 
almost always smaller than the distance between samples from different countries. Thus, 
he supports the view that “nations are meaningful cultural units” (57). 
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For the other hypotheses, the cultural effects of individualism and collectivism 
showed up in general but rather with mixed results. First, the hypotheses about the effects 
of individualism on trust and tolerance appear to be confirmed in general. Individualism 
both as cultural value and as cultural frame seems to affect trust positively, whether it is 
measured without a reference to a specific group (Table 3.3) or with reference to groups 
of people other than family members (Table 3.5). Both the coefficients of individualism 
index (IND) at the individual level and individualism-collectivism rating (IC) at the 
country level are positive and statistically significant regardless of controlling for 
government size and cross-level interaction term of IND and IC. Moreover, cross-level 
interactions in Model 3 and Model 4 for Trust (Table 3.3) are positive and marginally 
significant (p-value = 0.07), which suggests that IND and IC interacts to produce 
additional positive effect – i.e., more than the sum of each net effect of IND and IC – on 
“generalized trust” or a sense of trust toward generalized others. It is worthy of note that 
only individualism shows cross-level effects and that “Trust” is one of the three domains 
that such statistically significant effects exit. The others include “Membership” and 
“Political Action Scale.”  
In addition, collectivism at the country level (CI)28
                                                 
28 The country-level rating is reversed so that the expected effects are aligned across levels. This applies to 
all the models in the statistical analysis of the dissertation. 
 shows negative effects on 
“Trust” and “Trust Index” across all the models, with or without cross-level interactions 
and government size, which confirms the hypothesis in general. All of them are highly 
statistically significant with considerable sizes ranging from -0.21 to -0.19 for “Trust” 
and -0.76 to -0.61 for “Trust Index.” 
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Yet the hypothesized negative effects of collectivism are not confirmed at the 
individual level (COL). In fact, all the models show significantly positive effects of COL 
on generalized trust although the coefficients are relatively small, all close to 0.05 (Table 
3.4). The effects of COL on the more target specific measure of trust are also positive but 
not statistically significant with p-values ranging from 0.12 to 0.20 (Table 3.6). 
The hypotheses for the cultural effects on intolerance are also confirmed. The 
coefficients of individualism at both levels in all the models for intolerance are negative 
(Table 3.7) while those of collectivism also at both levels are positive (Table 3.8) and all 
of them are highly significant with p-values close to zeros. In other words, individualism 
leads one to be more tolerant while collectivism less tolerant. The size of the government, 
a proxy variable for collectivism, also seems to contribute to intolerance but the p-values 
are rather large (p=0.10). 
Second, the hypotheses about the effect of culture on membership seem to be 
partially supported. As Table 3.9 illustrates, individualist tend to belong to more groups 
and individualistic culture encourages this tendency despite the fact that the individual 
level effects (IND) are marginally significant with p-values ranging from 0.3 to 0.5. Yet 
there exist statistically significant cross-level effects as Model 3 and Model 4 show. 
Table 3.10 suggests that collectivism at the individual level (COL) also encourages more 
memberships as opposed to the expectation while collectivistic culture (CI) seems to 
discourage membership as hypothesized. The coefficients for both COL and CI are 
statistically significant and the absolute sizes are similar (0.11) for Model 1 and 2. In 
addition, the effects of COL are larger than those of IND. For example, the coefficients of 
COL are close to 0.11 while those of IND range from 0.03 to 0.04. Moreover, there exist 
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small but significantly negative cross-level effects in collectivism, that is, -0.02 for both 
Model 3 and 4. This may imply the total effects of collectivism on membership are 
indeed smaller than those of individualism, which is consistent with the hypothesis. 
Third, the results seem to support the level dependent hypothesis about subjective 
well-being (SWB) in general. At the individual level, collectivism affects positively on 
one’s SWB as expected (Table 3.11). In addition, the effects are statistically significant 
through all the models. It is worthy of note that in both cultures, income has relatively 
large, positive effects (close to 0.20) on one’s SWB, which is consistent with findings 
from existing literature. At the country level, individualism seems to affect one’s SWB 
positively (Table 3.11) while collectivism negatively as hypothesized (Table 3.12). 
Moreover, the effects are larger than those of income. The absolute sizes of the cultural 
level effects range from 0.32 to 0.37. Government size also affect one’s SWB negatively, 
which also supports the negative effect of collectivistic culture on SWB.  
Nevertheless, the hypothesized negative effect of individualism at the individual 
level on SWB was not confirmed. It seems to affect negatively one’s subjective feeling of 
happiness and satisfaction as hypothesized but the effects are close to zero (-0.01) and are 
not even statistically significant. 
Fourth, the hypotheses about the cultural effects on national pride are also 
partially confirmed. As expected, individualism as individual’s cultural value (IND) seem 
to affect negatively on one’s pride on nationality (Table 3.13) while collectivism as 
individual’s cultural value (COL) positively on one’s national pride (Table 3.14). This is 
significant because another possible “constraint” in mind, that is, left-right ideological 
self-placement, is controlled for in every model. The absolute sizes are similar – 0.4 for 
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IND and COL and 0.5 for ideology – and both are highly statistically significant.29
Fifth, as in national pride, the effects of individualism and collectivism on the 
individual’s level of political interest seem to exist as hypothesized but only at the 
individual level. According to Table 3.15 and 3.16, individualists do not seem to care 
about politics while collectivists do. In addition, the effects of individualism (-0.08) are 
four times as large as those of collectivism (0.02 or 0.03). Individualism and collectivism 
as cultural frame do not register statistically significant effects although the directions of 
the effect are consistent with the relevant hypotheses. 
 As 
both tables show, however, the corresponding cultural frames (IC and CI) are not 
statistically significant. In a sense, the cultural level effects seem reversed as government 
size exerts relatively small but negative effects on national pride (-0.02). They are 
statistically significant. 
Finally, the hypotheses about the effects of the cultural values and frames on 
political participation are disconfirmed. Individualism at both levels seems to affect 
political action scale positively, which implies that individualists are more likely to 
participate in non-electoral, difficult forms of political activity and the corresponding 
cultural frame seems to encourage this behavioral tendency. There also exist cross-level 
effects as shown in Model 3 and 4 (Table 3.17). Collectivism at the country level (CI) 
also seems to disconfirm the hypothesis (Table 3.18). The collectivistic culture appears to 
discourage people from involvement with actions in matters of public concerns. The 
effects are relatively large, close to -0.16, and statistically significant. Collectivism at the 
                                                 
29 The analysis did not hypothesize the effect of ideology but it seems to confirm conventional notion of the 
term. That is, the results show that the right are positively linked with national pride. Kim and Fording 
(1998) suggested “national way of life” as one of the Rightist categories. 
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individual level (COL) seems to have a positive effect on political action scale but the 
coefficients are not statistically significant. It is worthy of note that the left seem to be 
more politically active. The absolute size of the coefficients of the Left-Right ideological 
self-placement is similar to that of the coefficients of education. For individualism (Table 
3.17), the coefficient for education is 0.12 and that for ideology is 0.13 and for 




The empirical analysis of the dissertation is based on the premise that culture 
affects individuals’ political psychology via internalized cultural values and as “human-
made” environments under which they think and act. This chapter attempted to identify 
the effects of individualism and collectivism, which have been proposed as the central 
cultural dimensions in cross-cultural psychology literature, on the individual’s political 
attitude and behavior relevant to the theory of civic culture and social capital, while 
distinguishing the cultural and individual level effects. The results of multilevel analysis 
show that in general individualism and collectivism matter both for the elements of civic 
culture and social capital. The significant cultural effects show up either at one level of 
analysis or at both. 
Having said that, I speculate on some of the reasons for the unexpected results 
and alternative interpretation of some of the findings in the concluding section. 
First, a future analysis may need to reconceptualize and re-operationalize the 
definition of collectivism at the individual level in a way that emphasizes the component 
of close in-groups and family in particular rather than the abstract notion of 
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interdependent, group- and relation- centered aspects. This will increase conceptual 
consistency across the levels. 
The confirmation of the hypothesized negative effects of collectivism at the 
cultural level in the domain of trust, tolerance, and membership in fact strengthens the 
case of “family and close friends” specific nature of collectivism made by Triandis and 
his colleagues, among others (Hui and Triandis1986; Hui 1988; Triandis et al. 1988; 
Triandis et al. 1990). The family and close in-group component of collectivism might 
also explain the sizable negative effect of collectivism at the cultural level on political 
participation.30 Indeed, Triandis and his colleagues claimed that collectivists tend toward 
actions that benefit the family rather than the broad public good particularly if they are 
centered on the family as their major collective. Thus, according to these authors, 
“perhaps the major disadvantage of collectivism is in the political domain” (1988, 328).31
In addition, the unexpected positive effects of collectivism at the individual level 
on generalized trust and membership may be attributable to the fact that collectivism 
index contains “tolerance and respect for others” as one of the components. It seems that 
collectivists still interpret “others” in this question as in-group members especially 
considering the fact that collectivism at both levels affects tolerance negatively (Table 
3.8). Nevertheless, people may approach this relational, other-regarding cultural value as 
a universal norm, not specifically tied to their close in-group members. 
  
                                                 
30 In fact, Allik and Realo (2004) showed that individualism, not collectivism, was strongly positively 
associated with political activity as well as civic engagement. Their aggregate level analysis draws on the 
state level data of the United States and the second wave (1990-1991) of the World Values Survey. 
31 The authors invoked Banfield (1958), who attributed the lack of trust and cooperation for common good 
in a small town in southern Italy to the ethos of “amoral familism” that only encouraged the material, short-
run advantage of the nuclear family. 
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Yet the emphasis on the family in the definition of collectivism should not go too 
far as the evidence is not definitive. As cultural value at the individual level, collectivism 
seems to enhance national pride and political interest, whose targets are bigger than one’s 
family. In addition, we should note that family is also a critical component in the 
definition of individualism as suggested by Hofstede: “everyone is expected to look after 
him/herself and her/his immediate family only” (2001, 225). In fact, the concept of self in 
individualism and the West in general subsumes one’s immediate family according to 
self-interest literature (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Kinder 1998). Then, the question is 
under what conditions or situations, collectivists identify non-familial groups or 
collectives as close in-groups and collectivists cultures encourage individuals to do so. 
The confirmed result of the level dependent, reversed cultural effects on 
subjective well-being (SWB) emphasizes the need to incorporate major cultural 
dimensions into a unifying theoretical framework for cross-cultural analysis, as proposed 
by Inglehart and Oyserman (2004) and Schwartz (2004). They have found that Hofstede 
and Triandis’ individualism and collectivism, Schwartz’s autonomy and embeddedness, 
and Inglehart’s self-expression and survival, the major cultural dimensions at the 
aggregate level proposed so far, significantly overlap both theoretically and empirically. 
In a sense, they constitute “cultural syndromes,” that is, patterns of shared attitudes, 
beliefs, and values organized around a theme (Triandis 1996). Thus, self-expression value 
that emphasizes “freedom and choice,” as a societal condition could be introduced to 
facilitate reasoning for the positive effects of individualism at the cultural level on 
individual’s SWB. In addition, Inglehart’s finding (1997) that Postmaterialists seek 
relatively demanding, non-material standards for the quality of life appears to strengthen 
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the case for the hypothesized but unconfirmed negative effect of individualism on SWB 
at the individual level.32
In some cases where only individual level cultural effects show up, individuals 
might internalize cultural values so distinctively as their own that they may not need 
additional, societal pressure whether or not they are aware of it. National pride and 
political interest are cases in point. The divergent level effects should weaken the case for 
the alignment hypothesis that the effect of culture at the individual level is in the same 
direction of that of culture at the aggregate. To test the hypothesis further, we need to 
look more closely at political socialization and acculturation process in particular where 
individuals learn and internalize the dominant cultural norms. 
  
Finally, the divergent results between political interest and action – that is, 
individualism discourages political interests while encourages difficult forms of political 
participation – call for a serious theoretical consideration about the discrepancy between 
attitude and behavior in a non-experimental setting as in this observational study. The 
discrepancy may be due to a different level of specificity in the attitudinal and behavioral 
measures, as Inglehart (1997, 51-52) suggested as a reason for low levels of attitude-
behavior consistency. In other words, global cultural values and frames may be good at 
predicting global political interest but not specific political behavior. In addition to the 
measurement specificity issue, a future research agenda should include what motivates 
individualists to act against their apparent disinterest in politics and why collectivists do 
not follow up their revealed interest in public matters with actions.  
                                                 
32 Inglehart reasoned that economic prosperity throughout the formative years would allow Postmaterialists 




Table 3.1. The Number of Observations for Country by Wave 
Country\Wave 1981-84 1989-93 1994-99 1999-04 2005-07 Total N 
Australia 1,228 0 2,048 0 1,421 4,697 
Austria 0 1,460 0 1,522 0 2,982 
Belgium 1,145 2,792 0 1,912 0 5,849 
Canada 1,254 1,730 0 1,931 2,148 7,063 
Czech Republic 0 3,033 1,147 1,908 0 6,088 
Denmark 1,182 1,030 0 1,023 0 3,235 
Finland 0 588 987 1,038 1,014 3,627 
France 1,200 1,002 0 1,615 1,001 4,818 
Greece 0 0 0 1,142 0 1,142 
Hungary 1,464 999 650 1,000 0 4,113 
Iceland 927 702 0 968 0 2,597 
Ireland 1,217 1,000 0 1,012 0 3,229 
Italy 1,348 2,018 0 2,000 1,012 6,378 
Japan 1,204 1,011 1,054 1,362 1,096 5,727 
South Korea 970 1,251 1,249 1,200 1,200 5,870 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 1,211 0 1,211 
Mexico 0 1,531 2,364 1,535 1,560 6,990 
Netherlands 1,221 1,017 0 1,003 1,050 4,291 
New Zealand 0 0 1,201 0 954 2,155 
Norway 1,051 1,239 1,127 0 1,025 4,442 
Poland 0 1,920 1,153 1,095 1,000 5,168 
Portugal 0 1,185 0 1,000 0 2,185 
Slovakia 0 1,602 1,095 1,331 0 4,028 
Spain 2,303 4,147 1,211 2,409 1,200 11,270 
Sweden 954 1,047 1,009 1,015 1,003 5,028 
Switzerland 0 1,400 1,212 0 1,241 3,853 
Turkey 0 1,030 1,907 4,607 1,346 8,890 
Great Britain 1,167 1,484 1,093 1,000 1,041 5,785 
United States 2,325 1,839 1,542 1,200 1,249 8,155 
West Germany 1,305 2,101 1,017 1,037 988 6,448 
East Germany 0 1,336 1,009 999 1,076 4,420 
Total N 23,465 41,494 24,075 39,075 23,625 151,734 
Source: World Values Survey. 2009. “1981-2008 Unofficial Aggregate.” World Values Survey Association 




Table 3.2. Individualism and Collectivism Index with Country Level Ratings 
  Individualism Collectivism Country 
Country M SD M SD IND-COL* 
Australia 1.72 1.11 1.80 0.89 9 
Austria 2.14 0.96 1.18 0.74 6.75 
Belgium 1.58 1.07 1.50 0.91 7.25 
Canada 1.84 0.99 1.76 0.90 8.5 
Czech Republic 1.52 0.87 1.27 0.77 7 
Denmark 2.00 0.99 1.41 0.77 7.7 
Finland 2.29 0.94 1.48 0.76 7.15 
France 1.50 1.02 1.62 0.85 7.05 
Greece 2.17 0.95 1.28 0.87 5.25 
Hungary 1.59 0.95 1.23 0.88 6 
Iceland 1.97 1.18 1.69 1.14 7 
Ireland 1.20 1.01 1.94 0.97 6 
Italy 1.58 0.97 1.58 0.94 6.8 
Japan 2.33 0.99 1.16 0.79 4.3 
South Korea 2.02 0.94 0.95 0.79 2.4 
Luxembourg 1.91 0.99 1.47 0.88 6 
Mexico 1.83 0.98 1.99 1.03 4 
Netherlands 1.79 1.02 1.42 0.80 8.5 
New Zealand 1.89 1.09 1.53 0.94 7.9 
Norway 2.28 1.00 1.14 0.73 6.95 
Poland 1.43 0.88 1.85 0.80 5 
Portugal 1.31 0.89 1.73 0.82 3.85 
Slovakia 1.45 0.90 1.38 0.84 5.2 
Spain 1.60 0.96 1.42 0.85 5.55 
Sweden 2.08 1.02 1.36 0.67 7.55 
Switzerland 2.32 1.07 1.56 0.80 7.9 
Turkey 1.36 0.93 1.71 0.85 3.7 
Great Britain 1.45 1.07 1.89 0.91 8.95 
United States 1.65 1.06 1.83 1.02 9.55 
West Germany 2.22 1.04 1.08 0.73 7.35 
East Germany 2.33 0.94 1.13 0.66 6 
Total 1.78 1.04 1.50 0.90 6.49 
Individualism Index = independence + feeling of responsibility + imagination + determination and perseverance 
Collectivism Index   = tolerance and respect for other people + religious faith + unselfishness + obedience 
 
*Source: Suh et al. (1998). “The shifting basis of life satisfaction judgments across cultures: Emotions versus norms.” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 (2): 482-493. Authors averaged the country level measures by 






Figure 3.1. Individualism in OECD Countries over the Five Waves of the World Values Survey  
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Figure 3.3. Individualism-Collectivism Ratings at the Country Level 
 
Source: Suh, et al. 1998. “The shifting basis of life satisfaction judgments across cultures: Emotions versus 
norms.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 (2):482-93. 
 











































































































































































































































































Figure 3.5. Trust Index 
 
 




















































































































































































































Figure 3.7. Membership Index 
 
 




























































































































































































































































Figure 3.9. How Proud of Nationality 
 
 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3.Effect of Individualism on Trust 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=99,656 N1=96,909 N1=99,656 N1=96,909 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 
Income 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.01 0.01 0.56 0.01 0.01 0.69 0.01 0.01 0.55 0.01 0.01 0.67 
Individualism (IND) 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.00 
Constant -0.66 0.08 0.00 -0.66 0.09 0.00 -0.66 0.08 0.00 -0.66 0.09 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
IND*IC       0.02 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.07 
Country Level             
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) 0.17 0.05 0.00 0.17 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.05 0.00 
Size of the Government    0.00 0.02 0.86    0.00 0.02 0.86 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.21 0.06  0.22 0.06  0.21 0.05  0.22 0.06  
Covariance 0.02 0.01   0.02 0.01   0.02 0.01   0.02 0.01   






Table 3.4. Effect of Collectivism on Trust 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=99,656 N1=96,909 N1=99,656 N1=96,909 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.00 
Income 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.00 0.01 0.83 0.00 0.01 0.96 0.00 0.01 0.83 0.00 0.01 0.96 
Collectivism (COL) 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 
Constant -0.63 0.09 0.00 -0.63 0.09 0.00 -0.63 0.09 0.00 -0.63 0.09 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
COL*CI       0.00 0.01 0.87 0.00 0.01 0.84 
Country Level             
Collectivism-Individualism (CI) -0.19 0.05 0.00 -0.20 0.05 0.00 -0.20 0.05 0.00 -0.21 0.05 0.00 
Size of the Government    -0.02 0.02 0.29    -0.02 0.02 0.29 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.24 0.06  0.25 0.07  0.24 0.06  0.25 0.07  
Covariance 0.01 0.01   0.02 0.01   0.01 0.01   0.02 0.01   







Table 3.5.Effect of Individualism on Trust Index 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=16,967 N1=16,139 N1=16,967 N1=16,139 
 N2=18 N2=17 N2=18 N2=17 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed -0.33 0.06 0.00 -0.32 0.06 0.00 -0.33 0.06 0.00 -0.32 0.06 0.00 
Income 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.00 
Education 0.24 0.01 0.00 0.23 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.01 0.00 0.23 0.02 0.00 
Male 0.00 0.06 0.99 -0.01 0.06 0.91 0.00 0.06 0.99 -0.01 0.06 0.90 
Individualism (IND) 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.20 0.07 0.00 
Constant 16.43 0.34 0.00 16.68 0.37 0.00 16.43 0.34 0.00 16.68 0.37 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
IND*IC       -0.01 0.03 0.71 -0.01 0.03 0.71 
Country Level             
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) 0.74 0.17 0.00 0.65 0.18 0.00 0.73 0.17 0.00 0.64 0.18 0.00 
Size of the Government    0.14 0.09 0.13    0.14 0.09 0.13 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.05 0.02  0.05 0.02  0.05 0.02  0.05 0.03  
Variance Intercept 2.03 0.73  1.95 0.75  2.03 0.73  1.95 0.75  
Covariance 0.02 0.09  0.04 0.09  0.03 0.09  0.04 0.10  
Variance Residual 13.16 0.14   13.13 0.15   13.16 0.14   13.13 0.15   







Table 3.6.Effect of Collectivism on Trust Index 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=16,967 N1=16,139 N1=16,967 N1=16,139 
 N2=18 N2=17 N2=18 N2=17 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed -0.31 0.06 0.00 -0.30 0.06 0.00 -0.31 0.06 0.00 -0.30 0.06 0.00 
Income 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.00 
Education 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.25 0.02 0.00 
Male 0.00 0.06 0.99 0.00 0.06 0.95 0.00 0.06 0.99 0.00 0.06 0.94 
Collectivism (COL) 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.16 0.10 0.07 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.20 
Constant 16.53 0.36 0.00 16.80 0.39 0.00 16.54 0.36 0.00 16.82 0.39 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
COL*CI       -0.05 0.03 0.11 -0.05 0.03 0.12 
Country Level             
Collectivism-Individualism (CI) -0.76 0.18 0.00 -0.69 0.18 0.00 -0.71 0.18 0.00 -0.61 0.19 0.00 
Size of the Government    0.16 0.09 0.09    0.16 0.09 0.09 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.06 0.03  0.07 0.03  0.05 0.03  0.06 0.03  
Variance Intercept 2.21 0.79  2.21 0.85  2.20 0.79  2.19 0.84  
Covariance -0.08 0.12  -0.13 0.13  -0.08 0.11  -0.12 0.12  
Variance Residual 13.19 0.14   13.17 0.15   13.19 0.14   13.17 0.15   







Table 3.7.Effect of Individualism on Intolerance 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=65,691 N1=63,727 N1=65,691 N1=63,727 
 N2=29 N2=28 N2=29 N2=28 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed -0.18 0.02 0.00 -0.18 0.02 0.00 -0.18 0.02 0.00 -0.18 0.02 0.00 
Income -0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.05 
Education -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.00 
Individualism (IND) -0.13 0.02 0.00 -0.14 0.03 0.00 -0.14 0.02 0.00 -0.14 0.02 0.00 
Constant 2.89 0.14 0.00 2.91 0.14 0.00 2.89 0.14 0.00 2.90 0.15 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
IND*IC       0.02 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.02 0.23 
Country Level             
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) -0.30 0.09 0.00 -0.32 0.09 0.00 -0.29 0.09 0.00 -0.31 0.09 0.00 
Size of the Government    0.04 0.03 0.16    0.04 0.03 0.16 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.01 0.00  0.02 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.59 0.16  0.58 0.16  0.59 0.16  0.58 0.16  
Covariance 0.00 0.02  0.00 0.02  0.00 0.02  0.00 0.02  
Variance Residual 3.72 0.02   3.73 0.02   3.72 0.02   3.73 0.02   







Table 3.8.Effect of Collectivism on Intolerance 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=65,691 N1=63,727 N1=65,691 N1=63,727 
 N2=29 N2=28 N2=29 N2=28 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed -0.20 0.02 0.00 -0.20 0.02 0.00 -0.20 0.02 0.00 -0.20 0.02 0.00 
Income -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Education -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.00 
Collectivism (COL) 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.00 
Constant 2.88 0.15 0.00    2.88 0.15 0.00 2.90 0.15 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
COL*CI       0.00 0.01 0.89 0.00 0.01 0.72 
Country Level             
Collectivism-Individualism (CI) 0.31 0.09 0.00 0.33 0.09 0.00 0.31 0.09 0.00 0.33 0.09 0.00 
Size of the Government    0.05 0.03 0.10    0.05 0.03 0.10 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.63 0.17  0.61 0.17  0.63 0.17  0.61 0.17  
Covariance 0.01 0.02  0.01 0.02  0.01 0.02  0.01 0.02  
Variance Residual 3.75 0.02   3.75 0.02   3.75 0.02   3.75 0.02   







Table 3.9. Effect of Individualism on Membership* 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=68,365 N1=66,318 N1=68,365 N1=66,318 
 N2=27 N2=26 N2=27 N2=26 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.00 
Income 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 
Individualism (IND) 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 
Constant 0.78 0.06 0.00 0.78 0.07 0.00 0.78 0.06 0.00 0.78 0.06 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
IND*IC       0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 
Country Level             
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.15 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.00 
Size of the Government    -0.01 0.01 0.31    -0.01 0.01 0.30 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.11 0.03  0.11 0.04  0.10 0.03  0.10 0.03  
Covariance 0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  
Variance Residual 0.98 0.01   0.99 0.01   0.98 0.01   0.99 0.01   







Table 3.10. Effect of Collectivism on Membership 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=68,365 N1=66,318 N1=68,365 N1=66,318 
 N2=27 N2=26 N2=27 N2=26 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.00 
Income 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 
Collectivism (COL) 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.00 
Constant 0.80 0.06 0.00 0.79 0.07 0.00 0.80 0.06 0.00 0.79 0.07 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
COL*CI       -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 
Country Level             
Collectivism-Individualism (CI) -0.11 0.04 0.00 -0.11 0.04 0.00 -0.15 0.04 0.00 -0.16 0.04 0.00 
Size of the Government    -0.01 0.01 0.45    -0.01 0.01 0.44 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.11 0.03  0.11 0.03  0.11 0.03  0.11 0.03  
Covariance 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01  
Variance Residual 0.98 0.01   0.99 0.01   0.98 0.01   0.99 0.01   








Table 3.11. Effect of Individualism on Subjective Well-Being 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=101,521 N1=98,657 N1=101,521 N1=98,657 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.03 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.63 0.03 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.63 
Income 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Male -0.20 0.02 0.00 -0.20 0.02 0.00 -0.20 0.02 0.00 -0.20 0.02 0.00 
Individualism (IND) -0.01 0.02 0.70 -0.01 0.03 0.70 -0.01 0.02 0.72 -0.01 0.03 0.72 
Constant 2.62 0.16 0.00 2.66 0.14 0.00 2.62 0.16 0.00 2.66 0.14 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
IND*IC       -0.01 0.01 0.68 -0.01 0.01 0.71 
Country Level             
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) 0.32 0.08 0.00 0.35 0.08 0.00 0.34 0.09 0.00 0.36 0.08 0.00 
Size of the Government    -0.07 0.03 0.01    -0.07 0.03 0.01 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.02 0.01  
Variance Intercept 0.74 0.20  0.57 0.16  0.74 0.20  0.58 0.16  
Covariance -0.05 0.02  -0.03 0.02  -0.05 0.02  -0.04 0.02  
Variance Residual 9.43 0.04   9.39 0.04   9.43 0.04   9.39 0.04   







Table 3.12. Effect of Collectivism on Subjective Well-Being 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=101,521 N1=98,657 N1=101,521 N1=98,657 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.36 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.36 
Income 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Male -0.17 0.02 0.00 -0.17 0.02 0.00 -0.17 0.02 0.00 -0.17 0.02 0.00 
Collectivism (COL) 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.23 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.23 0.02 0.00 
Constant 2.61 0.16 0.00 2.65 0.14 0.00 2.61 0.15 0.00 2.65 0.14 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
COL*CI       0.02 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.23 
Country Level             
Collectivism-Individualism (CI) -0.36 0.09 0.00 -0.37 0.08 0.00 -0.33 0.09 0.00 -0.37 0.08 0.00 
Size of the Government    -0.08 0.03 0.00    -0.08 0.03 0.00 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.72 0.19  0.55 0.16  0.72 0.19  0.55 0.16  
Covariance 0.02 0.02  0.00 0.02  0.02 0.02  0.00 0.02  
Variance Residual 9.38 0.04   9.35 0.04   9.38 0.04   9.35 0.04   







Table 3.13. Effect of Individualism on National Pride 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=86,113 N1=83,594 N1=86,113 N1=83,594 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.00 
Income 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.06 
Education -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 
Male -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
Individualism (IND) -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.00 
Left-Right 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Constant 3.31 0.05 0.00 3.32 0.05 0.00 3.31 0.05 0.00 3.32 0.05 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
IND*IC       0.00 0.01 0.60 0.00 0.01 0.65 
Country Level             
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) 0.01 0.03 0.80 0.01 0.02 0.57 0.01 0.03 0.68 0.02 0.03 0.48 
Size of the Government    -0.02 0.01 0.01    -0.02 0.01 0.01 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.07 0.02  0.06 0.02  0.07 0.02  0.06 0.02  
Covariance 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Variance Residual 0.51 0.00   0.50 0.00   0.51 0.00   0.50 0.00   









Table 3.14. Effect of Collectivism on National Pride 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=86,114 N1=83,595 N1=86,114 N1=83,595 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.00 
Income 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.65 
Education -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 
Male -0.01 0.00 0.22 -0.01 0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.21 -0.01 0.01 0.07 
Collectivism (COL) 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 
Left-Right 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Constant 3.31 0.05 0.00 3.32 0.05 0.00 3.31 0.05 0.00 3.32 0.05 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
COL*CI       0.00 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.46 
Country Level             
Collectivism-Individualism (CI) -0.01 0.03 0.62 -0.02 0.03 0.45 -0.01 0.03 0.65 -0.02 0.03 0.50 
Size of the Government    -0.02 0.01 0.04    -0.02 0.01 0.04 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.07 0.02  0.06 0.02  0.07 0.02  0.06 0.02  
Covariance 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Variance Residual 0.51 0.00   0.50 0.00   0.51 0.00   0.50 0.00   







Table 3.15. Effect of Individualism on Political Interest 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=83,509 N1=80,537 N1=83,509 N1=80,537 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 
Income -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 
Education -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 
Male -0.26 0.01 0.00 -0.27 0.01 0.00 -0.26 0.01 0.00 -0.27 0.01 0.00 
Individualism (IND) -0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.01 0.00 
Constant 2.57 0.05 0.00 2.59 0.04 0.00 2.57 0.05 0.00 2.59 0.04 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
IND*IC       -0.01 0.01 0.32 -0.01 0.01 0.31 
Country Level             
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) -0.03 0.03 0.28 -0.03 0.02 0.30 -0.02 0.03 0.37 -0.02 0.02 0.40 
Size of the Government    -0.02 0.01 0.05    -0.02 0.01 0.05 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.07 0.02  0.05 0.01  0.07 0.02  0.05 0.01  
Covariance 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Variance Residual 0.75 0.00   0.75 0.00   0.75 0.00   0.75 0.00   








Table 3.16. Effect of Collectivism on Political Interest 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=83,509 N1=80,537 N1=83,509 N1=80,537 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 
Income -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 
Education -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 
Male -0.26 0.01 0.00 -0.26 0.01 0.00 -0.26 0.01 0.00 -0.26 0.01 0.00 
Collectivism (COL) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Constant 2.55 0.05 0.00 2.57 0.05 0.00 2.55 0.05 0.00 2.57 0.05 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
IND*IC       0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.29 
Country Level             
Collectivism-Individualism (CI) 0.02 0.03 0.38 0.02 0.03 0.36 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.03 0.03 0.27 
Size of the Government    -0.01 0.01 0.09    -0.01 0.01 0.09 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.07 0.02  0.06 0.02  0.07 0.02  0.06 0.02  
Covariance 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Variance Residual 0.76 0.00   0.76 0.00   0.76 0.00   0.76 0.00   








Table 3.17. Effect of Individualism on Political Action Scale 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=81,002 N1=78,612 N1=81,002 N1=78,612 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.31 0.01 0.00 0.30 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.01 0.00 0.30 0.01 0.00 
Income 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.00 
Individualism (IND) 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.25 0.02 0.00 
Left-Right -0.13 0.00 0.00 -0.13 0.00 0.00 -0.13 0.00 0.00 -0.13 0.00 0.00 
Constant 2.77 0.07 0.00 2.75 0.07 0.00 2.77 0.07 0.00 2.75 0.07 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
IND*IC       0.05 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 
Country Level             
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) 0.15 0.04 0.00 0.15 0.04 0.00 0.15 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.00 
Size of the Government    -0.01 0.01 0.57    -0.01 0.01 0.57 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.02 0.00  0.02 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.14 0.04  0.14 0.04  0.14 0.04  0.14 0.04  
Covariance 0.00 0.01  0.00 0.01  0.00 0.01  0.00 0.01  
Variance Residual 2.31 0.01   2.31 0.01   2.31 0.01   2.31 0.01   







Table 3.18. Effect of Collectivism on Political Action Scale 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=81,003 N1=78,613 N1=81,003 N1=78,613 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.35 0.01 0.00 0.34 0.01 0.00 0.35 0.01 0.00 0.34 0.01 0.00 
Income 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.00 
Collectivism (COL) 0.01 0.02 0.57 0.01 0.02 0.55 0.01 0.02 0.59 0.01 0.02 0.57 
Left-Right -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 
Constant 2.79 0.07 0.00 2.78 0.07 0.00 2.79 0.07 0.00 2.78 0.07 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
COL*CI       -0.01 0.01 0.22 -0.01 0.01 0.24 
Country Level             
Collectivism-Individualism (CI) -0.15 0.04 0.00 -0.15 0.04 0.00 -0.15 0.04 0.00 -0.16 0.04 0.00 
Size of the Government    -0.01 0.01 0.32    -0.01 0.01 0.32 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.14 0.04  0.14 0.04  0.14 0.04  0.14 0.04  
Covariance 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01  
Variance Residual 2.38 0.01   2.38 0.01   2.38 0.01   2.38 0.01   




Multilevel Model of Individualism and Collectivism  
Attribution of Responsibility 
 
“In collectivistic cultures the collective is responsible for the wrongdoing of one 
of its members; in individualistic cultures, it is solely the individual who is responsible” 
(Triandis 1995, 78). 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine political psychological implications of 
individualism and collectivism among the citizens of thirty OECD countries in the 
domain of attribution of responsibility. It is the second part of the empirical analysis of 
the dissertation that focuses on how those cultural frames and values affect the political 
attitude, preference, and behavior f citizens of advanced democracies. 
First, this chapter will evaluate the effects of individualism and collectivism on 
the individual’s feeling of freedom and control over his or her life in general. It will touch 
upon the question of agency, which should affect one’s expectation for the role of the 
government among others. Second, it will take a close look into the effects of those 
cultural values and frames on the individual’s opinion about government responsibility in 
general and her role in economy in particular. As in Chapter III, this chapter draws on 
multilevel modeling in order to disentangle the effects of cultural factors at the individual 







Psychologists and social psychologists in particular have long been interested in 
the interplay between the environments, be it physical or social, and human minds and 
behavior.1
Drawing on the scholarly achievements in these traditional fields, cultural and 
cross-cultural psychologists have approached culture as “human-made part of 
environment” (Herskovits cited in Triandis 1994 and 1996) and studied the effect of the 
subjective aspect or “the shared perceptions of the social environment” on the 
individual’s psychological functioning. Indeed, a major goal of cross-cultural psychology 
is to understand the relationships between human behavior and the cultural environment 
in which it has developed and now occurs (Berry et al. 2002). 
 Political psychologists have been no exception. Greenstein, for example, 
observed, “politics is a matter of human behavior, and behavior, in the formulation of 
Kurt Lewin and many others, is a function of both the environmental situations, in which 
actors find themselves and the psychological predispositions they bring to those 
situations” (1969, 7 italics in the original).  
Students of political culture have the similar understanding. For example, Street 
(1994) stated prosaically “political culture forms the context or environment for political 
action” (98). Elkins and Simeon elaborated political culture as a part of individual’s 
environment “which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of 
alternative behaviors, problems, and solutions which are logically possible” (1979, 128). 
These authors’ understanding of culture is consistent with Triandis observation that 
                                                 




culture affects individual’s perception and cognition by developing conventions for 
“sampling information” (Triandis 1989; Triandis and Suh 2002).  
One of the core concepts in cross-cultural psychological study of the interplay 
between the social environment and psychological functioning is agency that addresses 
the question of “what impels actions.” By logical extension, it addresses the question of 
who or what is responsible for an individual’s action and the answer has been suggested 
to lie on the dimension of personal (i.e., individual self) versus collective (i.e., others or 
group) agency. Menon et al. (1999) elaborated on the dichotomy. They advanced that not 
only an individual but also a collective can possess “the power of an agent to exert the 
law set forth by its internal will rather than that of external constraint,” which is Kantian 
notion of autonomy. In other words, the internal will that motivates an individual’s action 
could be originated from individual self or from collective. 
The concept of agency is closely tied in with “locus of control,” one of the most 
studied concepts of personality attribute in psychology. According to Rotter who 
pioneered the study in the 1960s, an individual’s “generalized expectancies” of the locus 
of control vary on the dimension of internal versus external control. A belief in “internal 
control” refers to “the degree to which persons expect that a reinforcement or an outcome 
of their behavior is contingent on their own behavior or personal characteristics” while 
“external control” refers to “the degree to which persons expect that the reinforcement or 
outcome is a function of chance, luck, or fate, is under the control of powerful others, or 
is simply unpredictable.” The dimension of internal-external locus of control reflects the 
degree which individuals accept personal responsibility for what happens to them (1996; 
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also cited in Waterman 1984, 44-48, italics added) and thus conceptually overlaps 
significantly with that of personal versus collective agency. 
As many issues in mainstream psychology that presuppose universality, however, 
the question of agency has preferred one particular answer, that is, personal agency. 
Psychologists have argued that “internal states, motives, and dispositions inside disjoint 
individuals” impel and hence, are responsible for, their actions. Indeed, there had not 
existed the notion of the dichotomy of personal versus collective agency in Western 
psychology. Yet as psychologists began to incorporate the concept of culture in the field 
of study, they realized that there exist other forms of agency, where actions are impelled 
by external forces that include “others, in relationship and interaction with others” 
(Markus and Kitayama 1991 and 2003). Thus, psychologists now conceptualize human 
agency in terms of personal versus collective or group agency, personal referring to the 
former, Western conception while collective or group to the latter, Eastern conception. In 
other words, they now consider others or collective as another unit of agency (Lehman et 
al. 2004; Bandura 2006). 
The origin of the different approaches to agency in the context of different 
cultural environments can be explained by Nisbett and his colleagues’ sociocognitive 
system theory (Nisbett et al. 2001; Nisbett 2003). According to the theory, social 
differences among different social environments or cultures affect not only individuals’ 
beliefs about specific aspects of the world but also “system of thought” that consists of 
metaphysics (i.e., beliefs of the nature of the world and causality), epistemology (i.e., 
beliefs about what is important to know and how knowledge can be obtained), and 
cognitive and perceptual habits. Historically, the social differences can be traced and 
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classified into two major social organizations or cultures, one that emphasizes a sense of 
personal agency and the other a sense of collective agency or one with less and the other 
with more social relations and role constraints.2
Theoretically, the concepts closely related to personal agency have frequently 
been suggested as one of the core attributes of individualism. For example, according to 
Lukes (1973, Chapter 8), autonomy or self-direction, one of the “basic ideas” of 
individualism, is the notion that an individual’s thought and action is his own, and not 
determined by causes outside his control.
 Thus, people tend to regard themselves 
as free agents or as constrained by and as less agentic than, social collective, depending 
on the type of cultures in which they were raised and live.  
3
 
 He elaborated on the term by contrasting it 
with what seems to constitute the notion of collective agency.  
an individual is autonomous (at the social level) to the degree to which he 
subjects the pressures and norms with which he is confronted to conscious 
and critical evaluation, and form intentions and reaches practical decisions 
as the result of independent and rational reflection (Lukes 1973, 52). 
 
Hofstede (1980) explained that emphasis on personal autonomy and initiative 
characterized “high individualism.” Waterman (1984) suggested Rotter’s internal locus of 
control as one of the four personality qualities that individualism embodies.4
                                                 
2 They trace these differences to as far as ancient Greek and Chinese society, the former typifying personal 
agency and the latter collective agency. For further discussion of sociocognitive system, see Nisbett (2003). 
 One can 
also find the conceptual affinity of personal agency with Schwartz’ self-direction at the 
individual level (1990) and autonomy at the aggregate level (2004). In addition, Markus 
3 The other basic ideas include the dignity of man, privacy, self-development, the abstract individual, 
political, economic, religious, ethical, epistemological, and methodological individualism (Lukes 1973). 
4 The other personality qualities include Eriksonian sense of personal identity, Maslow’s self-actualization, 
and Kohlberg’s principled (post-conventional) moral reasoning (Waterman 1984, Chapter 3). 
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(2001) defined individual autonomy as one of the three individualistic values in his 
analysis of American individualism and Anu et al. (2002) included it as one of the core 
components of individualism in their analysis of Estonian individualism.5
As opposed to the concept of personal agency, collective agency, as a relative 
newcomer to Western psychology, has not been extensively discussed as related to the 
attributes of collectivism except for contrasting purposes (e.g., Lukes 1973; Menon et al. 
1999; Schwartz 1994 and 2004). However, one can relate, without much difficulty, the 
notion of collective agency with relationship and group-centered elements of collectivism. 
In fact, cultural psychologists have attempted to demonstrate empirically that 
individualistic culture encourages personal agency while collectivistic culture collective 
agency (Menon et al. 1999; Choi et al. 1999; Choi et al. 2003). 
 
In sum, the question of agency deals with an individual’s global, enduring beliefs 
or “generalized expectancies” to use Rotter’s term, about who or what motivates and thus 
is responsible for, his or her actions in general. Individualism and collectivism have been 
suggested to influence an individual’s beliefs in individual and collective agency, 
respectively, both theoretically and empirically. 
That being the case, it is reasonable to assume that those cultural, cross-situational 
beliefs about “who or what have control over life affairs” would influence attribution of 
responsibility, which is specific behavior. In politics, the relevant actors for the question 
of agency are the individual and the government, the pair of which is the focus in the 
analysis of attribution of responsibility. 
 
                                                 
5 Markus’s other individualistic values are self-reliance and limited government while Anu et al.’s other 
individualistic values include mature self-responsibility and uniqueness. 
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Attribution of Responsibility 
 
Attribution Theory in Cross-Cultural Psychology 
In psychology, how individuals assign responsibility for behaviors and events has 
often been studied in the context of attribution theory especially since Heider led the way 
in the late 1950s. According to social and political psychologists, attribution theory 
aspires to provide a systematic account of how ordinary people make sense of and 
explain social events. In other words, it attempts to explain how lay people understand 
causally or more specifically assign causes and effects to the world around them 
including themselves (Fincham and Jaspars 1980; Kinder and Fiske 1986; McGraw 2001). 
This attribution process implicates responsibility attribution as the latter process also 
involves causality assignment or “imputation” as one of the “two facets” of responsibility. 
“Answerability,” which has been regarded as a synonym of responsibility, is the second 
facet and they have been theoretically distinguished in contemporary philosophy as well 
as in psychology. It focuses on “the liability for appropriate sanctions” (Schlenker 1994) 
or accountability (Fincham and Jaspars 1980). 
Attribution theorists have sustained that Heider’s claim that the most important 
distinction made by observers in their explanations of social acts is between internal 
cause – the traits, abilities, intentions, and so on, of the actor – and external causes – the 
incentives, pressures, demands, and so on, of the situation (Kinder and Fiske 1986). Thus, 
they have examined the degree to which and the conditions under which people rely on 
internal, dispositional or external, situational attribution.  
The dichotomy of internal versus external casual attribution is also relevant to the 
dichotomy of agency, internal versus collective agency. Culture oriented psychologists 
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have suggested that individualism and collectivism would encourage a particular form of 
agency would favor one way of causal attribution over the other. Indeed, they have 
advanced that individualism that encourages personal agency facilitates internal or 
dispositional attribution while collectivism that encourages collective agency facilitates 
external or contextual attribution. For example, Miller (1984), who first demonstrated the 
importance of culture in casual attribution, claimed that different “cultural meaning 
systems” would affect an individual’s development of everyday social explanation in the 
direction of dispositional or contextual emphasis, independent of his or her cognitive 
capacities and objective experiential conditions, both of which have been previously 
suggested as factors explaining cross-cultural attributional diversity. The author’s 
evidence suggests that contrasting cultural conceptions of the person, i.e., individualistic 
or holistic, entail these cross-cultural and developmental differences in social attribution. 
Morris and Peng (1994) showed that dispositional attribution for behavior was more 
widespread in individualistic culture of the United States than in collectivistic culture of 
China. According to these authors, the person-centered theory that social behavior reveals 
stable, global, internal dispositions is more prevalent in Judeo-Christian individualistic 
cultures while the situation-centered theory” that social behavior is shaped by 
relationships, roles, and situational pressures is dominant in Confucian collectivistic 
cultures. Triandis (1995) also observed that individualists attribute events to internal 
individual causes more frequently than collectivists, who tend to attribute them to 
external causes probably because their perceptions and cognition are influenced by 
different cultural syndromes. Furthermore, as discussed above, Menon and her colleagues 
(1999) explicitly framed the issue of cultural differences in attribution as the question of 
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agency. The authors proposed that cross-cultural, attributional divergences would arise 
from contrasting “implicit theories” or conceptions of which actors in society have 
agency, i.e., individual or collective, which they also traced to individualistic, Judeo-
Christian tradition in the West and collectivistic, Confucian tradition in the East. 
Recent studies have shown more nuanced cultural differences in attribution. 
According to extensive ethnographic and psychological data analysis by Choi et al. 
(1999), for example, internal attribution is a cross-culturally widespread mode of thinking. 
Yet they showed that East Asians, who represent collectivism, made more external 
attribution than their counterpart, Americans, who represent individualism. Choi and his 
colleagues (2003) confirmed the finding. 
 
Attribution of Responsibility in Political Science 
Political scientists in general as well as political psychologists have studied the 
attribution of responsibility extensively as the subject is particularly relevant to 
democracy, where citizens can hold their representatives accountable for their 
performances usually by electoral choices and not infrequently by public opinions. The 
significance of citizens’ responsibility attribution for political issues is well supported by 
the empirical studies of voting and public opinion (McGraw 2001). Rudolph (2003, 700) 
even claimed that the concept of responsibility lied “at the heart of theories of democratic 
accountability.”  
The majority of the political science literature on the subject has analyzed citizens’ 
attributions of responsibility for broadly defined political and social problems, such as 
economic conditions, crime, terrorism, and racial inequality. In fact, we have learned a 
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great deal about the political consequences of responsibility attributions – i.e., “throw the 
rascals out” – most likely based on citizens’ retrospective, sociotropic voting behavior 
(Kinder and Kiewiet 1979 and 1981; Feldman 1984; Anderson 1995; Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier 2000). Yet, we have only limited knowledge about the factors that influence 
the formation of responsibility attribution in politics (Gibson and Gouws 1999; McGraw 
2001; Rudolph 2003). In a sense, political scientists have focused on the second facet of 
responsibility, accountability, rather than the first one, causal imputation, which is 
logically antecedent to accountability. 
The dissertation proposes individualism and collectivism as cultural frames at the 
aggregate level and cultural values at the individual level should be considered as one of 
the important determinants of the individual’s attribution of responsibility. In this chapter, 
I will first examine the effects of individualism and collectivism on the question of 
agency in general, that is, without reference to the government. This will be the 
groundwork for the subsequent analyses of what factors influence who should be in 
charge of various policy issues. In addition, I will investigate the effects of individualism 






All the five waves of the World Values Survey have the same question that asks 
“how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns 
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out” on a scale of 1 (“no choice at all”) to 10 (“a great deal of choice”). This item is used 
to construct “Freedom of Choice and Control,” the first dependent variable for the agency 
question. As discussed above, personal versus collective agency has been conceptualized 
as binary opposite as internal versus external locus of control. Thus, the higher the score 
for this variable is, the more personal agency a respondent feels to have. 
The newest fifth wave (2005–2007) also has a similar question of agency. It asks 
to what degree a respondent’s view come closer to either “everything in life is determined 
by fate” or “people shape their fate themselves” on a 10-point scale. It is used to make 
“Fate versus Control,” the second dependent variable for the agency question.6
These two agency variables are used to verify the results from each other. Figure 
4.1 shows the distribution of freedom of choice and control and Figure 4.2 the 
distribution of fate versus control across countries. 
 Similarly 
as in “Freedom of Choice and Control,” the higher the score for this variable is, the more 
personal agency a respondent believes to have.  
Government versus Individual Responsibility 
Since the second wave (1989 – 1993), the World Values Survey has had a battery 
of items that tap citizens’ attitudes in economic self-reliance issues. In the first part of 
attribution of responsibility analysis, three items that measure an individual’s preference 
for government responsibility in the domain of basic personal welfare, ownership, and 
income redistribution are selected. 
The first dependent variable for responsibility attribution is “Government versus 
Individual Responsibility.” It is constructed based on the question that asks whether 
                                                 
6 According to Rotter (1996), fate is one of the external controls along with chance, luck, and others. 
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citizens agree with the statement “the government should take more responsibility to 
ensure that everyone is provided for” or “people should take more responsibility to 
provide for themselves” on a 10-point scale. The higher the score is, the more a 
respondent agrees with individual responsibility for the basic personal welfare. In 
contrast with the agency questions, the item directly invokes who or what is responsible 
for sustenance – i.e., the government or the individual. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution 
of “Government versus Individual Responsibility.” 
Government versus Private Ownership of Business and Industry 
The second dependent variable for attribution of responsibility is more specific in 
terms of the area the government is responsible for, ownership of business and industry. 
“Government versus Private Ownership of Business and Industry” is constructed based 
on the item that asks respondents whether their views are close to “private ownership of 
business and industry should be increased” or “government ownership of business and 
industry should be increased” on a 10-point scale. The more a respondent prefers private 
ownership, the higher score he or she will mark. Figure 4.4 illustrates the distribution of 
the variable. 
Income Redistribution 
The third dependent variable for attribution of responsibility is also about specific 
economic policy. Respondents are asked to reveal their preference on the issue of income 
redistribution – “we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort” or 
“incomes should be made more equal” – again on a 10-point scale. The question is used 
to make the variable “Income Redistribution.” The higher score means a respondent’s 
view prefers income equality rather than more incentives for individual effort. Although 
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this variable is not as explicit as the ownership variable in terms of who is in charge of 
this policy, it is included in the analysis of government responsibility because one can 
reasonably infer that the government is most responsible for the policy through a 
progressive tax system. The distribution of “Income Redistribution” across countries is 
shown in Figure 4.5. 
Claiming Government Benefits Justifiable 
The second part of attribution of responsibility analysis consists of two dependent 
variables that indirectly measure citizens’ attitude toward government responsibility. The 
first item, for example, asks respondents whether it is justifiable to claim “government 
benefits to which you are not entitled” and it is reasonable to assume that respondents 
should have preference for attribution of responsibility, i.e., whether the government is in 
fact responsible for benefits regardless of your entitlement, before they come up with an 
answer to the actual question. “Claiming Government Benefits Justifiable” is constructed 
based on this 10-point scale item. 
“Tax Cheating Justifiable,” the second dependent variable for an indirect measure 
of responsibility of attribution is constructed based on a 10-point scale question whether 
it is justifiable to cheat “on taxes if you have a chance.” As with the entitlement 
dependent variable, one can reasonable assume that respondents should have their own 
conclusion as to who should be in charge of managing their money before answering this 
question. 
Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of “Claiming Government Benefits Justifiable” 






All the independent variables in the analysis of attribution of responsibility are 
introduced in Chapter III.7
 
 
Level 1: Individual Level 
Individualism 
This is an additive measure that consists of four individualistic cultural values: 
independence, feeling of responsibility, imagination, and determination and perseverance. 
It ranges from 0 (least individualistic) to 4 (most individualistic). 
Collectivism 
This is an additive measure that consists of four collectivistic cultural values: 
tolerance and respect for other people, religious faith, unselfishness, and obedience. It 
ranges from 0 (least collectivistic) to 4 (most collectivistic). 
Left-Right 
This is a 10-category measure for ideological self-identification, 1 being left and 
10 being right. This variable is included in all the models in this chapter except for “Fate 
versus Control,” for which ideology does not seem to be relevant.8
Employed 
 
This is a dichotomous variable that collapse full time (thirty hours a week or 
more), part time (less than thirty hours a week), and self-employed into “employed” 
                                                 
7 More detailed descriptions can be found in Chapter III. 
8 In fact, the ideology variable was not statistically significant when included in “Fate versus Control.” 
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category while retired/pensioned, housewife not otherwise employed, student, and 
unemployed into “unemployed.” 
Income 
Income is measured on a 10-point scale, where 1 indicates the lowest income 
decile and 10 the highest income decile. It measures household income that includes all 
wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. 
Education 
Education is a 10 category variable that classifies the groups a respondent belongs 
to based on the age when he or she completed education.9
Gender 
  
This is a binary variable that classifies the gender of a respondent. 
 
Level 2: Country Level 
Individualism-Collectivism Ratings at the Country Level (IND-COL) 
This analysis utilizes an independent measure of individualism and collectivism at 
the country level instead of using the country means of those cultural values at the 
individual level in order to avoid the problem of serious multicollinearity. It relies 
primarily on the measure by Suh and his colleagues (1998). They averaged the country 
level measures by the two leading experts on the cultural frames, Hofstede (1980) and 
Triandis (1990). As opposed to the corresponding individual level values, this country 
level variable is considered unidimensional. In other words, the higher the rating of IND-
COL, the higher individualistic culture a country has. 
                                                 
9 The variable is missing for New Zealand, making the maximum number of level 2 observations thirty in 
the multilevel models. 
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 Government size 
Government size is measured by government share of real gross domestic product 
per capita in % in 2000 Laspeyres constant prices (Penn World Table 6.2).10
 
 This is an 
institutional proxy variable that is assumed to represent the degree of collectivism at the 
macro-level. East Germany is the only country that does not have the measure and is not 
included in the multilevel analysis. 
Cross-level Interaction 
There is one cross-level interaction variable in the analysis: individualism or 
collectivism at the individual level (level 1) multiplied by individualism-collectivism at 
the country level (level 2). The cross-level interaction variable is included in the models 
to determine whether cultural effects interact to amplify or dampen corresponding 




As in Chapter III, I run four multilevel models that estimate the effects of 
individualism and collectivism at the individual level and at the country level, with or 
without cross-level interaction and with or without the second macro-level variable, 
government size. Thus, there are four multilevel models to be estimated for each 
dependent variable.  
                                                 
10 East Germany is the only country that does not have the measure and is excluded in Model 2 and Model 
4 in the multilevel analysis. 
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The other parameter estimates of interest are variance components, the statistical 
significance of which is used to test the assumption that there exists differential 
contextual effect. The estimation of the multilevel models is based on the independently 
pooled cross-sectional data of 30 OECD member countries over the five waves of the 
World Values Survey. 
All the independent variables including the dichotomous ones are grand mean 
centered to facilitate substantively meaningful interpretation and to avoid 
multicollinearity in cross-level interactions. 
 
Model 1 
Level 1, Individual 
Attributional Variables 
= B0 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
+ B5 L-R Ideology + B6 Individualism or Collectivism + rij 
 
Level 2: Country 
B0 = G00 + G01 Individualism Culture + u0j 




= G00 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
+ B5 L-R Ideology + G10 Individualism or Collectivism  
+ G01 Individualism Culture + u1j Individualism or Collectivism + rij + u0j 
 
Model 2 
Level 1, Individual 
Attributional Variables 
= B0 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
+ B5 L-R Ideology + B6 Individualism or Collectivism + rij 
 
Level 2: Country 
B0 = G00 + G01 Individualism Culture + G02 Government Size + u0j 







= G00 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
+ B5 L-R Ideology + G10 Individualism or Collectivism + G02 Government Size 
+ G01 Individualism Culture + u1j Individualism or Collectivism + rij + u0j 
 
Model 3 
Level 1, Individual 
Attributional Variables 
Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation 
= B0 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
+ B5 L-R Ideology + B6 Individualism or Collectivism + rij 
 
Level 2: Country 
B0 = G00 + G01 Individualism Culture + u0j 




= G00 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
+ B5 L-R Ideology + G10 Individualism or Collectivism  
+ G01 Individualism Culture  
+ G12 Individualism or Collectivism*Individualism Culture  
+ u1j Individualism or Collectivism + rij + u0j 
 
Model 4 
Level 1, Individual 
Attributional Variables 
= B0 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
+ B5 L-R Ideology + B6 Individualism or Collectivism + rij 
Level 2: Country 
B0 = G00 + G01 Individualism Culture + G02 Government Size + u0j 





= G00 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
+ B5 L-R Ideology + G10 Individualism or Collectivism  
+ G01 Individualism Culture + G02 Government Size 
+ G12 Individualism or Collectivism*Individualism Culture  
+ u1j Individualism or Collectivism + rij + u0j 
 
A mixed model is a collapsed form of level 1 and level 2 models. B represents the 
fixed effect at the individual level except for the intercept (B0) and the slope of cultural 
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values (B6), both of which are random, that is, vary over countries. Gst is the effect of the 
macro variable t (i.e., macro-level intercept, Individualism Culture, and Government Size) 
on the regression coefficient of micro variable s (i.e., micro-level intercept and 
Individualism or Culturalism index). It represents the fixed effect at the country level. r 
refers to level 1 error and u level 2 error. The subscript i indexes respondent and j country.  
The analysis used STATA software and the restricted maximum likelihood 




The analysis focuses on (1) the statistical significance of slope and intercept 
variance estimates and (2) the effects of individualism and collectivism on agency and 
responsibility attribution variables while distinguishing their individual level effects as 
cultural values from the cultural level effects as cultural frames. 
First, I hypothesize that slope and intercept variance estimates are statistically 
significant for all the models. In other words, I expect that across countries there exit 
differential effects of individualism and collectivism as the individual level cultural 
values. In addition, I expect that the mean of each dependent variable when all the 
independent variables are set to their means – 0 in this case because of grand mean 
centering – is different across countries. That is, I hypothesize that the variance estimates 
for the intercepts are statistically significant. Substantively, this hypothesis is about 
whether each country is a legitimate unit for cultural analysis as well as for multilevel 
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modeling analysis in a sense that it has the different effects of cultural values and a 
different baseline value for each dependent variable 
Second, the effects of individualism both at the cultural level and at the individual 
level on “Freedom of Choice and Control” and “Fate vs. Control,” are hypothesized to 
positive while the effects of collectivism on those agency variables negative. In other 
words, individualism and collectivism exert opposite influences along these dimensions 
of the agency variables. 
As discussed above as well as in Chapter II, individualism values personal agency 
and responsibility. It encourages people who live in individualistic culture or who are 
individualists to exercise control over their own action. Personal agency has been also 
associated with such values as autonomy and self-direction that emphasize independent 
thought and action, not swayed by external causes outside of one’s control. On the 
contrary, collectivism values belongingness, relationship, context, duty, group, hierarchy, 
and harmony, among others, (Oyserman et al. 2002a) that promote external control and 
group or collective agency. Thus, it encourages people who live in collectivistic culture 
or who are collectivists to allow others or context to influence on themselves or their 
actions. 
In addition, the agency hypothesis, combined with the hypothesis about cultural 
effect on subjective well-being (SWB) suggested in Chapter II, will test whether 
“Freedom of Choice and Control” function as a mediating variable between culture and 
SWB. In Chapter II, I theorize that individualistic cultures would enhance individuals’ 
SWB by providing favorable cultural environments where they feel more freedom of 
choice and control over their lives. Evidence suggests that the agency variable, “sense of 
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freedom” to use Inglehart’s term, affects an individual’s SWB both as the individual level 
and as the country level variable (Inglehart et al. 2008). Moreover, Inglehart and 
Oyserman (2004) and Schwartz (2004) have shown that individualism, autonomy, and 
self-expression form a coherent cultural syndrome at the aggregate level. Thus, the 
hypothesis in this chapter will test the first part of the linkage of “Culture-Agency-SWB.”  
 Third, I hypothesize that the effects of individualism and collectivism on 
attribution of responsibility variables are also bipolar opposite. In other words, I expect 
individualism exerts positive effect on personal responsibility while collectivism on 
government responsibility when it comes to the basic personal welfare question. In 
addition, individualism is hypothesized to facilitate support for private ownership of 
business and industry and income difference as incentives for individual effort while 
collectivism support for government ownership and income redistribution. 
The expectation is consistent with the hypothesis proposed on the agency 
questions. Individualism that values personal agency or internal control should encourage 
the value of self-reliance when it comes to the basic personal welfare. By logical 
extension, individualism is expected to encourage the idea of “limited government” while 
collectivism to advocate or at least acknowledge the expanded role of modern 
government in macro-economic management. In fact, self-reliance, defined as “the idea 
that individuals should take care of their own well-being, particularly (but not only) their 
economic condition,” and limited government, defined as the belief that “the purpose of 
government is strictly to protect life, liberty, and property, and thereby provide a 
framework within which individuals may pursue their private interests” have been 
proposed as distinct aspects of American individualism, along with autonomy discussed 
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above (Markus 2001, 407 italics added).11
In addition, drawing on the empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis of 
“clarity of responsibility” that people tend to do better in attributional tasks when the cue 
of who is responsible is clear (Powell and Whitten 1993; Anderson 1995 and 2000), I 
expect still opposite but smaller effect of those cultural frames and values on 
responsibility attribution when the question of who is in charge is not explicitly invoked 
but implied.
 It is reasonable to assume that these aspects 
are relevant to individualism in general since the United States has been suggested to 
represent a prototypical individualist culture. For example, Hofstede (2001) rated her 
individualism (IDV) as 91 out of 100 and the most individualistic country out of fifty 
three nations and regions he evaluated. The country level measure of individualism by 
Suh et al. (1998) that this analysis draws on also rated her 9.55 out of 10 and the most 
individualistic country out of sixty nations they evaluated. 
12
Fourth, as for the indirect measures of responsibility attributions, I expect that 
individualism would lead citizens less likely to think that it is justifiable to claim 
government benefits to which they are not entitled while collectivism would lead them 
more likely. In addition, I hypothesize that individualism would direct citizens more 
 Thus, I hypothesize that collectivism would exert positive effect while 
individualism negative effect, on income redistribution but their effects are weaker than 
in cases above where the government is explicitly invoked in the questions. 
                                                 
11 I discussed the relationship between individualism and the idea of limited government in the context of 
political interest and participation in Chapter III. 
12 Feldman (1984) made an even stronger case for the cultural effect on attribution of responsibility while 
denying the influence or clarity of government responsibility suggested by Kramer (1971 and 1983). 
According to the author, personal attribution is strongly related to people’s belief in economic 
individualism that consists of the work ethic and equality of opportunity, not a matter of their failing to see 
government responsibility. Attribution of changing personal well-being to the wider societal context is only 
common among those who do not subscribe to both of these cultural beliefs. 
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likely to think that it is justifiable to cheat on taxes if they have a chance while 
collectivism would direct them less likely. 
As discussed above, individualism should lead people to think that individuals are 
responsible for their basic personal welfare. In other words, individualism should 
encourage self-reliance and limited government. This would lead them to think that the 
government should not hand out any benefits or at the very least that any government 
benefits should be kept at minimum. Hence, individualists will be more likely to oppose 
claiming government benefits. On the contrary, collectivism that facilitates the view that 
the government is responsible for her citizens’ basic welfare would lead people to think 
that it is justifiable to claim government benefits or to an extreme degree, regardless of 
their entitlement. In a similar reasoning, individualism that advocates the idea that 
individuals, not the government, should manage their own money would lead people to 
think that it is justifiable to cheat on taxes while collectivism that allow the government’s 
say in the management of citizens’ money more than individualism would lead people to 
think that it is not justifiable to do so. 
Lastly, I theorize the direction and statistical significance of cultural values at the 
individual level and cultural frames at the country level are aligned as in Chapter III. In 
other words, the positive effect of individualism as a cultural value at the individual level 
(IND) on personal agency will be accompanied with positive effect of individualism as a 
cultural frame at the country level (IC). In other words, individualistic people who live in 
individualistic culture are expected to value personal agency most. In addition, I expect 
significant cross-level effects of the aligned cultural values and dominant cultural frames. 
That is, there would be synergistic, mutually reinforcing cultural effects from the 
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individual and cultural level. For example, I hypothesize that a collectivist in collectivist 
culture would support government ownership of business and industry more than the sum 




As in Chapter III, the results seem to support that culture matters. In general, the 
cultural effects of individualism and collectivism showed up at least at one level – either 
the individual or the cultural level – except for income redistribution. First, as illustrated 
from the variance component estimation parts of Table 4.1 – Table 4.14, all the variance 
with the sole exception of the slop variance of individualism for “Fate versus Control” 
are statistically significant, which suggests that there exits contextual effect in general. 
All the estimates except for the slope variances of that dependent variable are at least two 
times larger than their standard error.13
                                                 
13 All the four slope variances of individualism at the cultural level for “Fate vs. Control” are about the 
same as their respective standard errors. See Table 4.3. 
 Thus, it is highly likely that each country has 
different slopes or different effects of individualism and collectivism at the individual 
level in the domain of agency and government responsibility. In addition, considering 
that variance of intercept estimates are statistically significant, it is also highly likely that 
each country has a different mean for each dependent variable when other independent 
and control variables are set to zero, that is, their respective grand means. Combined with 
the similar results in Chapter III, this should strengthen the case that each country is a 




For the agency questions, individualism both at the individual level (IND) and at 
the cultural level (IC) confirms the hypothesized positive effects on the “Freedom of 
Choice and Control.” In other words, individualists are more likely to “feel they have 
completely free choice and control over their lives” and individualistic culture adds a 
positive effect. In addition, the positive effects of IND and IC on the first agency variable 
strengthen the case that it is an intervening variable between culture and subjective well-
being. 
As Table 4.1 shows, cultural effects seem stronger at the national level 
considering 5-point scale of IND as opposed to 10-point scale of IC. The size of 
coefficients range from 0.11 to 0.13 for IC and are close to 0.12 for IND. It is also 
interesting to note that Left-Right self-placement is also positive (0.3 to 0.4) and 
statistically significant.  
According to Table 4.3, individualistic cultural value also leads people more 
likely to believe “people shape their fate themselves” although the cultural level effects 
on the same “Fate versus Control” variable are not statistically significant regardless of 
controlling for government size and cross-level effect (Table 4.3). The individual level 
effects of IND in fact seem to be larger, ranging from 0.16 to 0.18, than those in 
“Freedom of Choice and Control.”  
 By contrast, collectivism does not show consistent effects across levels on the 
agency variables. For example, Table 4.2 shows that collectivistic culture (CI) 
discourages the feeling of free choice and control over life as expected but collectivistic 
value at the individual level (COL) does not. The individual level effects of COL are all 
statistically insignificant. In addition, collectivists are more likely to believe “everything 
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in life is determined by fate” although collectivistic cultural frame does not appear to lead 
to the same belief. As shown in Table 4.4, all the coefficients for collectivism as a 
cultural frame are negative – meaning CI affects negatively the belief that ““people shape 
their fate themselves” – as hypothesized but they all are highly statistically insignificant. 
The p-values are at least greater than .5 
For the attribution of responsibility variables, individualism and collectivism both 
at the individual level and at the cultural level demonstrate statistically significant effects 
as hypothesized when it comes to “Government versus Individual Responsibility.” That is, 
individualism tends to encourage the belief that “people should take more responsibility 
to provide for themselves” while collectivism the belief that “the government should take 
more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.” Table 4.5 shows that the 
sizes of the effect of IND and COL are similar in absolute values, the former being close 
to 0.06 and the latter to 0.09. As shown in Table 4.5 and 4.6, the cultural level effects are 
the same in absolute values (0.33) and far greater than individual level effects. In addition, 
it is worthy of note that Left-Right self-placement is highly statistically significant and 
positive, 0.18 in both IND and COL models. Both cultural values and ideology have 
independent effects on citizens’ attitude toward government responsibility in the domain 
of basic personal welfare. 
Collectivism at both levels also leads to the belief that “government ownership of 
business and industry should be increased” especially when the size of the government is 
controlled. Table 4.8 shows that the coefficients for COL are -0.04 (p-value=0.03) for 
Model 2 and -0.05 (p-value=0.02) for Model 4, meaning that collectivists are more likely 
to oppose private ownership. The coefficients for CI are all highly significant and 
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negative, ranging from -0.17 to -0.20, smaller than those of “Government versus 
Individual Responsibility” but are still considered large. 
In contrast to the collectivism effects, the effect of individualism on the same 
dependent variable is mixed. It seems that individualism leads to the belief that “private 
ownership of business and industry should be increased” only at the cultural level. As 
shown in Table 4.7, the size of the coefficients, ranging from 0.19 to 0.21 is comparable 
to those of collectivism as cultural frames, which implies that it has equally powerful 
effect on the ownership preference. However, the effects of IND are not statistically 
significant.  
As in “Government versus Individual Responsibility,” Left-Right also seems to 
exert considerable effects in all the models for the ownership preference. The effects are 
highly statistically significant and close to 0.17 both for individualism and collectivism, 
almost equivalent in size to those of cultural frames. They are all measured on a 10-point 
scale. 
For “Income Redistribution,” the last responsibility attribution variable, none of 
the hypotheses about the effects of individualism and collectivism were confirmed. 
Although the effects of both individualism and collectivism at the individual level are in 
the expected direction, that is, the former being against and the latter for income 
redistribution, their p-values are rather large as Table 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate. The p-value 
is 0.14 for individualism in Model 4 and the p-value is 0.13 for collectivism in Model 1 
and 3.  
As with the case of the ownership question for individualism, this may have to do 
with the fact that the effects of ideology, all of which are highly statistically significant 
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and large, eclipse the cultural effect. The right are clearly against income redistribution 
and favor larger income differences as individual incentives. The sizes of the ideology 
effect are close to -0.24, larger than any other coefficients. Moreover, the absence of clear 
information about who or what is responsible for this policy may weaken the effects of 
individualism and collectivism, which exist in the other two responsibility attribution 
questions that involve “government.” In a sense, the results seem consistent with the 
clarity of responsibility hypothesis. 
The results for the effects of individualism and collectivism on the indirect 
measures of responsibility attributions are mixed. Individualism and collectivism at the 
cultural level exert statistically significant effects on “Claiming Government Benefits 
Justifiable” in expected directions but they do not at the individual level. As shown in 
Table 4.11 and 4.12, individualistic culture leads people to think that it is not justifiable 
to claim government benefits to which they are not entitled while collectivistic culture 
leads people to think that it is. The coefficients of these cultural effects are similar in 
absolute values, the coefficients of individualism ranging from 0.15 to 0.17 and those of 
collectivism ranging from 0.16 to 01.9. At the individual level, however, these cultural 
values do not seem to be linked with this dependent variable. The coefficients of IND and 
COL are not statistically significant. It seems, however, that Left-Right ideology 
functions as the individualistic value. The coefficients in all the models are small, close to 
-0.04 but all of them are statistically significant. It appears that people on the right are 
more likely to think that it is not justifiable to claim government benefits to which they 
are not entitled. 
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In contrast, individualism and collectivism as cultural values influence “Tax 
Cheating Justifiable” as hypothesized while they do not as cultural frames. As Table 4.13 
and 4.14 demonstrate, individualists are more likely to think that it is justifiable to cheat 
on taxes when they have a chance while collectivists that it is not, the coefficients of IND 
being close to 0.06 and those of COL close to - 0.17. At the aggregate level, however, 
those cultural frames do not appear to be related with the tax cheating variable. None of 
the coefficients of those cultural frames are statistically significant. It is interesting to 
note that the right are more likely to think that it is not justifiable to cheat on taxes 
although the effects are almost close to zero (-0.01) in all the models. They are still 
statistically significant. 
Lastly, despite of grand mean centering, none of the cross-level interactions are 
statistically significant, which suggests that the current data do not support the hypothesis 
that cultural frame and values have synergistic effects. This may have to with the fact that 




The empirical analysis of this chapter attempts to show that individualism and 
collectivism as cultural frames as well as cultural values matter when it comes to 
individuals’ attitude toward agency in general and political preference toward the issue 
related to individual versus government responsibility. A series of multilevel modeling 
that the analysis draws on to distinguish individual and aggregate level of the cultural 
effects seems to confirm that this is the case in general. The statistically significant 
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independent effects of individualism and collectivism show up as hypothesized either at 
one level of analysis or at both.  
In addition, the analysis of this chapter shows that individualism and collectivism 
register independent effects as cultural values or as cultural frames, in the areas – i.e., 
government responsibility in basic personal welfare, ownership of business and industry, 
and income redistribution – where the left-right ideology has been suggested especially 
powerful.14
This alignment of the effects of culture and political ideology – i.e., individualism 
with the right and collectivism with the left – suggests a new area in cross-cultural 
psychological study where both theoretical and empirical relationship between these two 
constructs should be examined. As the results of this analysis in this chapter show, the 
alignment is noticeable when it comes to economic policy preference. Yet there seem to 
 For “Government versus Individual Responsibility” in particular, 
individualism and collectivism at both levels as well as the ideological self-placement 
have significant effects on the individual’s attribution preference as hypothesized. An 
individualist in individualistic cultures who identifies with the ideology of the right is 
most likely to believe that “people should take more responsibility to provide for 
themselves.” In addition, for the ownership variable, collectivism at both levels as well as 
the ideology has independent effects on the individual’s preference as theorized. For 
example, a collectivist in collectivistic cultures who identifies with the left ideology is 
most likely to prefer government ownership of business and industry. 
                                                 
14 Elaborating on Inglehart’s definition of left-right ideology, Knutsen (1995) observed that the political 
values underlying left-right polarization are conflicts related to “economic inequalities, differences in 
ownership to the means of production, and conflict over the desirability of a market economy.” The 
comprehensive analysis of voter ideology in Western democracies confirms this observation (Kim and 
Fording 1998 and 2001). 
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exist other political attitudinal objects where the effects of culture and ideology overlap 
but are underexplored. For example, personal agency has been positively associated with 
autonomy and self-reliance aspects of individualism, both of which are also consistent 
with the ideology of the right.15
There also exist some results that need further elaboration. First, the fact that 
individualism and collectivism as cultural frames do not affect “Fate versus Control” as 
theorized appears to have to do with the question wordings loaded with religious 
connotation as opposed to the other agency variable, “Freedom of Choice and Control.” 
For example, the leading sentence of the item read as “some people believe that 
individuals can decide their own destiny, while others think that it is impossible to escape 
a predetermined fate” (italics added). Thus, at the individual level it could sufficiently 
invoke the question of agency but at the cultural level the relationship might vanish 
because individualism and collectivism at the national level is not dominated by religious 
component. Furthermore, when the similar concept is framed in a way that emphasizes 
individual level values, it might depress the corresponding cultural level effects if there is 
 According to the Kim and Fording (1998), negative 
attitude against “social services expansion” belong to the Rightist categories. In fact, the 
analysis shows that the effects of individualism at both levels and the ideology of the 
right on the “Freedom of Choice and Control,” an abstract agency variable, are in the 
same, positive direction while the effects of collectivism at the cultural level and the 
ideology of the left on the same variable are in the same, negative direction. 
                                                 
15 According to Markus (2001), American liberals defy the simple characterization. Liberals are 
individualists when individualism is framed as autonomy and conservatives are individualists when it is 




any. Indeed, the coefficients of individualism and collectivism at the individual level for 
“Fate versus Control” are larger than those for “Freedom of Choice and Control.” 
Second, the mixed results for government benefit and tax questions may have to 
do with the fact that the questions themselves invoke morality dimension by using such 
words as “not entitled” and “justifiable” as well as with the fact that they are indirect 
measures for responsibility attributions as laid out above. In other words, the issue of 
“what is right or wrong” might have dominated the question of “who is responsible”16
 
 
and the former might have overshadowed the attributional task. Thus, individualism and 
collectivism matter as individual values for the tax cheating question or as the aggregate 
level frames for the government benefit variable but the routes its influences take are 
open to questions, especially when it comes to these indirect, morality confounded, 
measures for responsibility attribution.  
  
                                                 
16 To use Schlenker and his colleagues’ terminology, “answerability” might have dominated “imputation” 
component of responsibility in these questions. 
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Figure 4.1. Freedom of Choice and Control 
 
 




















































































































































































































Figure 4.3. Government vs. Individual Responsibility 
 
 

















































































































































































































































































Figure 4.5. Income Redistribution 
 
 























































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.1. Effect of Individualism on Free Choice 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=88,272 N1=85,623 N1=88,272 N1=85,623 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.00 
Income 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.05 
Individualism (IND) 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.00 
Left-Right 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Constant 6.89 0.08 0.00 6.89 0.08 0.00 6.89 0.08 0.00 6.89 0.08 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
IND*IC       -0.01 0.02 0.43 -0.01 0.02 0.41 
Country Level             
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.05 0.01 
Size of the Government    -0.03 0.01 0.09    -0.03 0.01 0.09 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.03 0.01  0.03 0.01  0.03 0.01  0.03 0.01  
Variance Intercept 0.20 0.05  0.19 0.05  0.20 0.05  0.19 0.05  
Covariance -0.03 0.01  -0.03 0.01  -0.03 0.02  -0.03 0.02  
Variance Residual 4.32 0.02   4.32 0.02   4.32 0.02   4.32 0.02   






Table 4.2. Effect of Collectivism on Free Choice 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=88,273 N1=85,624 N1=88,273 N1=85,624 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.00 
Income 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.06 
Collectivism (COL) 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.16 
Left-Right 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Constant 6.89 0.08 0.00 6.90 0.08 0.00 6.89 0.08 0.00 6.90 0.08 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
COL*CI       -0.02 0.01 0.14 -0.02 0.01 0.14 
Country Level             
Collectivism-Individualism (CI) -0.10 0.05 0.03 -0.11 0.05 0.02 -0.12 0.05 0.02 -0.13 0.05 0.01 
Size of the Government    -0.03 0.02 0.12    -0.03 0.02 0.12 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.21 0.06  0.20 0.06  0.20 0.06  0.20 0.06  
Covariance 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01  
Variance Residual 4.36 0.02   4.35 0.02   4.36 0.02   4.35 0.02   






Table 4.3. Effect of Individualism on Fate vs. Control 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=16,772 N1=15,851 N1=16,772 N1=15,851 
 N2=16 N2=15 N2=16 N2=15 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.04 0.00 
Income 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 
Education 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.00 
Male 0.28 0.04 0.00 0.29 0.04 0.00 0.28 0.04 0.00 0.28 0.04 0.00 
Individualism (IND) 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.00 
Constant 6.70 0.12 0.00 6.74 0.15 0.00 6.70 0.12 0.00 6.75 0.15 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
IND*IC       -0.02 0.01 0.15 -0.02 0.01 0.11 
Country Level             
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) 0.01 0.06 0.82 0.02 0.06 0.81 0.03 0.06 0.56 0.03 0.06 0.61 
Size of the Government    0.01 0.04 0.75    0.01 0.04 0.75 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.01  0.00 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.21 0.08  0.24 0.10  0.21 0.08  0.24 0.10  
Covariance -0.01 0.02  -0.01 0.02  -0.01 0.02  -0.01 0.01  
Variance Residual 5.38 0.06   5.36 0.06   5.38 0.06   5.36 0.06   







Table 4.4. Effect of Collectivism on Fate vs. Control 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=16,772 N1=15,851 N1=16,772 N1=15,851 
 N2=16 N2=15 N2=16 N2=15 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.04 0.00 
Income 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 
Education 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.00 
Male 0.26 0.04 0.00 0.27 0.04 0.00 0.27 0.04 0.00 0.27 0.04 0.00 
Collectivism (COL) -0.09 0.04 0.02 -0.09 0.04 0.03 -0.09 0.04 0.02 -0.09 0.04 0.04 
Constant 6.79 0.11 0.00 6.83 0.14 0.00 6.79 0.11 0.00 6.83 0.14 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
COL*CI       0.01 0.02 0.78 0.01 0.02 0.77 
Country Level             
Collectivism-Individualism (CI) -0.03 0.05 0.56 -0.03 0.06 0.64 -0.03 0.06 0.64 -0.02 0.06 0.72 
Size of the Government    0.01 0.03 0.67    0.01 0.03 0.67 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  
Variance Intercept 0.19 0.07  0.22 0.09  0.19 0.08  0.22 0.09  
Covariance 0.02 0.02  0.02 0.02  0.02 0.02  0.02 0.02  
Variance Residual 5.40 0.06   5.37 0.06   5.40 0.06   5.37 0.06   






Table 4.5.Effect of Individualism on Government Responsibility vs. Individual Responsibility 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=74,494 N1=71,855 N1=74,494 N1=71,855 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.06 
Income 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.15 
Male 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.00 
Individualism (IND) 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03 
Left-Right 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 
Constant 5.88 0.11 0.00 5.87 0.12 0.00 5.88 0.11 0.00 5.87 0.12 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction       -0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.03 
COL*IC             
Country Level             
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) 0.33 0.06 0.00 0.33 0.07 0.00 0.34 0.07 0.00 0.34 0.07 0.00 
Size of the Government    0.00 0.02 0.94    0.00 0.02 0.96 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  
Variance Intercept 0.36 0.10  0.39 0.11  0.37 0.10  0.39 0.11  
Covariance -0.01 0.02  -0.01 0.02  -0.01 0.02  -0.01 0.02  
Variance Residual 6.89 0.04   6.83 0.04   6.89 0.04   6.83 0.04   






Table 4.6. Effect of Collectivism on Government Responsibility vs. Individual Responsibility 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=74,495 N1=71,856 N1=74,495 N1=71,856 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.07 
Income 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Male 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.00 
Collectivism (COL) -0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.09 0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.09 0.02 0.00 
Left-Right 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 
Constant 5.87 0.11 0.00 5.87 0.12 0.00 5.87 0.11 0.00 5.87 0.12 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
COL*CI       -0.01 0.01 0.42 -0.01 0.01 0.25 
Country Level             
Collectivism-Individualism (CI) -0.33 0.07 0.00 -0.35 0.07 0.00 -0.33 0.07 0.00 -0.34 0.07 0.00 
Size of the Government    -0.01 0.02 0.60    -0.01 0.02 0.60 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.37 0.10  0.39 0.11  0.37 0.10  0.40 0.11  
Covariance 0.00 0.01  -0.01 0.01  0.00 0.01  -0.01 0.01  
Variance Residual 6.90 0.04   6.84 0.04   6.90 0.04   6.84 0.04   






Table 4.7. Effect of Individualism on Government Ownership vs. Private Ownership of Business and Industry 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=64,236 N1=61,691 N1=64,236 N1=61,691 
 N2=28 N2=27 N2=28 N2=27 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 
Income 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.30 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.02 0.00 0.29 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.02 0.00 
Individualism (IND) 0.00 0.03 0.98 0.00 0.03 0.91 0.00 0.02 0.87 0.01 0.02 0.69 
Left-Right 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 
Constant 6.59 0.09 0.00 6.56 0.09 0.00 6.59 0.09 0.00 6.56 0.09 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
IND*IC       -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.00 
Country Level             
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) 0.19 0.05 0.00 0.19 0.05 0.00 0.21 0.05 0.00 0.21 0.05 0.00 
Size of the Government    0.01 0.02 0.64    0.01 0.02 0.68 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.21 0.06  0.22 0.06  0.21 0.06  0.22 0.06  
Covariance -0.01 0.02  0.00 0.02  0.00 0.01  0.00 0.01  
Variance Residual 5.57 0.03   5.55 0.03   5.57 0.03   5.55 0.03   






Table 4.8. Effect of Collectivism on Government Ownership vs. Private Ownership of Business and Industry 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=64,237 N1=61,692 N1=64,237 N1=61,692 
 N2=28 N2=27 N2=28 N2=27 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 
Income 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.30 0.02 0.00 0.32 0.02 0.00 0.30 0.02 0.00 0.32 0.02 0.00 
Collectivism (COL) -0.03 0.02 0.13 -0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.05 0.02 0.02 
Left-Right 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 
Constant 6.58 0.09 0.00 6.55 0.09 0.00 6.58 0.09 0.00 6.55 0.09 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
COL*CI       -0.01 0.01 0.39 -0.01 0.01 0.18 
Country Level             
Collectivism-Individualism (CI) -0.18 0.04 0.00 -0.17 0.05 0.00 -0.20 0.05 0.00 -0.20 0.05 0.00 
Size of the Government    0.01 0.02 0.40    0.01 0.02 0.39 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.21 0.06  0.21 0.06  0.21 0.06  0.21 0.06  
Covariance 0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  
Variance Residual 5.58 0.03   5.56 0.03   5.58 0.03   5.56 0.03   






Table 4.9. Effect of Individualism on Income Redistribution 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=67,954 N1=65,944 N1=67,954 N1=65,944 
 N2=29 N2=28 N2=29 N2=28 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed -0.13 0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.13 0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.02 0.00 
Income -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 
Education -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 
Male -0.19 0.02 0.00 -0.19 0.02 0.00 -0.19 0.02 0.00 -0.19 0.02 0.00 
Individualism (IND) -0.03 0.03 0.30 -0.04 0.03 0.25 -0.04 0.03 0.20 -0.04 0.03 0.14 
Left-Right -0.24 0.00 0.00 -0.23 0.01 0.00 -0.24 0.00 0.00 -0.23 0.01 0.00 
Constant 5.23 0.12 0.00 5.27 0.12 0.00 5.23 0.12 0.00 5.27 0.12 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
IND*IC       0.05 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00 
Country Level             
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) 0.01 0.07 0.87 0.07 0.07 0.29 0.01 0.07 0.90 0.03 0.07 0.71 
Size of the Government    -0.06 0.02 0.01    -0.06 0.02 0.01 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.03 0.01  0.03 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  
Variance Intercept 0.44 0.12  0.39 0.12  0.44 0.12  0.39 0.11  
Covariance 0.00 0.03  -0.03 0.03  0.00 0.02  -0.02 0.02  
Variance Residual 7.00 0.04   6.94 0.04   7.00 0.04   6.94 0.04   






Table 4.10. Effect of Collectivism on Income Redistribution 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=67,955 N1=65,945 N1=67,955 N1=65,945 
 N2=29 N2=28 N2=29 N2=28 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed -0.13 0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.13 0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.02 0.00 
Income -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 
Education -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 
Male -0.19 0.02 0.00 -0.20 0.02 0.00 -0.19 0.02 0.00 -0.20 0.02 0.00 
Collectivism (COL) 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.16 
Left-Right -0.24 0.00 0.00 -0.23 0.01 0.00 -0.24 0.00 0.00 -0.23 0.01 0.00 
Constant 5.24 0.13 0.00 5.27 0.12 0.00 5.24 0.13 0.00 5.27 0.12 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
COL*CI       0.00 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.97 
Country Level             
Collectivism-Individualism (CI) -0.02 0.07 0.77 -0.03 0.07 0.62 -0.02 0.07 0.78 -0.03 0.07 0.63 
Size of the Government    -0.05 0.02 0.05    -0.05 0.02 0.05 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.45 0.12  0.40 0.12  0.45 0.12  0.40 0.12  
Covariance -0.02 0.02  -0.01 0.02  -0.02 0.02  -0.01 0.02  
Variance Residual 7.01 0.04   6.95 0.04   7.01 0.04   6.95 0.04   






Table 4.11. Effect of Individualism on Claiming Government Benefits Justifiable 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=84,547 N1=81,890 N1=84,547 N1=81,890 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.00 
Income -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 
Individualism (IND) -0.01 0.03 0.71 -0.01 0.03 0.77 -0.01 0.03 0.70 -0.01 0.03 0.76 
Left-Right -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 
Constant 2.27 0.12 0.00 2.29 0.12 0.00 2.27 0.12 0.00 2.29 0.12 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
IND*IC       0.01 0.02 0.58 0.01 0.02 0.61 
Country Level             
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) -0.15 0.07 0.02 -0.16 0.07 0.02 -0.16 0.07 0.02 -0.17 0.07 0.02 
Size of the Government    0.01 0.02 0.77    0.01 0.02 0.77 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  
Variance Intercept 0.40 0.11  0.41 0.12  0.40 0.11  0.41 0.12  
Covariance -0.02 0.02  -0.02 0.02  -0.02 0.02  -0.02 0.02  
Variance Residual 4.18 0.02   4.21 0.02   4.18 0.02   4.21 0.02   






Table 4.12. Effect of Collectivism on Claiming Government Benefits Justifiable 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=84,548 N1=81,891 N1=84,548 N1=81,891 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.00 
Income -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 
Collectivism (COL) -0.04 0.02 0.10 -0.03 0.02 0.17 -0.04 0.02 0.10 -0.03 0.02 0.18 
Left-Right -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 
Constant 2.27 0.12 0.00 2.29 0.12 0.00 2.27 0.12 0.00 2.29 0.12 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
COL*CI       0.01 0.01 0.40 0.01 0.01 0.33 
Country Level             
Collectivism-Individualism (CI) 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.19 0.07 0.01 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.18 0.07 0.01 
Size of the Government    0.03 0.02 0.19    0.03 0.02 0.19 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.02 0.00  0.01 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.41 0.11  0.42 0.12  0.41 0.11  0.42 0.12  
Covariance 0.00 0.02  -0.01 0.02  0.00 0.02  -0.01 0.02  
Variance Residual 4.19 0.02   4.22 0.02   4.19 0.02   4.22 0.02   






Table 4.13. Effect of Individualism on Tax Cheating Justifiable 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=83,656 N1=81,001 N1=83,656 N1=81,001 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.02 0.00 
Income 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.33 0.02 0.00 0.32 0.02 0.00 0.33 0.02 0.00 0.32 0.02 0.00 
Individualism (IND) 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 
Left-Right -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Constant 2.46 0.10 0.00 2.48 0.11 0.00 2.46 0.10 0.00 2.48 0.11 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
IND*IC       0.00 0.01 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.97 
Country Level             
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) 0.04 0.06 0.53 0.04 0.06 0.47 0.04 0.06 0.52 0.04 0.06 0.48 
Size of the Government    -0.02 0.02 0.36    -0.02 0.02 0.36 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  
Variance Intercept 0.32 0.09  0.34 0.10  0.32 0.09  0.34 0.10  
Covariance 0.01 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.01 0.01  0.02 0.01  
Variance Residual 4.79 0.02   4.82 0.02   4.79 0.02   4.82 0.02   






Table 4.14. Effect of Collectivism on Tax Cheating Justifiable 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N1=83,657 N1=81,002 N1=83,657 N1=81,002 
 N2=30 N2=29 N2=30 N2=29 
 Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Individual Level             
Employed 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.02 0.00 
Income 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Education 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.31 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.02 0.00 
Collectivism (COL) -0.17 0.03 0.00 -0.17 0.03 0.00 -0.17 0.02 0.00 -0.17 0.03 0.00 
Left-Right -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Constant 2.46 0.11 0.00 2.47 0.11 0.00 2.46 0.10 0.00 2.47 0.11 0.00 
Cross-level Interaction             
COL*CI       0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Country Level             
Collectivism-Individualism (CI) 0.02 0.06 0.78 0.02 0.06 0.71 -0.04 0.06 0.50 -0.04 0.06 0.53 
Size of the Government    0.00 0.02 0.91    0.00 0.02 0.90 
Variance Component             
Variance Slope Individualism 0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.01 0.00  0.02 0.01  
Variance Intercept 0.34 0.09  0.35 0.10  0.33 0.09  0.34 0.10  
Covariance -0.03 0.02  -0.04 0.02  -0.03 0.02  -0.03 0.02  
Variance Residual 4.77 0.02   4.79 0.02   4.77 0.02   4.79 0.02   









This dissertation is based on the two premises: First, the original rationale for the 
study of political culture is still valid. In other words, in comparative politics we need a 
unifying theoretical framework that will help bridge the gap between the individual and 
aggregate level analysis. As Almond and Verba (1963, 32) stated, “the connecting link 
between micropolitics and macropolitics is political culture.” Second, culture, specified 
as individualism and collectivism, affects an individual’s political attitude and behavior 
as internalized values at the individual level and as “human-made” environments under 
which people think and act. 
In the first chapter, I critically reviewed select political and cross-cultural 
literature to make a case why we need to study political culture and how we can enrich 
the field by introducing the constructs of individualism and collectivism, which have 
been suggested as the central organizing dimensions of culture by culture-oriented 
psychologists. In addition, I elaborated on the issues of both current political culture 
research and cross-cultural psychology that inspired this dissertation. They are: the 
overemphasis on the aggregate level approach in the political culture research, the lack of 
studies of cultural effects on political attitude and behavior in psychology, and the 




Therefore, in the empirical chapters, I aspired to show the cultural effects of 
individualism and collectivism on citizens’ political attitude and behavior disentangling 
individual level effects of cultural values from the aggregate level effects of cultural 
frames. Moreover, I attempted to maximize the external validity of the findings, which is 
difficult to claim based on 2-3 country comparison experimental studies, by drawing on 
representative samples from the five waves of World Values Survey data for thirty 
OECD countries. 
For the empirical analysis, I used multilevel modeling which has been suggested 
as most appropriate in the data analysis of comparative political behavior as well as 
cross-cultural psychology. It takes into account the fact that the observations are 
relatively homogeneous within the same cultural context and at the same time 
incorporates contextual information in the same model. 
In Chapter III, I measured the cultural effects of individualism and collectivism 
on such civic culture/social capital variables as trust, tolerance, membership, subjective 
well-being, national pride, and political interest and participation. In Chapter IV, I again 
measured the cultural effects on citizens’ attitude toward the agency and government 
responsibility attribution 
 
The Empirical Findings and Their Substantive Implications 
First, I found that culture matters. Specifically, individualism and collectivism 
mattered in the sense that they affected citizens’ political attitude and behavior. The 
independent effects of individualism and collectivism on individual’s attitude and 




individual level or as cultural frame at the cultural level, or at both. For example, 
evidence suggests that individualism at both levels affects trust, tolerance, membership, 
and political action positively while collectivistic culture affects these civic culture/social 
capital variables negatively. In contrast, individualism at the individual level affects 
national pride and political interest negatively while collectivism at the same level affects 
them positively. Individualistic culture and collectivistic cultural value affect subjective 
well-being positively while collectivism at the cultural level affects this measure of one’s 
feeling of happiness negatively. Furthermore, my analysis shows that individualism 
enhances consideration of personal agency while collectivism either at the individual 
level or at the cultural level raises consideration of collective agency.  
 Rather surprisingly, individualism and collectivism also have independent effects 
in some areas where political ideology has been suggested to have dominant influences 
such as in government responsibility for basic personal well-being. Evidence suggests 
that individualistic culture and collectivism at both levels also matter even in citizens’ 
policy preference for ownership – whether they prefer private ownership of business and 
industry or government ownership.  
Second, my analysis suggests that we need to reexamine the individual-level 
implications of some of the findings of social capital literature both theoretically and 
empirically. Many social scientists have attributed a decreasing stock of social capital to 
rising individualism, largely based on the aggregate level analysis. Evidence suggests, 
however, that individualists put more trust on outgroups and are more tolerant with even 
stigmatized groups than collectivists. The individualistic culture also seems to encourage 




capital values. Moreover, individualism is positively linked with rather difficult forms of 
political engagement such as signing a petition, joining a boycott and attending peaceful 
demonstrations, in addition to membership.  
Third, it turns out that a country is a legitimate unit of analysis in cultural studies. 
My analysis shows that there exist different cultural effects at the individual level. In 
addition, the baseline value of the mean of each dependent variable across countries is 
different. This may mean that either a higher aggregate level analysis, based on language 
or religion for example, or a within-country cultural variation analysis has its own merits 
but would not invalidate the country level approach in the study of culture. 
 
Future Avenues of Inquiry 
I will conclude this dissertation with discussion of potential future avenues of 
inquiry. First, there may exist components of the individual level measures of 
individualism and collectivism that should be excluded in operational definition in order 
to enhance the internal validity of each measure. Evidence suggests that the focus on 
family and close acquaintances characterizes collectivism and that rather abstract 
relational, group oriented values such as “tolerance and respect for other people” may not 
be relevant to the construct. Moreover, the inclusion of “religious faith” in the index 
might have inflated the degree of collectivism while “determination and perseverance” 
might have done the same to individualism. Thus, a theoretical discussion to distinguish 
the “defining attributes” and secondary attributes or consequents of individualism and 




Second, this dissertation could not test “causality” as the hypotheses in the 
analysis implied, in the absence of time-series analysis. In addition, for the same reason, 
it could not test the influence of fluctuation of such macro-level factors as economy and 
government ideology. It is likely that they might have affected or affected by, the 
variables in the both sides of the equations in the analysis of this dissertation. Now that 
we have the World Values Survey data available, which have measured individuals’ 
attitude and behavior for about thirty years, we are in a better position to implement a 
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